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ABSTRACT

Khallaf, Rana Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2016. Interactional Risks Associated with
Parties to a PPP Project. Major Professor: Makarand Hastak
Public private partnership (PPP) projects involve a variety of project governance structures.
Common among all these varied structures is the long-term contractual period between multiple
public and private entities. These entities include government, concessionaire and financier. The
increased uncertainty of a long-term contract duration coupled with the involvement of multiple
actors proves to be a challenge to developing risk mitigation strategies in PPP. Therefore, it is
necessary to systematically collect, assess and frame the risks associated with these projects and
explore associated dynamics. There has been a recent shift towards focusing on interactions of
parties due to shared risks. Exploring the interactions among the parties in risk and renegotiation
scenarios can help in understanding and mapping out the potential outcomes and multiple
strategies for each party. The main objectives of this dissertation are: 1) Establish risks affecting
PPPs: Macro, Market and Project level; 2) Identify timeline for the identified risks where they
occur in or affect a project phase; 3) Analyze three-party interactions in the context of identified
risks as well as renegotiation scenarios; and 4) Develop a model to quantify the
actions/interactions between parties and the resulting outcome. This is tackled through the use of
techniques such as Systematic Literature Review (SLR) and Delphi Technique to create a
framework/model to assess risks in PPP projects. Following that scenario analysis, three-party
interactional analysis and simulation were conducted to model the risk and renegotiation
scenarios and analyze the range of potential outcomes for parties to the risk.

xi
This combined approach can help planners to prepare for a range of complex and uncertain
scenarios. This dissertation extends the current literature by (i) integrating the framing of the risks
with their modeling and simulation, and (ii) expanding the analysis of interactions to three parties
in risk and renegotiation scenarios. Two case studies are conducted to showcase the proposed
framework. This framework can be used by any party to a PPP project to assess risks and
simulate risk scenarios to understand the outcome of the different strategies available. This can be
used to propose mitigation strategies for each party. Interactional analysis, as proposed in this
dissertation, has been introduced to simulate three-party interactions specifically in PPP risk
scenarios. However, it can be further applied to other three-party situations in different project
delivery methods such as for Integrated Project Deliver (IPD).
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1. INTRODUCTION

Public Private Partnerships added up to $450 billion dollars worth of projects worldwide from
1985 to 2004 (Ho 2006). This form of project delivery involves many parties closely working
together to address challenges related to infrastructure development. Konchar and Sanvido (1998)
studied three forms of project delivery systems: construction management at risk, design build,
and design bid build and reported that design build showed better results than others in terms of
higher project delivery speed and improved cost by eliminating the separate bid process for each
phase and combining them into one. PPP projects are in part design-build with the addition of the
operation phase. Since the PPP organization consists of various parties, it faces risks associated
with the interaction of the internal and external parties manifested in the project that could result
in delays or cost overruns or both. The escalation of these problems causes project modifications,
halting of work and sometimes even the cancellation of projects. These problems manifest
themselves in one of the major risks that face PPP projects, renegotiation.

1.1 Problem Statement
PPP projects are necessary to address the increasing challenges associated with infrastructure
development. The application of PPP has faced increasing challenges that require the study of
risks in every stage of a PPP project with respect to the country-level, market-level and projectlevel as well. Along with that, this unique project structure presents distinctive interactions
between parties that dictate how projects progress. PPP projects face technical complexities as
well as organizational complexities that are manifested in the actions of each party separately and
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in their interactions together (Dehornoy 2012). One of the most common risks facing PPP
projects is renegotiation of the contract as presented by previous studies (Guasch et al. 2007;
Guasch and Straub 2008; Engel et al. 2009; Nikolaidis and Roumboutsous 2013; Guasch et al.
2014; Cruz et al. 2014). These renegotiations are affected by the relationship and interactions of
the parties involved, which affect the negotiation outcome. No previous work has been done to
relate interactional effects of parties in PPP projects within situations of renegotiation. No work
has also focused on the timeline of risk occurrence and how it might cascade into other phases of
the project. Additionally, previous work has only focused on the public and private party in a
negotiation scenario without taking into perspective the effect of outside parties such as the
general public in instigating or altering renegotiations.

1.2 Research Questions and Thesis
Renegotiations are a common risk in PPP projects considering the complexity of the network of
these projects including the actors and their interactions. Analysis of these interactions in the
context of renegotiations may provide insights such as the patterns in the nature of dynamics
between actors in common renegotiation scenarios. Analysis of interactions in terms of power
relations can reduce the recurrence of renegotiations, increase the chances of settlement, and
ultimately impact the project lifecycle.
Thesis
A PPP project involves multiple actors and their resulting interactions, which leads to a complex
set of project lifecycle risks. Study of the interactions among multiple parties to a risk can assist
in analyzing the outcome of the project lifecycle risk thereby increasing the chances of settlement
and reducing multiple renegotiations.

3
1.3 Research Objective
The objectives of this research can be divided into four parts:
1

Create a risk registry for risks affecting PPP projects under: Macro, Market and Project
level.

2

Identify high risks and the timeline for the identified risks where they might occur or
affect a project phase.

3

Identify parties to various risk scenarios in PPP projects.

4

Analyze three-party interactions in the context of identified risks, develop a model to
quantify the actions/interactions between parties and the resulting outcome and propose
mitigation strategies based on results of the model.

1. Create a risk registry for
PPP projects and model to
assess risks (ICRAM-PPP)

2. ID and map high risks
according to project using the
Delphi technique

4. Interactional analysis of
risk/renegotiation scenarios

3. ID parties involved in
cases of renegotiations or
high risks

Figure 1.1 Flowchart showing Research Objectives
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1.4 Research Scope
The scope of this research can be divided into two main areas:
In terms of project type: the focus of this research is on public private partnership projects and
complexity that ensues from the long engagement between the public and private entities as well
as the effect of external entities on the project.
In terms of analysis: the focus of this research is on three-party interactional analysis in the
context of risk associated with the project that might lead to renegotiation of the contractual terms
between the project stakeholders/parties to the contract.

1.5 Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 presents the literature review for this dissertation. It starts by defining public-privatepartnership projects and moves along to discuss its types, advantages and the challenges faced by
PPP projects. It then introduces risk analysis in PPP projects, the International Construction Risk
Assessment Model (ICRAM), scenario planning, and interactional analysis. Chapter 3 lays out
the framework for the methodology followed in this dissertation and briefly discusses the
objectives. Chapter 4 presents the approach used to create the International Construction Risk
Assessment Model for Public Private Partnership projects (ICRAM-PPP). Chapter 5 presents the
Indiana Toll Road project and Tanzania Railway project case studies. It ties all the work
performed in the dissertation through a case study approach. It starts with the application of
ICRAM-PPP for the Indiana Toll Road in order to assess the high risks affecting the project and
one of these high risks is then chosen to propose the interactional analysis framework for threeparty interactions in a risk scenario. This is also performed for the Tanzania Railway project in
the context of renegotiation and shown in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and
recommendations for future work.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1
2.1.1

Public-Private Partnership Projects
Definition of Public Private Partnerships

PPP is defined as a venture between public and private entities for the delivery of a service
combining design, build, finance, operate, maintain and lease or transfer (Pallister and Law
2006). It is a long-term contract where the government pays the private sector for the construction
and/or delivery of a service (Chhun 2014). The period of contract can range from 10 to 30 years
and sometimes can even reach 99 years.
Some projects are successful in reaching the set goals while the majority of projects
deviate and may even fail. Success of projects can be attributed to various factors, out of which
reacting to conditions such as political and economic disruptions is vital (Ashley et al. 1998). Li
et al. (2005) discuss the critical success factors in PPP projects in the UK, which include risk
allocation and creation of a management framework as the top two factors. These two factors can
be addressed through the study of the high risks facing PPP projects with a focus on the
interaction between the parties. The success of PPP projects is also dependent on the
compatibility and similarity between the public and private parties’ goals. The government’s
goals include completing the project with minimal disruptions, within quality standards and with
minimum cost. The private party supports these goals but additionally includes goals like dealing
with minimum interference from the government and collecting enough profit during the
operational phase (Rebeiz 2012). According to a World Bank report that studied over 60 projects
in more than 35 developing countries, the framework for successful PPP projects consists of three

6
interconnected parts: economic, politics and execution (World Bank Report February 2014). A
project must prove a strong economic standing, political support from the right sectors/levels and
an adequacy of preparatory work (such as feasibility study) in order to be successful.
PPP projects were first introduced in the UK and amounted to £11 billion from 1992 to
1999 (Li et al. 2005). As of 2012, over 550 PPP projects were signed in England alone worth £46
billion (European PPP Expertise Center 2012). PPP projects have since then spread to developed
countries as a way to benefit from private sector expertise and to manage risks. PPP has also
spread to developing countries such as Egypt and has been increasing throughout the years.
According to the World Bank, Egypt procured $23 billion dollars of investments in PPP projects
from 1990 to 2013 and the number of new projects has been increasing since then (The World
Bank Group 2014). These projects are bound to face risks especially with the political instabilities
since 2011. In order to minimize their effects promptly, a model is needed that would map the
risks in PPP projects and study interactions of parties involved in order to establish mitigation
strategies.
2.1.2

Parties involved

There are a number of parties involved in PPP projects, which can be divided into internal
and external or public and private. Common parties include: owner or government, developer,
financier,

sponsor,

supplier,

architect,

subcontractors,

contractors,

non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), media, authorities and regulatory bodies, politicians, workers, end-users
and experts (Jooste and Levitt 2009). The private party can also either be a single firm offering
construction and engineering services or can be a concession or consortium of firms such as
construction, engineering, manufacturing, and financiers (Rebeiz 2012). This consortium is also
referred to sometimes as a special purpose vehicle or SPV (Demirag et al. 2011). The public party
can be the government or a set of legal bodies in the country (Martins et al. 2010, Koch and
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Buser, 2006). Jooste et al. (2011) also introduced the classification of these parties as a ‘PPP
enabling field’, which consists of the public, private and non-profit organizations that aim to
promote the development of PPP projects. All these parties interact throughout the multiple
phases of the projects in negotiations, clarifications of conflicts, opposition and decision-making.
Zou (2012) divided relationships into the hard side consisting of contractual complexity and
contract management and the soft side consisting of trust and commitment.

Table 2.1 Goals of Public Sector Vs. Private Sector
Public Sector
Vague and unclear
Towards their own goals
Reactive
Politically constrained
Not very clear at all times
Closed
Input-focused
High
Based on a system
High
Formal
Interactions through written memos

Agent-principal relationship
Focus/orientation
Management
Management style
Level of constraint
Clearness
Goals
System style
Orientation
Unionization
Labor
Salary
Security of employees
Communication Style
Communication
Communication Style
and Reporting
Level of sophistication of
Systems
Underdeveloped
management systems
Geographically constrained
Location
Nature and
National
Orientation
Location of Entity
Limited
Diversification
(Source: Adapted from Jamali 2004 and Shafritz and Hyde 1997)

Private Sector
Clear
Towards the market
Proactive
Less constrained
More clear, towards profit
Open and adaptable
Output-focused
Low
Based on market and performance
Low
Less formal
Interactions more direct
Developed and strong
Geographically unconstrained
International
Open and adaptable based on market
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PPP projects face several risks and interactions that are unique due to their different set-up.
Different strategic and operating goals emerge due to the differences between the parties since
one is publicly owned while the other is privately owned (Zou 2012). Table 2.1 shows a
comparison between the public and private sectors with regards to their internal structure and
goals. It can be seen that both parties have different outlooks in many areas such as management
and goals. These differences may cause risks to manifest and even heighten the outcomes at
times.
According to the World Bank, poor risk management is one of the main reasons behind
infrastructure project delays, which can be attributed to the relationship between the public and
private sectors (Zhang 2005; Heravi and Hajihosseini 2012). The most important relationship in a
PPP project is between the public and private sector and plays a massive role in the success or
failure of the project (Zou 2012). External parties like the general public can also affect this
relationship. The focus on interactions has been recently seen as an important and necessary shift
from the focus on actors themselves (Helbing 2013; Naderpajouh and Hastak 2014). These
interactions are pivotal in determining the progress of the project. An example is opposition from
the public or through a media campaign, which can stop a project, or lead to extensive
renegotiations whereas a project supported by the public or by NGOs can run more smoothly.
2.1.3

PPP Types

PPP projects include a combination of several phases including design, construction,
finance, operation, maintenance and transfer. Hence, there are many variations under PPP
contracts. These types vary in terms of the level of involvement of the government in financing
and operation and the risk sharing between the parties. These variations are presented below (Ho
2006, Chhun 2014).
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- Procurement: in this form of delivery, the private party is contracted for the procurement phase
only with the government controlling the project. This limits the involvement of the private party
and the risks they assume.
- Management: this form of project delivery is similar to the procurement form with the shifting
of some operation processes to the private party. Adding more responsibilities to the private
entity increases the risks they assume or share with the public entity.
- Lease: the private party leases the infrastructure for a specific period. Risks assumed/shared by
the private party are typically higher under leasing than in the previous types.
- Concession: in this type of PPP delivery method, the private party is responsible for the design,
construction, finance, operation and maintenance of the infrastructure and then transferring it
back to the government at the end of the concession period. There are different variations to the
concession such as: BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer), PFI (Private Finance Initiative), BTO, BOO
(Build-Operate-Own), DBFO (Design-Build-Finance-Operate), DBOM (Design-Build-OperateMaintain).
- Divestiture: in this delivery method, the private party fully controls the infrastructure as the
ownership is transferred to it from the public sector. The public sector sells its shares or assets to
the private entity, which is usually required to have a license to operate the asset. In case license
is revoked (under a contract breach), the private entity can no longer own the asset and should sell
it to a new operator.
- Maintenance and operation contracts are usually used for existing facilities such as highways
and trains or subway lines. Risks borne by the private entity are limited in this delivery method
due to their limited involvement in the project.
PPP projects can also be divided into two categories based on the project itself. They can
either be new construction or maintenance and operation. New construction includes greenfield
and brownfield projects. A greenfield project is a new construction on a new and previously
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unused land whereas a brownfield project is constructed on a previously used land so demolition
of the old structure is sometimes necessary. Examples of maintenance and operation contracts are
highway projects.
The European Commission divided PPP projects into two types: contractual PPP projects
and institutionalized PPP projects (Martins et al. 2010). Contractual PPP projects are those where
both parties are bound by the contract only whereas in institutionalized PPP projects, both parties
may join to form one entity and a different governance model is created (Martins et al. 2010).
Institutionalization of PPP projects refers to the creation of a central government
office/entity responsible for overseeing and promoting PPP projects through the formation of a
PPP unit that aims to target projects that are proposed for delivery using PPP projects (Mrak
2006). Benefits of having a PPP unit include aiding in negotiations between the public and private
sector, decreasing transaction costs, creating standardized structures and procedures, acting as a
liaison between the PPP project parties and both the general public and other ministries in the
country. There are three types of institutionalization models: centralized, decentralized and mixed
(Mrak 2006). In the centralized model, a new governmental entity is formed for addressing PPP
projects so any new projects have to receive approval from it first. This can create problems since
every ministry would have to go through this entity especially for funds. At the other end of the
spectrum is the decentralized model where each ministry or government body deals with their
own PPP projects. So the department of public works would be involved for a project under their
sector. The most common model is the mixed model, which combines benefits from the other two
models. Here a central PPP entity is created as well as an entity for each sector with the common
goal of coordinating functions in PPP projects (Mrak 2006).
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2.1.4

Advantages of PPP projects

Garvin (2010) discussed the opportunities and challenges of applying PPP projects for
transportation in the United States. Ahmadjian and Collura (2012) presented a four-step process
for assessing the benefits, costs, and other impacts associated with the use of PPP projects.
When operated effectively and correctly, PPP projects can be successful and can lead to
speedy project delivery and reduced costs. In the Express Lanes project in Orange County,
California, the government saved $250M due to shifting the development, operation and
maintenance to the private sector (Chhun 2014).

Table 2.2 shows some of the important

advantages of using PPP as a delivery method as compiled from various literature. As shown, the
main benefit is in introducing the private party to the project thus reducing the investment of the
public and the risks they accept and increasing the efficiency of the final product.
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Table 2.2 Advantages of PPP projects

Advantages
Risk sharing with the private sector
Use of additional resources from the private sector
Lower costs borne by public
Increased efficiency
Exposure to new techniques from the private sector
Improve the delivery of services
Utilize assets in a more efficient manner
Probability of cost overruns is significantly lower
Long-term investment planning rather than short-term
Higher value for money (compared to traditional
contracting)
Relieve state funds
Reduce debt

Grimsey
and
Lewis
2002
X

Jamali
2004

Martins
et al.
2010

Reside
and
Mendoza
2010

Tan
et al.
2012

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Sambrani
2014

X
X

X
X

Chhun
2014

X
X

X
X
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2.1.5

Challenges associated with PPP projects

There are a number of challenges that affect PPP projects worldwide such as opportunism,
complexity of projects and lack of coordination, communication or trust between parties. These
challenges can be divided into three areas: contractual, relational, and financial.
Contractual: One challenge that affects PPP projects is incomplete contracts, which later
manifests as a risk. MacNeil (1974) suggested a classification of contracts based on the level of
completeness and divided them into classical, neoclassical and relational. Classical contracts are
usually strict contracts that do not account for contingencies and are thus not commonly used for
PPP projects (Chan 2010). Neo-classical contracts are an extension of the classical type with
added benefits like risk scenarios and action and compensation plans which is a reason why this
type of contract is widely used for PPP projects, since it addresses uncertainty. This type of
contract includes some measures for avoiding or mitigating risks but does not include every
possible scenario otherwise the added costs (i.e. costs related to making changes or additions to
the contract) would be too high (Naderpajouh 2013). The last type, the relational contract
provides a general outline of the terms of the relationship and does not include specifics so it
relies on trust between parties and thus is not widespread in PPP projects (Chan 2010). Other
contractual challenges include: (Ismail and Harris 2015, Ullah 2014)
Lack of guidelines pertaining to PPP projects
Lack of evaluation measures
Absence of clear roles of each party
Minimal involvement of the general public
Lengthy negotiations
Relational: These challenges manifest due to the relationship between parties and their distinct
goals and objectives. Coordination between “heterogeneous parties” with different profit
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orientations is a difficult task (Tiwari 2012). One important challenge is opportunism, which is
described as “self-interest seeking with guile” (Ping et al. 2015). Opportunistic behavior can be
instigated by the public, private or third parties. The private party may enter the contract through
a low bid if they know that they can renegotiate later on and seek some of the amount they had
initially cut off from their bid. They may also renegotiate throughout the project stages to gain
more shares of the project and enhance their financial standing. According to Brux (2009) and
Alcazar et al. (2002), the winner of the bidding process for a water concession project in Buenos
Aires was the bidder who had the highest confidence in renegotiating the contract afterwards. The
private party is usually confident in renegotiating if they feel the government is at a weaker
position or is less knowledgeable. This weak position can be seen in case of approaching
elections, instability of the relationship between the government and general public,
government’s fear of project bankruptcy or public opinion, and inexperienced or naïve
government. The second potential instigator is the government. According to Vernon (1971), the
“obsolescing bargain” is the reason behind government-led renegotiations usually occurring after
the construction period. After the construction is complete, the government is no longer as
dependent on the private party as in the beginning of the project hence their agreement becomes
obsolete or of less value to the government (Chan 2010). This makes the government feel
powerful during that stage and more likely to instigate renegotiations and think more
opportunistically. The third probable party of opportunistic behavior is the third parties such as
certain groups of interest or political opponents (Spiller 2008, Brux 2009). Lack of commitment
and trust among parties is also a barrier to PPP projects.
Financial: One challenge that faces many construction projects but can escalate in PPP projects
due to its different set-up is cost overrun. Cost overruns were reported in many PPP projects and
have reached 600% (NAO 1999a, Ahadzi and Bowles 2004). Debt is also usually encountered
before any project profits materialize which affects projects financially.
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2.1.6

Cases of PPP failure

Reside and Mendoza (2010) studied PPP projects in Asia and presented the number of
failed projects per country with China having the highest number of 36 failed projects (out of
727) followed by Indonesia with 11 (out of 83) and Malaysia with 7 (out of 104) failed projects.
However, if we compare the percentage of failure with respect to the total number of projects,
Indonesia’s percentage of failure would be the highest with 13.25% while China’s percentage
would only be 4.95% (Reside and Mendonza 2010). An example is the NAIA 3 (Ninoi Aquino
International Airport) terminal in the Philippines, which was a BOT project, signed in 2007
(Reside and Mendoza 2010). A legal dispute arose between the contractor and government
regarding the contract and escalated leading to the Philippine Supreme Court nullifying the
contract and the contractor seeking arbitration from international organizations.
Another case of project failure is the Da Chang WFOE (wholly foreign-owned enterprise)
project that was for building a water treatment plant. In 2002, a few years after signing the
contract, a change in the government policy aimed at changing the fixed rate of return led the
private company to negotiate with the government to reach an agreement about the new changes
(Choi et al. 2009). However, the negotiations failed and the private company sold its assets to the
“Shanghai Shibei (Northern City) Water Treatment Corporation” (Choi et al. 2009). Hence, many
renegotiations and projects fail due to the way different parties react to changes, propose changes
and interact together.

2.2
2.2.1

Risk Analysis
Risks in PPP Projects

According to Chhun (2014), the four factors that affect the efficiency of PPP projects are:
economic, procurement, governance, and risk. Chhun (2014) has defined economics is an
important issue because one of the drivers for PPP projects is relieving the burden on public funds
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where the private entity usually arranges for the financing for the project through bank loans or
pension funds. The second factor, procurement includes factors specifically related to the PPP
procurement/delivery method. For example, opportunistic behavior of parties is a factor that
plagues PPP projects, which often leads to contract renegotiation. Another example of
opportunistic behavior is if the government cuts tariffs to secure votes in a reelection. In order to
reduce these negative occurrences, parties seek to craft a contract that contains terms that would
restrict these acts such as opportunistic behavior. However, it is extremely difficult, costly and
almost impossible to include all contingencies in a contract thus some unspecified items remain
that may lead way to a contract renegotiation by either party. This is referred to as a result of the
incomplete contract problem. Many construction projects suffer from the incomplete contract
issue, however, with PPP projects this can be magnified more due to the longer contract duration.
Governance relates to the creation of agencies to establish and monitor each party’s role in a PPP
project to maximize efficiency and minimize risk. The last factor is risk. Risks are prevalent in
PPP projects and can emerge from the synergies between project participants (Chhun 2014).
Risks that have affected PPP projects include default of the concessionaire in the Sydney
Airport Rail Link project, refusal of the bank to loan the concessionaire in the Channel Tunnel
Rail Link project in the United Kingdom and high interest loans on the private debt in the Taiwan
High Speed Rail project, all of which forced the government to take charge of the projects
(Dehornoy 2012). Another risk is low ridership during the operation phase as compared to the
forecast, which faced the Seoul Airport Rail Link project (Dehornoy 2012). Lack of legislation is
risk that faced the Poland A1 Toll Motorway project so it took seven years for the government
and private to finally sign an agreement after having to make changes to the initial construction
framework (Cuttaree 2008). Other contractual complexities caused problems for the Netherlands
High Speed Railway Line project due to the complex contract signed (Cuttaree 2008). When
these risks manifest, the parties usually go through negotiations to reach an agreement on how to
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handle these events. These types of risks/negotiations are the focus of this research in order to
understand the synergies between parties and how to address the ensuing emergent issues that led
to different project outcomes.
Ashley and Bonner (1987) define political risk sources as a set of factors (i) stemming out of
the firm itself: relationship of the firm to the government, local power groups and local businesses
and (ii) outside factors affecting the firm: public attitude towards firm and project and other
external factors. These are only one type of risks facing projects. Other risks include economic
factors, social factors or regional. Risks can be divided according to type such as “planning and
design, construction, accessibility, technological, performance, demand, financial, legal and force
majeure” (Martins et al. 2010). Another method, which is followed in this research, is to divide
risks according to the level that they occur in, either project, market or global level. Mahalingam
(2010) divided nine important risks that face Indian PPP projects into three categories:
institutional, organizational and project. Table 2.3 below shows the risks affecting PPP projects
that were collected through literature review.

Table 2.3 Risks in PPP projects
Risks in PPP Projects

Area

Source

-Residual value risk
-Technology risk
-Tendering cost risks
-Debt risk
-Land acquisition risk

PFIs

Akintoye
et al. 1998

Political risks:
PPP projects in Sachs et
-Unreasonable guarantees by the government
China
al. 2007
-Decisions by local government official to satisfy their short-term
needs that might oppose the local government’s long-term goals
-Increase of the national debts
-Dependence of investors on government’s promises
-Corruption
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-Absence of national PPP law
-Lack of standardized models for PPP projects
-Poor decision-making of the public
-Changes in construction regulations
-Archaeological findings
-Project’s financial attractiveness
-Innovation in construction techniques

PPP projects in Roumbout
Greece
sos and
Anagnosto
poulos
2008

-Cost overrun
-Maintenance problems (such as need for more maintenance
frequently)
-Lack of coordination between parties
-Improper distribution of responsibilities or authorities
-Differences between parties in methods
-Changes to policies regarding rates of return
-Restrictions to refinancing schemes
-Difficulty in changing tariffs/other agreement about price
-Limited availability of domestic loans for long-term projects

Water projects Choi et al.
in China
2009

-Parties’ commitment
-Parties’ risk management practices
-Instability in the industry
-Uniqueness of project
-Complex project design
-Complex project construction
-Complex project operation/maintenance
-Bidding competition
-Duration of concession
-Flexible project contract
-Established dispute resolution mechanism
-Inadequate regulations related to PPP infrastructures

PPP
infrastructure
projects

Jin
and
Zhang
2010

-Unexpectedly low demand
-Competition
-Risks from supporting utilities
-Corruption
-Subcontractor insolvency
-Site safety
-Labor/material shortage
-Facility condition

PPP projects in Ke et al.
China
2010
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-Poor decision-making in political areas
-Ground conditions
-Supply risks
-Lack of competition in the bidding phase
-Limited concession experience regarding PPP projects
-Political reneging
-“Macroeconomic fluctuations in currency/purchasing power”
-Project governance
-Lack of policies/legislation
-Lack of trust between parties
-Presence of many agencies that are required for approval
-Defining specific outputs
-Accidents
-Expropriation
-Licenses
-Uncertainty regarding the quality required during maintenance

Infrastructure
Mahalinga
projects
in m 2010
India

Wind Power
project in
Portugal

-Tariff freeze for roadway projects
Infrastructure
-Policy volatility
projects in Asia
-Economic volatility
-Contracting with local government instead of federal
government
-A small number of veto players in the government which would
lead to volatility in decision-making, policymaking and
investment decisions
-Planning
-Traffic revenue and demand forecast (transport projects)
-Long-term preservation/maintenance of the asset
-Regulatory risks
-Life-cycle cost
-Method for payment

Martins et
al. 2010

Reside
and
Mendoza
2010

Transportation Chhun
projects in the 2014
US

Researchers have agreed that risks should be assigned to the party better equipped at handling
them. Risks assumed by the private party are those related to the phases in which it operates such
as construction and operation activities while the public sector assumes risks related to political
changes, permits and environmental risks (Chhun 2014). A small number of veto players in the
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government would lead to volatility in decision-making, policymaking and investment decisions
since a smaller number of people would be in control of the decisions so it would be easier to
steer them in a certain direction. Contracting with the local government is riskier as opposed to
contracting with the federal government, which has more experience and is more competent. This
is seen in the case of higher project failures in China that are contracted with the local
government (Reside and Mendoza 2010). Political instability can occur due to a number of
reasons such as transitions between governments or political figures, lack of set/clear legislations
or regulatory risks.
2.2.2

ICRAM

ICRAM-I, the “International Construction Risk Assessment Model” is a model that
assesses risks for international projects by classifying risks into three categories: country, market
and project levels. The three levels form a hierarchy with the country or macro level at the top
followed by the market level and then the project level. Thus, the higher level, the country level,
can impact the lower level, the market or project levels. ICRAM-1 contains seventy-three risks
gathered through literature review and discussions with experts, which are put under the
corresponding country, project or market level. The user then establishes weightings for each risk
factor using a combination of the Analytic Hierarchy Process and the pairwise comparison
method. The results of the analysis are high-risk indicators, risk analysis for the project and the
impact of the country and market on the project (Hastak and Shaked 2000). Table 2.4 shows the
73 risks presented in ICRAM-1.
However, ICRAM is a general model for international projects and thus needs to be
modified in order to address PPP projects specifically. It only identifies the risks associated with a
project at the macro, market, and project levels but does not take into consideration the
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interactions between parties to the risk and how these interactions might affect the risk outcomes
(Naderpajouh 2013). Chapter 4 discusses the modified model, ICRAM-PPP.
Table 2.4 Risks from ICRAM
Hierarchy and Analysis of Macro (Country) Level Risk Indicators

Host government
Operational
risk

Economic & financial

Administration

External causes

Political
risk

Internal causes

Symptoms of instability

Political continuity
Attitude toward foreign investors and profit
Nationalization/expropriation
Enforceability of contracts
Government incentives
Monetary inflation
Economic growth
Bureaucratic delays
Communication and transportation
Professional services other than construction
Hostilities with neighboring country or region
Dependence on or importance of major power
Fragmented political structure
Fractionalization by language, ethnic, and regional
groups
Restraints to retaining power
Mentality, including nationalism, corruption, and
dishonesty
Social conditions (e.g., population density & wealth
distribution)
Societal conflicts (e.g., demonstrations, strikes, & street
violence)
Instability because of nonconstitutional changes

Financial
risk

Legal framework

Actual laws versus practices for repatriation of capital

Foreign exchange
generation

Current account balance
Capital flow
Foreign exchange reserves
Gold and other reserves
Debt as GDP converted to U.S. dollars
Capacity service debt

International reserves
Foreign debt assessment
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Budget performance

Extent of deficit/surplus
Sources of revenue and major spending

Hierarchy and Analysis of Construction Market Level Risk Indicators

Technology

Investor’s technological advantage
Technology protection system
Market suitability for advanced technology
Availability of basic construction/
Technologies and equipment

Contracts and
legal
requirements

Type of partnership
Types of contracts
Enforceability of construction contract
Procedure for bidding and design approvals

Resources

Availability and quality of local contractors
Availability of construction materials
Availability of skilled and unskilled workers
Labor cost/productivity
Availability of equipment and parts

Financing

Medium and long term financing for construction projects
Tax and nontax incentives in construction industry
Special construction industry index

Business cultural
differences

Market potential

Interaction of foreign management with local contractors
A/E/C firms client or owner relationship
Competitive/negotiated bidding
Current market volume in core competency
Future market volume in core competency
Bidding volume index

Hierarchy and Analysis of Project Level Risk Indicators
Technology

Problems in technology transfer and implementation
Retention of technological advantage

Contracts and
legal issues

Possibility of contractual disputes
Problems in dispute settlement due to country’s laws

Resources

Shortage of skilled and unskilled workers
Availability of special equipment
Delays in material supply
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Design

Delay in design and regulatory approvals
Defective design, error, and rework
Work change order
Difficulties to meet construction programs
Unforeseen adverse ground conditions

Quality

Bad quality of materials
Bad quality of workmanship

Financial

Financing difficulties because of tax or capital movement restrictions
Financial difficulties because of currency exchange rate
Drop in project revenue
Difficulty in converting local currency to foreign exchange

Construction

Construction manager

and cultural
indicators

Third party delays
Safety

Other

Weather conditions and other natural causes of delay
Physical damage to project by riots, terrorist act, and so forth

Several case studies were collected to see the risks that impacted them. Table 2.5 shows three
case studies and identifies risks that affected them.

Project

Table 2.5 Case studies where risks occurred
Risks

Reference

Central Greece
Motorway (E65)

Severe downgrade of sovereign debt
Decrease in traffic estimates
Change in governing party (delayed project signing by
5 years)
Greek financial crisis
Lack of renegotiation clauses in the contract (led to a 3
year renegotiation process)
Political instability
Leadership of the Public Works Ministry changed 5
times during the renegotiation process
Complex decision-making process due to an added
party to the structure resulting from the financial crisis
(EU officials were involved in overseeing the
restructuring process)
Change in project scope
Delay in land acquisition

Roumboutsos et
al. 2014

Aegean

Economic crisis
Drop in purchasing power

Roumboutsos et
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Motorway

The
Buenos
Aires
Concession
(Aguas
Argentinas)

Increase in toll fees
Increase in VAT
Insecurity in the employment sector
Drop in traffic and subsequently in revenue
Lower revenue than forecasted
Violations and non-payment from toll-users
Public unrest and demonstrations
Lack of liquidity of the financial institutions
Administrative delays (delayed the construction about
3 years)
Weak regulator
Service expansion targets that were difficult to
achieve
Political instability
Public opposition

2.2.3

al. 2014

Water
and
Sanitation
Program-South
Asia 2001

Renegotiations: Definition and Causes

Parties enter into a partnership in order to deal with risks and uncertainties in the project
jointly instead of having to rewrite the contract whenever a change occurs (Zou 2012). An
important risk that is inevitable in projects is renegotiation. Renegotiations occur in PPP projects
regardless of their sector, duration and location. A renegotiation can be defined as a change in the
original contract signed by the parties. It is a severe risk that occurs in many projects and can be
triggered by the occurrence of other risks. Examples of such triggers include modifications to the
originally agreed upon contract terms such as reduction/increase in the level of service, contract
extension, reduction/increase in tariffs and changes in the financial agreement (Guasch et al.
2014). Other causes include changes in the risk-sharing mechanism between the parties and
changes in project scope such as additions to the contract. However, in cases where changes are
written in the contract, such as tariff adjustment they are not considered renegotiation cases
(Guasch et al. 2014). After renegotiation, both parties agree on a new contract with the added
terms such as extension of time, additional payments or changed scope.
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Renegotiations affect all parties such as the government, private sector and general public.
Consequences of renegotiations include (Guasch et al. 2014):
Higher costs to the government
Loss of government credibility
Public opposition to changes made
Public boycotting the project
Renegotiations can lead to an extension in contract duration, certain tax exemptions, or extra
subsidy from the government (Ho 2006). Guasch et al. (2014) suggested that the average
percentages of renegotiations occur in the construction phase 55% of the time and after the
construction phase 45% of the time for the countries they studied. However, they did not give
details as to when exactly they occurred or if it was a cascading risk or not. No previous research
has focused on risk outcomes and if the risk was eliminated or resolved after the renegotiation or
if caused more problems afterward. Renegotiations can either be seen as a risk that affects
projects or as a consequence of other risks that occur. In this research, renegotiation is looked at
as an outcome or consequence of other risks occurring.
2.3

Scenario Planning

A scenario is defined as a possible outcome of what might happen (Porter 1985, Chermack 2004,
Bartholomew 2007). Scenario analysis is a method used to forecast future events based on a
systematic process where the outcome is a “set of possible futures” (Schnaars 1987). According
to Rachmatullah et al. (2007), scenario planning consists of three distinct phases: “writing,
analysis and decision-making”. The first step, decision writing, consists of five steps as shown
below (Zegras et al. 2004).

27

Step 1: Identify scope

Step 2: Identify factors affecting the outcome

Step 3: Identify driving forces that affect the factors (from step 2)

Step 4: Develop combinations of the driving forces that lead to
scenarios

Step 5: Create scenarios

Figure 2.1 Steps needed to perform Scenario Planning
Various researches have applied scenario planning in their studies to follow a systematic
path. Rachmatullah et al. (2007) used scenario planning to create an electricity supply plan for
Indonesia. Zegras at al. (2004) studied scenario planning for transportation planning.
Bartholomew (2007) reviewed eighty scenario planning projects in “land-use transportation” and
reported on its importance in engaging the public to receive their approval on the projects.
Scenario planning is used in this research to look at all possible angles of a risk scenario and
simulate them to look at patterns of outcomes and reach best scenarios. These scenarios are used
in the interactional analysis to study the outcomes of these risks.
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2.4

2.4.1

Interactional Analysis

Interactional Analysis applications in negotiations

There are several modeling/simulation techniques available such as agent-based modeling,
system dynamics and game theory. Table 2.7 shows some of the previous research conducted on
negotiations using different modeling techniques.
Table 2.7 Previous Research showing modeling techniques for negotiations
Source
De

Clerck

Description of work
and Used Game theory to depict a bidding model for a PPP project

Demeulemeester
(2016)
Zhu et al. (2016)

Used bargaining game theory, time-dependent tactics, and a leaning
approach to analyze the negotiation of debt terms between a bank and a
sponsor in PPP projects

Leu et al. (2014)

Used Bayesian theory to analyze the opponent's historical offers and
approximately predict the opponent's preference over procurement price
negotiations

Xiong and Zhang Used Time-Series models to develop a renegotiation framework and
concession model to study “toll adjustment, contract extension, and

(2014)

annual subsidy” for PPP projects
Carneiro

et

al. Applied case-based reasoning to propose an online dispute resolution

(2013)

mechanism in legal cases

Xue et al. (2005)

Proposed an agent-based multi-attribute negotiation framework for
supply chain coordination issues. They also commented that simulating
behaviors was a challenge and limitation in their research
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Used case-based reasoning and multi-attribute utility theory to model

Sycara (1990)

labor negotiations
Zlotkin

and Applied game theory to multi-agent negotiation

Rosenschein (1989)

Literature has agreed that the best method to model negotiations or interactions between
parties is game theory. In this research, game theory has been chosen to apply interactional
analysis because it is the optimal method to model interactions between parties as it focuses on
actions and payoffs of players in a game. It is based on the interactions of parties in a situation
where each of them has a set of actions/counter-actions that they can take. These actions dictate
what their payoff is based on how the game proceeds.
Game theory frameworks or models consist of three main aspects: “players, strategies and
payoffs” (Glumac et al 2015). Game theory can be used to portray the opponents’ behavior,
strategy and payoff for each move they make (Ho 2006). It can be used to solve situations of
conflict by estimating the “equilibrium point of conflict” (Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos 2008). It
can portray both competitive and cooperative behavior of players. Game theory has been used in
various fields such as psychology, economics and political science. Parsons and Wooldridge
(2002) state seven important properties of frameworks for multi-agent interactions:
Guaranteed success: when an agreement is ensured to happen. This is reached through
Nash equilibrium in game theory where Nash equilibrium represents the best-case
solution for all parties so they do not have any incentive to deviate from it.
Maximizing social welfare: when the negotiation result maximizes the aggregate utility
of all actors.
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Pareto efficiency: occurs in the absence of another outcome that would increase an
actor’s utility without reducing another actor’s utility
Individual rationality: when rationality of all actors’ is the best strategy for all of them to
play.
Stability: such as Nash Equilibrium.
Simplicity: when an actor can easily reach the best strategy easily.
Distribution: occurs when the framework reduces communication among actors.
Several authors (Asgari et al. 2014, Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos 2008, Madani 2010,
Madani and Lund 2011, Parsons and Wooldridge 2002, Samsura et al. 2009, Zlotkin and
Rosenschein 1989) proposed the use of game theory in various negotiations settings to analyze
and portray parties’ behaviors. Asgari et al. (2014) proposed a game theory framework to model
resource sharing and management among subcontractors. Naderpajouh et al. (2014) used game
theory to model social opposition to infrastructure projects. Madani (2010) applied game theory
to address conflicts in managing water resources. Samsura et al. (2009) used game theory to
model the behavior of actors in situations of decision-making related to land development. It can
be seen that game theory has been an important and effective technique in identifying the effects
of interactions between actors on the collective decision-making process in diverse settings.
However, all these researches have only looked at two-party interactions.
2.4.2

Interactional Analysis applications in PPP Projects

Interactional analysis can be defined as the study of interactions between actors in a system
(Naderpajouh 2013). The focus is on emergent dynamics that transpire due to synergies between
different actors. It is based on power relations, where potential actions of one party exercise
control over opposing party. Interactional analysis has been used in other areas, which are mainly
based on the sociological view of studying human behavior and their interactions with other
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objects (such as technology) or other people in certain situations. Interactional analysis involves
the study of the actions of different parties in a situation and how the relationship between parties
manifests through these actions and affects the process and outcome of a risk/negotiation.
Interactions can either be due to contractual or informal governance (Zou 2012). Zheng et al.
(2008) reflect that the dynamics of the relationship between parties affects how contracts are
executed throughout project stages.
Interactional analysis, through game theory has also spread to engineering where it is
used in bidding, negotiations, dispute resolution, and water resource allocation problems
(Mahjouri and Ardestani 2010). Game theory shows “interactions between self-interested agents”
that act rationally to maximize their utility values. (Parsons and Wooldridge 2002). In a game,
each player has certain choices, a strategy for making these choices and a utility value or payoff
for each choice or outcome (Scharle 2002). Players are assumed to be rational aiming at
maximizing their payoff through their strategy. Many definitions of PPP projects exist such as
“management reform, risk shifting, restructuring public service and power-sharing” (Scharle,
2002). Among these definitions, power sharing is the closest to game theory concepts since it
aims to foster cooperative relations and balanced partnerships. The outcome of a game is the
strategy chosen by the player and his payoff from using this strategy. The payoff or utility of a
player is a number that is based on the possible return received from choosing a specific strategy.
This payoff is reduced when actors take informal or formal actions. Informal actions are defined
as: political/media/public pressure, work stoppages, and threats. They are also referred to as
relational approaches since they depend of the dynamics between the parties (Caldwell et al.
2009). Formal actions are defined as: law suits, licensing challenges, legal actions, formal notices
and claims/disputes (Naderpajouh et al. 2014). Since the parties have different structures and
objectives, they also have different evaluation metrics for the utility values, which might then
cause disagreements between parties (Glumac et al. 2015).
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Several authors (Ho 2006, Chen et al. 2012, Kennedy 2013, Glumac et al 2015, Kargol
and Sokol 2007, Scharle 2002, Shen et al. 2007, Zou and Kumaraswamy 2009) proposed the use
of game theory in renegotiation settings to analyze and portray parties’ behaviors. Scharle, (2002)
emphasized the importance of the gaming perspective to understand PPP projects. Kargol and
Sokol (2007) presented a descriptive method in order to link the theoretical aspects of PPP to
game theory. Zou and Kumaraswamy (2009) presented a basic summarized theoretic approach
for understanding risk allocation in PPP projects in terms of which action to assume, take or
transfer a risk. Chen et al. (2012) presented a game theory model to analyze the Taiwan High
Speed Railroad project to examine how developers implement different strategies during project
stages to alter the contract's conditions in order to continually create competitive advantage after
they have been awarded the contract. Ho (2006) provided a framework to show government
behavior towards distressed projects and when they rescue them or let the concessionaire claim
bankruptcy. Kennedy (2013) applied the model developed by Ho (2006) to “Metronet - London
Underground PPP” project. Glumac et al. (2015) applied a game theory experiment to brownfield
PPP projects in three cases of negotiations: “building claim, future land use and reparcelling of
the land” to solve the issue of forming a joint venture company between the developer and
government or not. Shen et al. (2007) applied a game theory model to show the bargaining
behavior of the public and private in negotiating a concession period. No previous research has
looked into modeling scenarios of high risks in PPP projects, and none have addressed three-party
interactions. This dissertation proposes a framework for three-party interactional analysis using
game theoretic concepts.
An important pillar of a PPP project is the interactions of the parties. Although these
parties share mutual interdependence during project delivery phases for a successful project, they
do not always cooperate in every decision. In each decision, there are multiple parties involved
with different agendas, power relations and negotiation limitations. These aspects factor in the
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resolution of a decision or risk. Blockuis et al. (2012) focused on conflicts and cooperation
between parties in redevelopment projects to analyze decision-making in urban projects. An
example they use is the interaction between the municipality and established company in a certain
area to decide on a redevelopment project. Table 2.8 discusses a railway project in Melbourne,
Australia.

Table 2.8 Interactional risks in a PPP project: Passenger rail services in Melbourne, Australia
Risk
New government that opposed
the project
Change in political arena
and/or because the union’s
power was strengthened by the
performance regime
Arrangement flaws e.g. for
inter-operator and intermodal
revenue sharing and for
monitoring infrastructure
conditions

Party 1

Party 2

Outcome

Government

Operator/
Concession

Difficulty in negotiations on pending
contractual issues

Government

Operator/
Concession

Failure of the new operators to
negotiate sufficient productivity
improvements with staff

Operator/
Concession

Disputes, aggravated by problems
with the ticketing system itself, caused
a serious distraction of management
and officials’ time

Government

Having two concessions with
some shared infrastructure in
the center of Melbourne

Operator/
Concession N

Operator/
Concession
C

Inability to draw from each other’s
fleets at times of vehicle shortage,
difficulty in arranging to use each
other’s platforms, disputes about the
maintenance of common electrical
overhead and signaling, and
distraction of management time
dealing with interfaces and disputes.

Financial difficulty of
Operators/Concessionaire

Operator/
Concession N

Operator/
Concession

Negotiations with the Government
which led to a one-off additional
payment by the government

Government

Concession (National Express) took a
write-off of the order of A$300
million including forfeit of their
performance bond. Its concession was
then managed by an administrator,
with day-to-day help from government
officials

Concessionaire withdrew

Operator/
Concession N
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Concessionaire withdrew

Operator/
Concession C

New government decision to
undertake a major upgrading
of the infrastructure to
accommodate much faster
trains

Operator/
Concession N

Government

Project was signed to other
concessionaire (Connex) and
Government took back some of the
revenue risks by agreeing to top
revenue up if it fell below a threshold,
and requiring a sharing of profit above
an upper threshold and reduced
concession period.

Government

Caused contractual complexities and
physical disruptions during
construction work

The second project to be discussed is the Vasco da Gama Bridge Project (The Lusoponte
Concession). It is one of the earliest PPP projects in Portugal that links the urban part of Lisbon to
the South Bank and has a length of 17.2 km intended to reduce congestion off of the existing 25th
of April Bridge (Cruz and Marques 2013). The contract was a Design-Build-Operate-Finance for
30 years with an 867 million euro original investment and was signed in 1994 to the Lusoponte
Concession with construction beginning 2 years later and the bridge being open in 1998 (Cruz et
al. 2014). The Portuguese Government created Gattel, a governmental agency under the Ministry
of Public Works that has ties to the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Planning to
monitor and coordinate the project (Lemos et al. 2004). From 1995 to 2000, the project was
renegotiated 6 times and Financial Renegotiation Agreements (FRA) were reached.
As shown in Table 2.9, six renegotiations took place from 1995 to 2008. The first
renegotiation occurred due to the strong public opposition to the increase in tolls for the existing
“25th of April” Bridge. The result of this renegotiation was several changes to the existing
agreement such as the introduction of discounts for frequent users and fixing of prices for the
“25th of April” Bridge. The next four financial renegotiation agreements were the result of
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changes made in the first agreement. This cascading risk affected both parties and led the
government to compensate the concessionaire several times. The compensations varied in amount
from 3.9M € to 306.1M € adding up to 490.4M € in total.

Table 2.9 Vasco da Gama Bridge Project Renegotiation Reasons and Results (Pinto 2012)
Date

FRA (I)
March 24,
1995

FRA (II)
September
23, 1996

FRA (III)
February,
17 1997

FRA (IV)
February
22, 1999
FRA (V)
July 3,
2000

Risk/Reason for Renegotiation

Increase in toll fares of the 25th of
April Bridge led to public protest
which became violent and had an
impact on the public opinion to the
new project.

Changes in the contract due to FRA I
that was introduced by the
Government. (Main reason was the
fixing of toll fares)
Changes in the contract due to FRA I
that was introduced by the
Government. (Main reason was the
no-fare-payment for August 1996 and
1997).
Changes in the contract due to FRA I
that was introduced by the
Government. (Main reason was the
no-fare-payment for August 1998).
A Global Agreement between parties
to enforce FRA I to the remainder of
the contract duration and prevent
reoccurrence of FRA’s II-IV.

Results of Renegotiation
Changes introduced by the Government:
-Discounts for frequent users of the 25th of April
Bridge
-No fare payment for the month of August from
1996 to 1998.
-Fixing of toll prices for the 25th of April Bridge
-Revenue from the 25th of April Bridge was to be
dealt
with
differently
than
previous
-Higher risk due to the public opposition
FRA requested by Lusoponte Concession:
- 90.4M € awarded to the concession
-Shifting of risks to increase government
responsibility in the case of rescission of the
contract and government liability to provide a
settlement in case similar public opposition occurs
in the future.

A settlement of 4.9M € to the concession.

A settlement of 3.9M € to the concession.

A settlement of 63.2M € to the concession.

-New distribution of risks
-Changing the Base Case to project the current
concessionaire situation after the FRA’s
-Fixing the concessionaire period to 35 years
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FRA (VI)
November
28, 2008

Additional clauses to the previous
Global Agreement in VI

instead of the previous flexible rule of a maximum
of 30 years (to reach 2.250 million vehicles)
-New financing conditions
-Compensation of 306.1M € to the concessionaire
-Concession refunds the extra generated money
due to the changes in the Income tax
-Concessionaire compensates government for the
non-construction of the Gattel Building
-Compensation of the government to the
concessionaire for the discounts the government
made to the users
-Compensation of 22M € to the concessionaire

*FRA: Financial Renegotiation Agreement

Table 2.10 shows a comparison of the contract after the fifth negotiation as compared to
the initial contract. The changes that were made in all renegotiations were in favor of the
Lusoponte concession because they received several direct compensations from the government
as well as risk sharing of financial and demand risks, which were previously allocated solely to
the Lusoponte concession.

Table 2.10 Results of Renegotiations in the Vasco da Gama Bridge Project (Pinto 2012, Cruz and
Marques 2013)
Contract item
Initial Contract (1995)
Contract after Renegotiation V
(2000)
Tolls
Government
investment
Contract
duration
Demand risk
Financing risk

Tolls to be the same for both bridges

Tolls are different for both
bridges

100M €

306.1M €

Flexible, up to 2.250 million vehicles
with a maximum of 33 years

Fixed number of years: 35 years

Assumed by Lusoponte concession
Assumed by Lusoponte concession

Other risks that aggravated conditions in this project are:

Shared between Lusoponte
concession and Government
Shared between Lusoponte
concession and Government

37
a. Political risks: there was political unrest after the contract was signed where the
Government’s orientation changed from Social Democrat to Socialist which was later
replaced by a new Socialist Government (Lemos et al. 2004). This inconsistency in the
government aggravated the interactions between parties during negotiations because the
concession was forced to deal with more than one partner at times and also try to find a
common ground with their changing political views (Lemos et al. 2004). The concession was
also contractually bound to perform feasibility studies for a new bridge although the
government had not yet made a decision whether to go through with this project or not.
b. Financial risks: interest rates increased 7-8% in 1993 during the bidding period to 11-12% in
1995 which negatively affected the project’s Internal Rate of Return (Lemos et al. 2004).
c. Design risk: Gattel made several changes to the preliminary design that led to delays in the
approvals due to the need to coordinate between several authorities (Lemos et al. 2004).
d. Traffic risk: it can have a huge impact on a roadway project since it can reduce revenue and
cause financial instability for the concession. In March 2000, the government increased fuel
prices, which led to a reduction in traffic levels for two months before resuming to the initial
level (Lemos et al. 2004).
e. Operation/Maintenance risks: are affected by traffic and the rate of accidents for the existing
25th of April bridge.
f.

Legal risks: changes in laws or taxation were fully assumed by the concession

g. Environmental risks: EU funds were suspended due a suspected violation of the
Environmental Impact Study (EIS) but were resumed when the Portuguese Government
signed an agreement with the EU on an accepted EIS (Lemos et al. 2004).
h. Social risks: Expropriation was a social risk that faced the Vasco da Gama project. Out of the
350 areas of land to be expropriated, 250 were settled and 100 had to go to court where some
owners opportunistically asked for multiples of the reasonable amount (Lemos et al. 2004).
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Interactions in the Vasco da Gama Bridge
There are several parties involved in a PPP project but the main parties in a renegotiation
are the Government and the Concessionaire. These two parties engaged in several phases of
renegotiations in order to reach an agreed upon contract to guide the remaining duration of the
project.

Figure 2.2 Timeline of Negotiations for the Vasco da Gama Project
Figure 2.2 shows the timeline for negotiations throughout the project along with the
actors involved in each negotiation. In all renegotiations, the Government and the Concessionaire
are the actors interacting to reach a Financial Renegotiation Agreement. However, the first
renegotiation was triggered by an outside party, the general public whose protests led to FRA I
and the effects of this FRA continued to affect the project and led to the occurrence of the rest of
the 5 FRA’s. The Vasco da Gama project is an example of how a trigger from a third (and noncontractual) party can affect a project throughout its phases from the start of construction through
the operation phase.
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2.4.3

Three-Party Interactional Analysis

Game theory is a mathematical technique that addresses interactions between decision-makers in
conflict or negotiation situations (Fisk 1984). These games can either be simultaneous or
sequential. In construction-related areas, the games are usually sequential where the actors take
turns making choices. For each choice, there is a payoff per actor and transaction cost.
Transaction costs are incurred when taking an action such as filing a claim. Sequential games are
depicted in game trees to show the sequence of actions taken by each actor and the payoffs
obtained at each level. More details will be explained about this in the coming section.
Previous research has shown the application of interactional analysis through game theory in
two-party scenarios. Expanding beyond two parties has not been addressed as it adds complexity
in the scenario. In a two-party scenario, actor A takes an action, which is followed by an action
from actor B, then actor A acts again and so on. For a game where the parties are assumed to take
a maximum of 4 actions (where both parties can perform informal actions followed by formal
actions), the game would proceed as follows:
Actor A

Actor B

Actor A

Actor B

The actions are unilateral, in the sense that the two actors take turns making decisions and
taking actions until the issue is resolved. There are no other possible iterations for it since an actor
will take an action then waits for their opponent to respond. This is similar to two players in a
chess game. Game theory calculates the Nash equilibrium for such a game based on the possible
payoffs they would receive.
Adding a third party would increase the number of possible scenarios between the actors.
Assuming that actor A would take the first action, there would be 8 possible scenarios, which are
shown below:
1. Actor A

Actor B

Actor C

Actor A

2. Actor A

Actor B

Actor C

Actor B
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3. Actor A

Actor C

Actor B

Actor A

4. Actor A

Actor C

Actor B

Actor C

5. Actor A

Actor B

Actor A

Actor C

6. Actor A

Actor B

Actor A

Actor B

7. Actor A

Actor C

Actor A

Actor C

8. Actor A

Actor C

Actor A

Actor B

However, not all these scenarios would be plausible and real since there are contractual
relationships that would limit certain actions. For example, in the case of the Tanzania Railway
Project, the union requested salary increase that was previously promised by the government
before the concessionaire was signed. The actors are:
Actor A: Tanzania Railways Association of Worker Union
Actor B: Concessionaire
Actor C: Government of Tanzania
In this case, Actor A (union) always has to go to actor B (concessionaire) first to request
the salary increase since the contractual relationship is between union workers and the
concessionaire. The next action would be by Actor B (concessionaire) to actor C (government)
where B could negotiate with C to provide subsidy for the salary increase they promised. In this
case four scenarios (numbers 3, 4, 7 and 8) are not plausible so they should be removed as shown
below.
1. Actor A

Actor B

Actor C

Actor A

2. Actor A

Actor B

Actor C

Actor B

3. Actor A

Actor C

Actor B

Actor A

4. Actor A

Actor C

Actor B

Actor C

5. Actor A

Actor B

Actor A

Actor C

6. Actor A

Actor B

Actor A

Actor B
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7. Actor A

Actor C

Actor A

Actor C

8. Actor A

Actor C

Actor A

Actor B

Three-player games in literature have been limited to simultaneous games where players
choose strategies at the same time without knowing what strategies the other players chose. They
only show an empirical approach of the simultaneous game where payoffs for each player were
assumed to be a specific number and shown in a payoff matrix in order to calculate the Nash
equilibrium.
Table 2.11 shows a sample payoff matrix for a 2–person simultaneous game. This graphical
form is also denoted as the “normal form” of a game. In this game, there are 4 possible
combinations of outcomes where the players either choose action 1 or 2. Player A is depicted on
the left while player B is on the top. For each action, a player has a payoff denoted by their letter
followed by action taken and a roman numeral. For example, A1i is the payoff for player A when
he takes action 1 and i denotes the first game. In the context of construction one of the actions for
player A could be refusing to pay and an action for player B could be filing a claim.
Table 2.11 Payoff Matrix for a 2-person game
Player B
Action B1

Action B2

Action A1

(A1i,B1i)

(A1ii, B2i)

Action A2

(A2i,B1ii)

(A2ii,B2ii)

Player A

In order to address 3-player simultaneous games, the third party is added, which doubles
the combinations of outcomes from only four to eight as shown in Table 2.12. The payoffs for
each game are written between brackets with the order: player A payoff, player B payoff, player
C payoff. The notation A1i means payoff of player A when he takes action 1 and i represents the
first game (since the player can play action 1 four times and action 2 four times). This is under the
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same assumption that each player has a set of 2 possible actions, Action 1 or 2 (which are the
same for all players) and that they all choose an action at the same time.

Table 2.12 Payoff Matrix for a 3-person game
Player C
Action C1

Action C2

Player B

Action
Player
A

Player C

Player B

Action B1

Action B2

Action B1

Action B2

(A1i,B1i,C1i)

(A1ii, B2i, C1ii)

(A1iii,B1iii,C2i)

(A1iv,B2iii,C2ii)

(A2i,B1ii,C1iii)

(A2ii,B2ii,C1iv)

(A2iii,B2iii,C2iii) (A2iv,B2iv,C2iv)

A1
Action
A2

The difference between this 3-person game and 2-person game in terms of payoff matrix
is the addition of the third person (player C) on the top. This denotes that a dichotomy of
outcomes; the first scenario is when player C chooses action 1 so the other two players can each
separately choose action 1 or 2 producing 4 possible outcome combinations. The strategy
combinations for the players in order would be:
Action 1, Action1, Action 1
Action 1, Action2, Action 1
Action 2, Action1, Action 1
Action 2, Action2, Action 1
The second scenario is when actor C chooses action 2 so again the other two actors can
choose between action 1 and 2. The strategy combinations for the players in order would be:
Action 1, Action1, Action 2
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Action 1, Action2, Action 2
Action 2, Action1, Action 2
Action 2, Action2, Action 2
Each of these strategies has a unique payoff for each player as denoted in Table 2.12. These
normal form games only depict simultaneous games. However, the actual cases with regards to
PPP projects are not simultaneous games. One main reason is that in real PPP projects the actions
of players are sequential and not simultaneous. In the case of a two-player game, one player (for
example, government) takes an action against another player (concessionaire) and the
concessionaire then reacts to this action. The game then goes on between both players. In case
three-player games, the scenario is expanded to include three players in the sequential game.
Sequential games are shown using the “extensive form”, which is a game tree that shows the
sequence of actions by parties. A simplification of this game tree is shown below to show two
sequential actions, one by each player.

Figure 2.3 Simplified Game Tree
The next section discusses the gaps in literature with regards to interactional analysis of risks in
PPP projects.
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2.4.4

Gaps in Literature

Based on the literature review that was conducted, the following gaps in literature were
discovered:
Lack of a comprehensive risk registry for PPP projects
Lack of a model to quantify all risks and provide high risk that affect a PPP project
Many researches have focused on calculating the percentage of renegotiations per
country/region (Guasch 2004, Woodhouse 2006, Engel et al. 2009, Reside and Mendoza
2010 and Bitran et al. 2012) and have not looked into risks behind them and the process
that occurs
Lack of assessment of emergent risks through modeling of interactional dynamics
Lack of three-party analysis
Lack of simulation frameworks to model different scenarios and investigate the impact of
different mitigation strategies

2.5 Summary
This chapter presented the literature review related to the dissertation. It presented a review of
literature on PPP projects, risks facing them and provided a glimpse of interactional analysis,
which is applied in this dissertation. A detailed explanation and case study for ICRAM-PPP is
discussed in chapter 4 and the explanation and case study for interactional analysis is addressed in
chapter 5. It can be concluded that PPP projects have seen an increase in use over the years but
have also been affected by many risks. These risks can lead to contract renegotiation or even
project failure. This dissertation aims to address these risks through interactional analysis. The
first step would be discovering high risks in a project, which would then be used to create risk
scenarios to understand possible outcomes and payoffs for each party. Chapter 3 presents the
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methodology and literature related to systematic literature review, ICRAM-PPP, and interactional
analysis.
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3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Framework
The previous section presented literature review on topics including advantages of using PPP
projects as a delivery method, parties involved in a PPP, risks affecting these PPP projects and
how these risks lead to renegotiations or failures of the projects. The role that the interaction of
parties plays in affecting the resolution of risks has not been previously addressed in other
researches despite its imminent importance.
PPP projects are a unique venture since they involve a multitude of parties contractually
involved for the delivery of a project over a long duration. PPP projects also involve outside
parties that can have a direct influence on the project. This adds complexity to the risk scenarios.
In order to find the best strategies for risks in PPP projects, high risks need to be identified, the
phases in which they occur need to be mapped and finally an analysis of the actions of parties in
these high risks undertaken. This chapter discusses the methodology approach for this
dissertation. It starts by discussing systematic literature review (SLR), which is performed to
collect all risks affecting PPP projects in order to modify ICRAM-1 and create ICRAM-PPP.
After ICRAM-PPP is created, scenario analysis is used to create scenarios for the high risks.
Interactional analysis is presented which is based on the scenarios created. Finally, simulation of
different scenarios is discussed.
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3.2 Systematic Literature Review
Systematic literature review (SLR) is a method to answer a question in a study using a systematic
approach where all related data is looked into. It consists of three main steps: plan, perform and
report (Brereton et al. 2007). Systematic literature review has been famous in contexts such as
software engineering (Barcelos and Travassos 2006, Brereton et al. 2007, Beecham et al. 2008,
Jørgensen and Shepperd 2007, Kitchenham et al. 2009, Turner et al. 2010) and recently in
infrastructure (Roehrich, Lewis and George 2014).
In the planning phase, a protocol needs to be established which is followed throughout the
rest of the systematic literature review stages. This protocol is a detailed description of the
method to be followed, data to be collected, how the analysis will proceed and how validation
will take place. Various literature sources that propose a process for SLR (Kitchenham 2004 and
Leuderitz et al. 2016) were studied and a final process was established. Figure 3.1 shows the
process taken to perform a SLR.
1. Plan: the first stage and involves the planning of the SLR process. The first step is
identifying the objectives of the study and framing the research questions. This step is
important because it initiates the study and is the basis for the remaining work. The next
step is creating the protocol based on the research questions. This protocol identifies how
the following items will be addressed:
How the questions will be answered
Sources for acquiring articles
How the search will proceed
How the articles will be chosen
How the analysis will be performed
How the reporting process will occur
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These steps will be followed throughout the SLR process therefore it is imperative to
create a protocol that encompasses all areas of the research and it reviewed and updated
constantly in case any changes occur.
2. Perform: the second stage and involves applying the protocol previously established in
the planning stage. The “perform” stage consists of two steps. The first step is identifying
sources for information, which include ASCE library, Science Direct and other search
engines. Once these sources are identified, articles/books are acquired and narrowed
down in the second step according to the predetermined criteria. Criteria are chosen for
how to narrow down the list of articles and only include those that are relevant to the
study. After reaching a final set of articles, the next stage starts.
3. Report: the third and final stage and involves analyzing and reporting of the findings.
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1st Stage: Plan
Identify objectives

Create the study
protocol

2nd Stage: Perform
Identify sources
for information
Limit output
according to preestablished
criteria

3rd Stage: Report
Perform analysis
Report
Figure 3.1 Stages of Systematic Literature Review
SLR has been used in various fields but has not been common in civil engineering,
specifically in construction engineering and management. This dissertation highlights the
usability and benefits from using the SLR approach in construction engineering and management
by applying it to collect all risks pertaining to PPP projects. After collecting all risks in PPP
projects, ICRAM-1 is modified to create ICRAM-PPP. This is performed through removing all
risks in ICRAM-1 that do not pertain to PPP projects, adding new ones from the SLR process and
modifying existing risks to include more sub-risks underneath them. Chapter 5 discusses the
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application of ICRAM-PPP to the Indiana Toll Road project as well as the Tanzania Railway
project. Applying ICRAM-PPP gives an output that is quantification of risks in the project and
identification of high risks. These high risks are then used to create risk scenarios and model them
using interactional analysis. These risk scenarios are created using scenario planning as discussed
in the next section.
3.3 Scenario Planning
Literature review discusses the different uses of scenario planning according to a number of
literature sources (Munoz 1998, Munoz and Sussman 1999; Zegras, et al. 2004). In this
dissertation, scenario planning is conducted through five steps. These steps are discussed below
for the formation of risk scenarios for this research.
Step 1: Identify scope
The scope of this section/research is to understand dynamic outcome of the associated risk in a
PPP project because of the actions taken by the parties to the risk.
Step 2: Identify factors affecting the outcome and rank them
The factors that affect the outcomes are the risks that manifest in PPP projects. Examples of these
risks include: opportunistic behavior of one of the parties to the PPP project, union discontent
with current conditions, opposition to the project or delivery mode, recession, incorrect demand
projections, inaccuracy of specifications or contract documents, etc. Ranking of these
factors/risks can be obtained from ICRAM-PPP and prioritized according to the resulting
weighted assessment per risk. From this prioritization, one risk is chosen for further analysis.
Step 3: Identify driving forces that affect the factors (from step 2)
The driving forces that affect the factors or risks are the actions taken by each party that lead to
escalation or resolving of the issue. These actions can either be formal or informal where informal
actions include political/public/media pressures, threats of suing or contacting a party to
negotiate. On the other hand, formal actions include lawsuits, licensing challenges, legal actions
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and claims. Both informal and formal actions have transaction costs that vary with formal actions
being higher than informal actions.

Step 4: Develop combinations of the driving forces that lead to scenarios
Different combinations of driving forces (outcomes) lead to the creation of different scenarios.
These scenarios must be realistic and reflect a possible and plausible scenario.
Step 5: Create scenarios
The different scenarios created from step 5 are looked into in order to eliminate scenarios that are
not realistic.
Scenario for Risk #1: Opportunistic behavior, new government’s opposition to PPP projects,
inadequate specifications led to private party requesting subsidy from the government. This is
rejected by the government, which leads to renegotiation. End result is that the project is
transferred back to the government.
Scenario for Risk #2: Union request salary increase which leads to a meeting between the
government and private, however, no decision is made. Union workers go on strike so the
government decides to contribute to the salary increase.
These scenarios are then translated into a game using game theoretic concepts and payoffs are
calculated for each outcome. The next section discusses interactional analysis used to model these
dynamics.

3.4 Delphi Technique
The Delphi technique was developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s to create a method
aimed at conducting an analysis to achieve consensus about a specific topic (Dalkey 1972). It
avoids the problems that emanate from group dynamics since the participants are geographically
dispersed and do not interact (Hsu and Sandford 2007). One of its benefits is that it uses expert
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judgment in a specific area in a “controlled environment” (Hallowell 2009). Studies showed that
the average of a group decision is usually higher than the average of individual’s responses thus
asserting the use of a Delphi technique (Okoli and Pawlowski 2015). Participants are targeted and
their identities kept anonymous. The Delphi technique usually consists of 2-4 iterations, although
many researchers recommend 3 iterations (Cyphert and Gant 1971; Brooks 1979; Ludwig 1994
and 1997; and Custer, Scarcella, and Stewart 1999), where the same participants are targeted and
sent the survey information. A description of the rounds is presented below (Kerlinger 1973, Hsu
and Sandford 2007):
Round 1: usually consists of the data collection phase where the participants are asked a
question relating to the study to gather their input. A modification to this is if there is
availability of data from extensive literature review so the first round consists of a
questionnaire based on the collected data.
Round 2: the participants are sent a questionnaire where they have to provide input such
as ranking of data. They are given a timeframe to return the questionnaire by. Once all
questionnaires are returned they can be analyzed and round 3 can commence. All
participants remain anonymous throughout all rounds and only the researchers can
identify them.
Round 3: data that is collected in the previous round is analyzed and the questionnaire is
modified based on this information. The modified questionnaire is sent again to the
participants along with a summary of the results of round 2 to revise their answers (if
necessary). This iteration serves the purpose of narrowing down the data, getting
participants’ opinion on it and reaching an agreement about it. If there is still huge dissent
between the opinions, more iterations can be performed which have the same steps as
round 3.
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There is disagreement among researchers regarding the optimum number of participants to
include in the study. Sourani and Sohail (2015) recommend a minimum of seven to eight
participants, Mitchell and McGoldrick (1994) suggest a minimum of eight to ten while Delbecq,
Van de Ven, and Gustafson (1975) recommend ten to fifteen participants as an optimal number.
Hallowell and Gambatese (2010) recommend a minimum of eight participants and state that most
studies have on average eight to sixteen participants but recommend that this depends on the
subject matter itself and the availability of experts. According to Ludwig (1997), majority of the
studies used fifteen to twenty participants. Table 4.3 lists previous Delphi studies with the number
of participants, rounds and description of research. The number of participants and rounds chosen
should depend on the topic of research, availability of experts and number of rounds required for
the experts to reach consensus.

54
Table 4.3 Previous Delphi Studies

Reference
Clayton (1997)

Number of:
Participants
(Rounds)
15-30

Xu, Chan, and Yeung
(2010)

34 (2)

Streveler et al. (2003)

35 (4)

Okoli and Pawlowski
(2004)

10-18 * 4

Research
Review of literature on procedure and features of
the Delphi process
Developing a Fuzzy Risk Allocation Model
for PPP Projects in China
Using a Delphi Study to Identify difficult concepts
for in Thermal and Transport Science for students
The Delphi method as a research tool: an example,
design considerations and applications

Yeung, Chan and Chan
(2009)

22 (4)

Created a model to assess relationship-based
projects in construction though the use of KPIs

Rossouw, Hacker, and
de Vries (2011)

32 (3)

Chan et al. (2014)
Ameyaw and Chan
(2015a)
Ameyaw, and Chan
(2015b)
Austin, PishdadBozorgi and de la Garza
(2015)

108 (2)
40 (2)

Sourani and Sohail
2015

21 (3)

Concepts and contexts in engineering and
technology education: an international and
interdisciplinary Delphi study
Ranked risk factors in PPP water projects in China
Ranked risk factors in water infrastructure PPP
projects in Ghana.
Evaluated risk factors for water PPP projects in
Ghana
Identified and ranked best practices in Flash Track
projects.
(They were asked to reconsider the 20 practices on
which they had not reached consensus on in Round
1, plus the four additional practices proposed by
them in Round 1, along with the corresponding
anonymous comments from Round 1)
The first case study looked at the use of Delphi in
research related to sustainable construction.
The second case looked at the benefits of students’
use of Delphi in research projects.
Use of Delphi to identify the target group and target
method that is interested in “Prevention through
Design” which aims at mitigating design hazards to
workers and facilities.

40 (2)
55 (3)

17 (3)
Tymvios and
Gambatese (2016)

17 (3)

Sourani and Sohail (2015) promote the use of the Delphi technique in risk management due to the
lack of an agreed understanding of risk management in construction projects. The Delphi
technique was used in this research in order to validate the risks collected from the systematic
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literature review process and create a reliable registry. This (Delphi) technique uses the expertise
of the participants to create a risk registry for PPP projects that can assess risks under three levels:
macro, market and project. Details on how this technique was applied and the results obtained are
presented in Chapter 4.
3.5 Interactional Analysis
As discussed in the literature review, interactional analysis is based on game theoretic
concepts. This section will discuss the concepts behind interactional analysis and how a game is
created. A thorough game will be discussed in chapter 5 under the Indiana Toll Road and
Tanzania Railway project case studies. After identifying the high risks through ICRAM-PPP, a
scenario analysis is conducted to create a scenario for a specific high risk in a PPP project. This
scenario is then translated to a game.
These games are based on the premise that the players are rational and that they take
sequential actions. Players take actions and receive a payoff based on the outcome of the game,
which is based on their actions and the actions of other players. Taking an informal action
reduces their payoff by a value of alpha (a uniform value within a range chosen by the user, can
vary according to the party to the risk). Taking a formal action reduces the player’s payoff by beta
(a uniform value within a range chosen by the user, can vary according to party and is higher than
the value of alpha since formal actions cost more). Cost of formal action can be the cost of filing
a claim or hiring a lawyer. The outcome of the game is the Nash equilibrium, which is the best
outcome for all players under which no player would want to deviate. The Nash equilibrium is
reached in these games through backward induction. Backward induction solves a game by
starting from the end of the game. The last action is evaluated and a comparison of the payoff for
each action (for the player making the choice at that step) is conducted. Since we do not have
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exact values of the payoffs, they are given equations and an assumption is made for each term in
the equation during the simulations.
The game is simulated using Anylogic software for 1000 simulations. The results obtained
from solving the model and from the simulation are analyzed to propose strategies to each actor.
The next section discusses simulation of the interactional analysis scenarios.

3.6 Simulation
Simulations of the interactional analysis game are performed in order to study the effect of
varying the values of the parameters and extracting patterns. These simulations are used to
observe a wide spectrum of outcomes. One case is named the base case in order to compare it to
the rest of the cases. In the rest of the cases, one parameter is changed (from the base case) while
the rest are kept constant. This will help in comparing the effect of changing one parameter on the
payoffs received for each actor. Details of the values/ranges chosen for each parameter are
discussed in chapter 5 under the ITR case study.
3.7 Summary
This chapter provided a synopsis of the methodology used in this dissertation. It presented the
flow of processes under this dissertation and the thought process behind it. It showed a brief
outline of the methodology process that will be discussed in detail in the coming chapters.
Chapter four presents the International Construction Risk Assessment Model for Public Private
Partnerships (ICRAM-PPP).
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4. ICRAM-PPP(INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION RISK ASSESSMENT
MODEL FOR PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS)

4.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the International Construction Risk Assessment Model for Public Private
Partnerships (ICRAM-PPP). ICRAM-PPP is a risk assessment model tailored specifically for
PPP projects based on the original ICRAM-1 (Hastak and Shaked 2000). It consists of risks
divided into three levels: Macro, Market and Project. Under each level, there are sub-levels that
group various risks. ICRAM-PPP is intended for use by parties looking to enter into a publicprivate partnership agreement such as private companies, governments or financiers. In order to
modify ICRAM-1, a systematic literature review process was conducted to collect all risks
relating to PPP project.
4.2 Systematic Literature Review for ICRAM-PPP
This dissertation applies the framework of systematic literature review (SLR), as proposed by
Kitchenham (2004), Brereton et al. (2007), and Kitchenham et al. (2010), on the topic of risks in
PPP projects in the construction industry. SLR is appropriate for broad review of any phenomena
(in this case renegotiations in PPP) within the literature of a discipline (in this case construction
area) based on primary research (in this case published articles, reports and case studies)
(Kitchenham 2004, Brereton et al. 2007, and Kitchenham et al. 2010). In this research, SLR is
used to provide an overview of current body of knowledge and to frame risk factors in case of
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PPP projects. Figure 4.1 shows the research outline starting on the top left with the SLR which
leads to the creation of the risk registry framework and ICRAM-PPP, followed by risk analysis
through interactional analysis and finally a case study applying ICRAM-PPP and interactional
analysis.

Figure 4.1 Structure of the Research
Systematic literature review consists of 3 stages: plan, perform, and report. Under each stage,
there are a number of sub-stages. Figure 4.2 shows the stages performed for the systematic
literature review process. Each stage consists of two sub-stages under it.
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1st Stage: Plan
Identify objectives

-Identify risks in the Macro, Market and Project levels in
PPP projects

Create the study
protocol

-How will the article search process proceed?
-What are the sources for articles? Which Journals?
-What are the inclusion/exclusion criteria for literature?

-Updated Table by Gross (2010)
with ~400 articles relating to PPP projects
-ASCE Library (JME and JCEM)
-Science Direct
-Google Scholar
Result: 500+ articles about PPP projects

2nd Stage: Perform
Identify sources
for information

Limit output
according to preestablished
criteria

Keyword selection of the literature was:
(i) PPP, P3, 3P and PFI.
(ii) One of the following 4 terms: “Risk
management/assessment/allocation/factors.
Result: 44 articles pertaining to risks in PPP projects

Figure 4.2
Systematic Literature Review Process

3rd Stage: Report
Perform analysis

Report

Data was tabulated to show risks in each article or case study.
Nvivo was used to verify results.
Over 400 risks were found and narrowed down to 82 risks.
List was finalized and merged to create ICRAM-PPP.
Validated through the Delphi process

The search for studies was conducted using
a number of identified sources:
ASCE Library
Science Direct
Google Scholar
Purdue Online Library
List of literature related to PPP collected by Gross (2010)
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A set of articles as the “primary studies” was defined based on the tabulated list of literature on
PPP by Gross (2010) consisting of about 450 articles. This list is classified according to the
following eight categories: (1) general concepts, (2) governance issues, (3) procurement, (4)
contract design, (5) risk management, (6) financial elements, (7) public sector considerations and
(8) national applications and case studies. At the first step this set was updated through the
addition of 105 articles. An online search for articles was conducted using the ASCE library,
Science direct, Google scholar and Purdue online library. The second step involved limiting the
selection to articles that discuss risks in PPP projects. Within the selected set, all the case studies
were chosen. Besides, two criteria had to be met in order for the article to be selected. The
keyword for selection of the literature had to include the following:
(i)

One of the following 4 terms: “Private finance initiative, Public private
partnerships (PPP), Private sector participation, 3P, P3” due to different terms
used in different countries, and

(ii)

One of the following 4 terms: “Risk management/assessment/ allocation/factors”

All articles chosen met both criteria with the exception of 2 articles that only had PPP as
a keyword. The final set consisted of 44 articles that were used to identify suggested risk
indicators. This is performed in view of the structure of ICRAM-1 (Hastak and Shaked 2000) as
the framework for risk registry in international construction. The 73 risk indicators in ICRAM-1
are categorized based on higher-level risk indicators. For example, societal conflicts (e.g.,
demonstrations, strikes, & street violence) and instability because of non-constitutional changes
are under the symptoms of instability. The higher-level categories are considered to identify risks
associated with PPP within the selected set of literature. Therefore, a Table was created using
higher-level risk indicators suggested by ICRAM-1, to classify risk indicators suggested by the
literature under these higher-level criteria. It includes the exact wording of the referenced article
for risks and reference to their location in the reviewed article to facilitate the review, revision
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and validation process. The result was over 400 risk factors, which were then integrated with
existing risk factors from ICRAM-1 and refined to reduce the repetition. In the process of cross
analysis between existing and identified risks, few risk indicators from ICRAM-1 that were not
traced in the literature were eliminated or integrated into the identified risk indicator. In this
process, the literature was also coded into NVivo and used in triangulating the results and refining
the Table. For example, coded literature into NVivo was used as a query for the most referred
risks available in literature under each category (such as political risk). This query then was
compared to extracted risks for potential elimination of risks from ICRAM-1 that were not related
to renegotiation in PPP. The final outcome is a tabulated risk registry for risk indicators
associated with renegotiation in PPP based on contrasting risks from ICRAM-1 as an established
risk framework with the structured literature of PPP.
4.3 Increasing Reliability of ICRAM-PPP
In order to increase ICRAM’s reliability, the impact of some of the risks was calculated using
well-established indicators. These indicators were collected from various sources and pertained to
some of the macro and market level risks. These risks include:
Monetary Inflation (under Macro Level): the indicator for this risk is inflation as calculated by
the World Bank (2016). Table 4.1 below shows a sample of the inflation rates for some countries.
Using trends analysis, criterion was established to match the trend in each country to a specific
level of risk as shown in Table 4.2. A decreasing slope for inflation indicates low significance of
the risk and a rating number of 25 whereas a sharply increasing slope shows that inflation has
been a highly likely trend and thus shows a high significance and a rating number of 100.
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Table 4.1 Monetary Inflation for select countries from 2006-2014 (Source: IMF)
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Country name
Armenia

2.9

4.4

8.9

3.4

8.2

7.7

2.6

5.8

3

Aruba

3.6

5.4

9

-2.1

2.1

4.4

0.6

-2.4

0.4

Australia

3.5

2.3

4.4

1.8

2.8

3.3

1.8

2.4

2.5

Austria

1.4

2.2

3.2

0.5

1.8

3.3

2.5

2

1.6

Azerbaijan

8.4

16.6

20.8

1.4

5.7

7.9

1

2.4

1.4

Bahamas, The

2.4

2.5

4.5

2.1

1.3

3.2

2

0.3

1.5

Bahrain

2

3.3

3.5

2.8

2

-0.4

2.8

3.2

2.8

Bangladesh

6.8

9.1

8.9

5.4

8.1

10.7

6.2

7.5

7

Barbados

7.3

4

8.1

3.6

5.8

9.4

4.5

1.8

1.9

Belarus

7

8.4

14.8

12.9

7.7

53.2

59.2

18.3

18.1

Table 4.2 Mapping out risk assessment and rating using trends analysis
Assessment

Rating

Trend

25

Low

Decreasing slope

50

Medium

Horizontal slope

75

High

Increasing slope

100

Extremely High

Sharply increasing slope

Economic Growth and volatility: the indicator for this risk is the GDP growth as calculated by
the World Bank.
Debt as GDP converted to US dollars: the indicator for this risk is debt as GDP as calculated by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Capacity to Service Debt: the indicator for this risk is total debt service.
Capital Flow: the indicator for this risk is capital flows as calculated by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
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Government Reliability/Creditworthiness/Cooperation: the indicator for this risk is credit
rating of government. One of the agencies that provides these ratings is Standard and Poors and
the rating ranges from AAA (prime) to D (in default).
Extent of deficit/surplus: the indicator for this risk is given by cash surplus/deficit as calculated
by the World Bank. The numbers are plotted on a graph and using trends analysis, a risk rating is
given. A sharply decreasing slope would indicate sharp increases in deficit and thus a high risk
rating.
Current Account Balance: the indicator for this risk is calculated by the World Bank. Similar to
the previous risk, a sharply decreasing slope would indicate sharp decreases in account balance
and thus a high risk rating.
Political Continuity/Stability of Government: the indicator for this risk is the political
instability indicator which shows the threats posed by social unrests to the government.
Current Market Volume in Core Competency: the indicator for this risk is calculated by the
market potential index as calculated by Michigan State University (GlobalEdge, 2016)
Foreign Exchange Reserves: this is calculated by the International Monetary Fund for all
countries. A sharply decreasing slope would indicate sharp decreases in foreign exchange
reserves and thus a high risk rating.
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4.4 Risk Registry
4.4.1

Risk Registry for the Macro/Country Level

OPERATIONAL RISKS
Host Government Indicators:
1. Political continuity/Stability of Government: this includes policy volatility, unstable public
partner (government) and inconsistency in government policies.
2. Attitude toward foreign/private investors and profit: an unfavorable climate towards
foreign/private investors and repatriation of profit will affect the progress of a PPP project
and may cause opposition
3. Nationalization/expropriation/sequestration of assets: decision of a country to take over
privately-owned assets in national interest
4. Enforceability of contracts: the availability of legislative regulations ensure the
enforceability of a contract, protect the parties, reduces risk and support the use of PPP as a
delivery method
5. Government Incentives: lack of an incentive for the private investor would affect the
attractiveness of the project.
6. Inadequate/Absence/Change of national PPP laws and standardized models for PPP
projects: PPP projects in countries that are newly adopting the PPP delivery method or
countries that do not have enforced laws will suffer until a standard is established for all
projects to follow
7. Changes in country/region legislation and regulation: UnsTable governance mechanisms
may lead to inconsistency or changes to federal or state policies/laws/regulations. Industrial
regulatory changes may also be observed which will affect the project phases. Legal and
policy changes reduce the reliability of the system and willingness of private entities to enter
projects.
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Economic and Financial Indicators:
8. Monetary inflation: change in inflation as a measure of a country’s economic condition
9. Economic growth and volatility: Economic growth can be measured using economic
indicators such as GDP. Other factors include a poor or volatile financial market.
Administration
10. Bureaucratic delays: caused by a poor or lengthy decision-making process, which leads to
delays in approval of project submittals, permits and licenses.
11. Required services: such as a lack of IT infrastructure, communication, and Transportation
POLITICAL RISKS
External Indicators:
1.prc

Regional turbulences (war, etc.)

2.prc

Dependence on (or importance of) a major power network: such as dependence of an

investor on the government’s promises so the withdrawal of the government’s support system
would affect the project
Internal Indicators:
3.prc

Fragmented political structure (e.g., local and federal governments): such as entering

into contract with the local government instead of the federal government. Another example
is volatility in decision-making and policy-making caused by a small number of veto players
in the government
4.prc

Fractionalization by Language, Ethnic, and Regional Groups: various groups

representing different religions or tribes may contribute to political instability
5.prc

Institutional behaviors including nationalism, corruption, and dishonesty: a country

where corruption and dishonesty are prevalent may suffer from political instability
6.prc

Social conditions (e.g., population, density & wealth distribution): these conditions may

be an indication of political instability
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7.prc

Satisfying short-term interest of the governing body: occurs when the local government

officials decide to satisfy their own short-term goals rather than the local government’s longterm goals. This can happen when a government official is only focusing on the duration
he/she will be in office or when he/she is nearing the end of their term
Symptoms of Instability Indicators:
8.prc

Societal conflicts: such as protests, opposition, demonstration, strike, hostility, vandalism

or industrial action. Another risk is the adverse portrayal of the project by the media.
9.prc

Government reliability/creditworthiness/cooperation:

this includes government

interference (breach/cancellation of contract, failure to renew approvals, unfair taxes, import
constraints, contractual violations), political reneging or discontent and lack of government
cooperation with the private party.
10.prc Instability because of non-constitutional changes: affected by political instability of a
government
FINANCIAL RISKS
Legal Framework Indicators:
1.frc

Actual laws versus practice for repatriation of capital: can be caused by an immature

juristic structure.
Foreign Exchange Generation Indicators:
2.frc

Current account balance: measure of a country’s economic condition

3.frc

Capital flow: measure of a country’s ability to produce foreign exchange

International Reserves Indicators:
4.frc

Foreign exchange reserves: foreign currencies held as reserves to back liabilities

5.frc

Gold and other reserves: measures the economic condition of a country since gold is a

measure of international reserves
Foreign Debt Assessment Indicators:
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6.frc

Debt as GDP converted to US dollars: can be heightened by an increase in the national

debt.
7.frc

Capacity to service debt: a low capacity to service debt already present in the country

would reduce the stability of the government. This can be measured by “a ratio of annual
public foreign loan obligations and foreign exchange earned”
Budget Performance Indicators:
8.frc

Extent of deficit/surplus: this affects the interest rate, inflation rate and other financial

measures in the market
9.frc

Restrictions to refinancing schemes: these restrictions can deter a project that has been

suffering financially and can’t find any new financing opportunities
10.frc Sources of revenue and major spending: the dependence of a country on one main
source of revenue, such as petroleum, would leave it susceptible to volatility in its price thus
affecting the financial stability of the country
4.4.2

Risk Registry for the Market Level

TECHNOLOGY
1.m Investor’s technological advantage: can be affected by competitor’s innovation in
technologies or their application of similar technologies which would reduce the current
company’s technological advantage
2.m Availability of basic construction technologies and equipment: some projects might need
special equipment or novel techniques that may not be readily available.
CONTRACTS AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
3.m Type of partnership: the structure of the partnership, involvement or responsibility or parties
are some examples
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4.m Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract: lack of enforceability of
contracts will affect the project and may lead to a higher rate of contract renegotiations
5.m Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of many agencies, delay in
granting approvals): the presence of a large number of agencies that are required for
approval would delay the process and could lead to a failure in obtaining statutory approvals.
RESOURCES
6.m Availability and quality of local contractors: lack of high quality local contractors can delay
project start and increase costs incurred from getting contractors from outside the local area
7.m Availability of construction material: lack of construction material may deter a project or
increase costs if materials had to be brought in from outside the country
8.m Availability of skilled and unskilled workers: working in a foreign country may create a
problem if there is a shortage of skilled workers
9.m Labor cost/productivity: may delay the project or lead to an upsurge in cost
10.m

Availability of equipment and parts: this is important to the construction and operation

phases of a project to avoid delays due to unavailable equipment
FINANCING
11.m

Availability of financing: can be influenced by high finance costs, limited capital or

limited availability of loans for long-term projects.
12.m

Tax and non-tax incentives in construction industry: can be influenced by

macroeconomic fluctuations in interest rate, currency or purchasing power.
13.m

Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate: interest rate volatility and macroeconomic

fluctuations in currency/purchasing power
14.m

Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability: can be affected by a financial crisis

such as the Greek financial crisis that affected PPP projects
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BUSINESS CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
15.m Interaction of foreign management with local contractors: cultural differences may cause
problems between parties
16.m A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship: can be disrupted due to lack of coordination or
trust between parties
17.m Risk management practices of parties involved: may be affected by differences between
parties (country of origin, cultural differences)
MARKET POTENTIAL
18.m

Current market volume in core competency: current market volume would affect the

project’s attractiveness and substantiate the need of the project
19.m

Future market industry volume in core competency: changes in the market need to be

examined before starting a project
20.m

Bidding volume index resulting in competition: lack of qualified bidders would reduce

bidding competition whereas a high number of bidders would increase competition
21.m

Stability of associated industries: instability of related industries can adversely affect the

project phases
4.4.3

Risk Registry for the Project Level

TECHNOLOGY

1.p Problem with technology transfer and implementation: unproven technologies, unforeseen
failure of technologies or technology obsolescence can cause problems.

2.p Retention of technological advantage: problems due to technology transfers.
CONTRACTS AND LEGAL ISSUES

3.p Possibility of contractual disputes and negotiations: negotiations that occur throughout the
duration of the project could be caused by differences in accounting of profit and loss.

70

4.p Problems in dispute settlements due to country's laws: can be affected by a country’s
dispute resolution method and its effectiveness

5.p Inadequate distribution of responsibilities/authorities/risk allocation: disagreements on risk
allocation, staffing of people or distribution of authority.

6.p Problems in contract conditions: accuracy, complexity or flexibility of contracts can cause
problems between parties. Excessive contract variations also cause problems.

7.p Capability and experience of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) including management,
construction, operation, and financing capability: such as inadequate experience in PPP
projects or lack of management competence of parties.
RESOURCES

8.p Shortage of skilled and unskilled workers: incompetence or unavailability of available
workers

9.p Insolvency/default of subcontractor or operator or suppliers: this can occur due to
subcontractor/operator’s inherent financial problems or financial problems in the country
itself which can lead to halting of projects or delays and search for new
subcontractors/operators

10.p

Delay/unavailability/unreliability of material supply: can be caused by supply risk,

failure of materials in inspection or low quality of resource supply.
DESIGN

11.p

Delay in design and regulatory approvals: bureaucratic delays can affect the approval

process thus delaying dependent tasks

12.p

Complex/defective design, error, and rework: such as inappropriate or inefficient design,

forecasting errors due to changes in traffic (for transportation projects), changing output
specifications, reliability of available data and design integration.
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13.p

Change orders/variations: such as excessive or late changes in design or scope

14.p

Difficulties to meet construction programs: this can occur due to bad design or materials

15.p

Unforeseen adverse ground conditions: this is a common risk in construction projects

and can lead to delays resulting from the need to change design to accommodate the
unexpected conditions
QUALITY

16.p

Bad quality of materials: which can be linked to reliability of source.

17.p

Bad quality of workmanship: this can cause rejection of work by the owner and the need

for rework which would increase the costs and delay the project

18.p

Uncertainty regarding the quality required for maintenance: problems manifest due to

the long-term maintenance of assets, occurrence of latent defects or shortfalls in asset service
quality.
FINANCIAL

19.p

Financial difficulties because of tax or capital movement restrictions: such as cash flow

problems and financial capability of government, consortium or financier.

20.p

Financial difficulties because of currency exchange rates: this can occur especially in

PPP projects since the project can depend on money from financial organizations outside the
country hence currency exchange rates would affect its financial status.

21.p

Drop in project revenue: inaccurate prediction of project demand leads to a drop in

revenue.

22.p

Risk of non-payment or delayed-payment by the public partner/delay in annuity: an

inconsistent or unreliable public partner can affect the private partner’s financial status by
reducing/delaying their cash flow
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23.p

Tariff problems: especially for transportation projects where there is a risk of changes in

tariff increase, decrease or even tariff freeze).
CONSTRUCTION AND CULTURAL ISSUES

24.p

High costs of project operations: costs can be due to land acquisition, utility relocation

or transaction costs in claims.

25.p

Third party delays: such as utility risks or unexpected risks due to the presence of

multiple contractors.

26.p

Safety/security/failure problems at project site: poor safety measures will increase the

occurrence of accidents on-site and may delay projects.

27.p

Managerial issues:

this includes lack of incentives in the project where cost of

compliance is higher than penalization, site preparation risks, failures or prolonged downtime
and land and right of way acquisition

28.p

Organization/coordination/commitment risks between parties:

such as differences

between parties’ risk attitude, working methods and commitment.

29.p

Weather conditions, geographic/demographic changes, natural causes of delay (force

majeure) and unforeseen risks

30.p

Physical damage to project by riots, terrorist act, theft and so forth

4.5 Delphi Process
The Delphi technique was applied in this research in order to validate the risk registry
and ensure that all possible risks pertaining to PPP projects were included. Decision-makers who
are top management, industry experts, financial advisors and academic professors were targeted
as participants. Since risks in PPP projects were previously identified for inclusion in ICRAMPPP, they were used as the risk registry. The first round of Delphi started by sending the
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participants the risk registry previously identified in ICRAM-PPP. Definitions of each risk were
also sent to the participants to ensure common understanding of the risks.
Average results along with reasons behind them were sent to the participants in the
second phase. Sending the reasons is known to help in accurately answering the survey the
second time (Best 1974). According to Hallowell (2009), reporting of median values is preferred
over mean values in order to minimize biases.
This study requires people who have had exposure to various areas in a PPP project such as
social, economic, political and technical aspects. An advantage of the Delphi method is that it
does not require geographic proximity of the participants since the expertise required could be
found in people who are geographically diverse (Okoli and Pawlowski 2015). Panel selection was
based on the following criteria (Ke et al. 2010, Chan et al. 2014):
Experience in academia either in teaching or researching about PPP projects and or
Experience in industry through working in PPP projects
Experience in PPP project
In this research, we follow the systematic procedure suggested Okoli and Pawlowski (2015)
“knowledge resource nomination worksheet”. The first three steps, which are applicable to our
research, are as follows:
1. Identify the sectors for the panels such as academia and researchers
2. Write names for the people to contact in each sector
3. Contact the nominees and ask them to nominate others
One of the challenges facing the Delphi method is the low response rate as reported by Chan
et al. (2014) who had an 18% response rate. In this research, the response rate was slightly higher,
at 20%. One of the reasons behind this response rate is that some of the people contacted felt that
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they did not have enough experience in PPP projects to participate and that they either had not
been

in the industry enough, were not directly involved or had not seen situations of risk. For the
second stage, 50% of the participants were involved.

Participants' Roles in PPPs

Figure 4.3 Participants’ roles in PPP projects
The total number of participants in the study is 24 experts. This shows a response rate of
about 20%. Figure 4.3 shows a graph of the number of participants who are working (or
previously worked) in each role in a PPP project. Some participants worked in more than one role
for different projects as can be seen. The classification “others” includes consultant, lender and
investor. Representing various backgrounds and positions was important in order to capture the
experience of different sectors of people. Figure 4.4 shows a graph of the number of participants
involved in each range of years for active participation (direct work in PPP projects) and passive
participation (research on PPP projects). Figure 4.5 shows the percentage of participant
involvement in the different PPP phases.
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Active Participation

Passive Participation

Figure 4.4 Number of Participants vs. Years of experience for Active and Passive Participation in
PPP projects

PPP Project Phases that Participants are/were involved in:

Other:

Transfer

Operation and
Maintainance

Build
(Construction)

Design

Procurement

Finance

Planning

90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Figure 4.5 Participant involvement in PPP project phases

Gunhan and Arditi (2005) stated that most of the changes occur in the first 2 rounds and
after that, change was little. Since we started with results from a structured literature review, our
aim was to create consensus among participants for existing data so the number of rounds
required is minimum. Hence, we used two rounds.
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In the first round, we sent invitations to 122 people to participate in the Delphi process.
24 responses with consent were received so they were emailed the survey. In the second round,
some modifications were made to the definitions to reduce confusion. It was noticed that industry
experts were more prone to confusion about the Delphi study than were the academics.
The results of the Delphi study were twofold. The first result was validating the PPP risk
registry where the participants were asked to indicate if a risk does not occur in PPP projects. Out
of the 82 risks, two were found to be not applicable to PPP projects: “4.Fractionalization by
language, ethnic background, etc.” and “5.Gold and other reserves”. These two were removed
from the risk registry. The second result was mapping out the risks according to what project
phase(s) they occur in or affect. Tables 4.4 through 4.6 present the results of the Delphi study for
the second result.

Table 4.4 Delphi Results for the Macro Level Risks

Transfer

O&M

Build

Design

Procurement

Finance

Risk affects highlighted phases
(Blue)
Planning

Transfer

O&M

Build

Design

Procurement

Finance

Macro Level Risks

Planning

Risk occurs in highlighted
phases (Yellow)

1.orc=Political continuity/Stability of Government
2.orc=Attitude toward foreign/private investors and profit
3.orc=Nationalization/Expropriation/sequestration of assets
4.orc=Enforceability of contracts
5.orc=Government Incentives
6.orc=Inadequate/Absence/Change of national PPP laws and standardized models for
PPP projects
7.orc=Changes in country/region legislation and regulation
8.orc=Monetary inflation
9.orc=Economic growth and volatility
10.orc=Bureaucratic delays
11.orc=Required services (IT infrastructure, Communication, Transportation)
1.prc=Regional turbulences (war, etc.)
2.prc=Dependence on or importance of major power network
3.prc=Fragmented political structure (e.g. local and federal governments)
5.prc=Institutional behaviors including nationalism, corruption, and dishonesty
6.prc=Social conditions (e.g., population, density & wealth distribution)
7.prc=Satisfying short-term interest of the governing body
8.prc=Societal conflicts (demonstrations, strikes)
9.prc=Government reliability/creditworthiness/cooperation
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10.prc=Instability because of nonconstitutional changes

1.frc=Actual laws versus practice for repatriation of capital
2.frc=Current account balance
3.frc=Capital flow
4.frc=Foreign exchange reserves
6.frc=Debt as GDP converted to US dollars
7.frc=Capacity to service debt
8.frc=Extent of deficit/surplus
9.frc=Restrictions to refinancing schemes
10.frc=Sources of revenue and major spending
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Table 4.5 Delphi Results for the Market Level Risks

Transfer

O&M

Build

Design

Procurement

Finance

Planning

Risk affects highlighted
phases (Blue)
Transfer

O&M

Build

Design

Procurement

Finance

Market Level Risks

Planning

Risk occurs in highlighted
phases (Yellow)

1m=Investor’s technological advantage
2m=Availability of basic construction technologies and equipment
3m=Type of partnership
4m=Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract
5m=Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of many agencies,
delay in granting approvals)
6m=Availability and quality of local contractors
7m=Availability of construction material
8m=Availability of skilled and unskilled workers
9m=Labor cost/productivity
10m=Availability of equipment and parts
11m=Availability of financing
12m=Tax and non tax incentives in construction industry
13m=Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate
14m=Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability
11m=Availability of financing
12m=Tax and non tax incentives in construction industry
13m=Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate
14m=Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability
15m=Interaction of foreign management with local contractors
16m=A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship
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17m=Risk management practices of parties involved
18m=Current market volume in core competency
19m=Future market industry volume in core competency
20m=Bidding volume index resulting in competition
21m=Stability of associated industries

Table 4.6 Delphi Results for the Project Level Risks

Transfer

O&M

Build

Finance
Procuremen
t
Design

Planning

Risk affects highlighted
phases (Blue)
Transfer

O&M

Build

Finance
Procuremen
t
Design

Project Level Risks

Planning

Risk occurs in highlighted
phases (Yellow)

1p=Problem with technology transfer and implementation
2p=Retention of technological advantage
3p=Possibility of contractual disputes
4p=Problems in dispute settlements due to country's laws
5p=Changes in construction regulations
6p-Inadequate distribution of responsibilities/authorities/risk allocation
7p-Capability and experience of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
8p=Shortage of skilled and unskilled workers
9p=Availability of special equipment
10p=Delays with the material supply
11p=Delay with design and regulatory approvals
12p=Complex/Defective design, error, and rework
13p=Change orders/variations
14p=Difficulties to meet construction programs
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15p=Unforeseen adverse ground conditions
16p=Bad quality of materials
17p=Bad quality of workmanship
18p=Uncertainty regarding the quality required for maintenance
19p=Financial difficulties because of tax or capital movement restrictions
20p=Financial difficulties because of currency exchange rate
21p=Drop in project revenue
22p=Risk of non-payment or delayed-payment by the public partner/Delay in annuity
23p=Tariff problems
24p=High costs of project operations
25p=Third party delays
26p=Safety/Security/Failure problems at project site
27p=Managerial Issues
28p=Organization/coordination/commitment risks between parties
29p=Weather conditions, geographic/demographic changes, natural causes of delay
(force majeure) and unforeseen risks
30p=Physical damage to the project by riots, terrorist act, theft and so forth
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4.6 Summary
This chapter discussed the development of the risk registry and modification of ICRAM-PPP in
detail. Appendix B shows an example of the calculations made in ICRAM-PPP for the AHP and
pairwise comparison. It discussed the Delphi method that was conducted, steps taken and results
obtained. The following chapter presents the Indiana Toll Road (ITR) and Tanzania Railway
project case studies. It starts by discussing the background of each project then applying ICRAMPPP to get the high risks and finally introducing the three-party interactional analysis.
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5

INDIANA TOLL ROAD CASE STUDY

5.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the Indiana Toll Road (ITR) project as the case study in this dissertation.
It applies the suggested framework to identify high risks in the ITR project in order to create a
scenario using interactional analysis between three parties to show possible outcomes and best
strategies. This is performed through two steps: the first is applying ICRAM-PPP to the project to
get the high risks and the second is applying the Interactional Analysis framework to the risk
scenario chosen.
5.2 Background
This section describes the historic background of the project, parties involved and then introduces
the problems they faced. Data collection for this case study included analysis of project
documentation, newspaper articles and semi-structured interviews with high-level management
involved in the project.
The Indiana Toll Road spans about 157 miles between the Ohio Turnpike and Chicago
Skyway. It was open to traffic in 1956 (Levy 2011). In 2005, Governor Mitch Daniels took office
and led the Indiana Department of Transportation to conduct a study on the state of highways in
Indiana. The study showed a shortage of $1.8 billion, which led to the creation of the “Major
Moves” program aimed at funding transportation projects in the state (Levy 2011). In order to
fund this program and to offset losses in toll collection from the Indiana Toll Road, a decision to
lease the toll road was made.
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In 2006, Cintra (a subsidy of the Spanish company Ferrovial) and Macquarie Group
(Australian Investment bank) won a 75-year lease to operate the Indiana Toll Road for a 50-50
share through a bid of $3.8 billion with ITRCC being 85% debt-financed. The same
concessionaire had also previously won rights for the Chicago Skyway project a few years earlier.
Work under the lease included:
Implementing electronic tolling equipment, and
Expanding the number of lanes to 3 in some areas
ITRCC would make revenue from the tolls collected along the roadway. In an effort to
secure/enhance their financial status, ITRCC agreed on interest rate swaps with their lenders. An
interest swap is a financial measure taken by two parties to swap their interest rate based on a
specified amount. One party usually has a fixed rate while the other has a floating rate (NYU
Stern School of Business 1999). For example, if party A has a floating or variable rate and wants
to be financially safer, they can enter into contract with party B that has a fixed interest rate for its
bond to swap interest rates for a certain period of time. This way party A would pay the fixed
interest and party B would pay the floating interest for that duration (so they both swap interests
and pay the other’s interest rate). When party A chooses the fixed interest rate over the floating
rate, it would benefit only if the floating rate during that period exceeds its fixed rate. So their
new interest rate (fixed) is lower than the original interest rate (floating) hence they would be
gaining. However, if the floating interest rate for a month is lower than the fixed rate, they would
be at a loss. In the case of ITRCC the interest sap did not work as anticipated and their new fixed
rated was higher than the floating rate which meant that ITRCC would owe the difference (to the
other party to the swap). This interest swap by the ITRCC led to an increase in its debt by $2.15
billion (The Times of Northwest Indiana, 2014). This increase in debt coupled with the decline in
profits due to recession affected the project and eventually led to the operator’s bankruptcy in
2015.
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Stakeholders

ITRCC spent 18 months negotiating a restructuring plan with lenders and finally had to
file Chapter 11 plan and declare bankruptcy in September 2014. In the case that a sale could not
be made, ITRCC’s debt would have been reduced and the creditors would receive 95.75% of
ITRCC’s equity (Macquarie Atlas Roads Annual Report 2014). In October 2014, the court
approved ITRCC’s declaration of bankruptcy. The new bidding process resulted in 2 highest
bidders: IFM investors (an Australian global fund manager) as the highest bidder and Lake and
Laporte County coming in second (The Times of Northwest Indiana, 2015). IFM was chosen with
a $5.8 billion buyout for ITRCC’s assets. IFM investors have been operating the ITR since then
under the same name of ITRCC since they bought out its assets.

5.3 ICRAM-PPP for ITR
ICRAM-PPP was applied to the Indiana Toll Road project to identify the spectrum of risks in
the project. Extensive literature review about the project was conducted and high-ranking experts
involved in the ITR were identified and contacted. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with
the identified experts to gather their input on customizing ICRAM-PPP for the Indiana Toll Road
project.
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted with four individuals, two from the
concessionaire’s side and two from Indiana Finance Authority to collect their expert opinions on
the weights and impacts for the risk factors in ICRAM-PPP.
Their input was used to apply ICRAM-PPP to the Indiana Toll Road project specifically and
capture the correct information about risks affecting this project. The modifications that were
made were in the following areas of ICRAM-PPP:
Comparison between the levels of risk categories under each of the three levels: macro,
market and project. The project level contains eight levels underneath it (technology,
contracts and legal requirements, resources, design, quality, financial, construction and
cultural differences, and others); the market level consists of six levels (technology,
contracts and legal requirements, resources, financing, business cultural differences and
market potential); while the macro level contains three levels (operational, political and
financial) with each level further consisting of sub-levels underneath it. The scale used
included five choices, which were: much more importance, more importance, same
importance, less importance and much less importance as shown in Table 5.1. The
experts were asked to choose from the list of five choices for comparing the levels under
macro, market and project.
Table 5.1 Scale used for the pairwise comparison
Level of Impact
Numerical
Much more importance
1.5
More importance
1.25
Same importance
1
Less importance
1/1.25
Much less importance
1/1.5
Comparison of the sublevels under the macro level. Each of the three levels (operational,
political and financial) contains sublevels under it. For example, the political level
consists of three sub-levels, which are: external causes, internal causes and symptoms of
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instability. The choices for comparison were: much more importance, more importance,
same importance, less importance and much less importance as shown in Table 5.1. The
experts were asked to choose from this list for comparing the sublevels under the macro
level.
Comparison between the risks under each level. Each level/sublevel contains a list of
risks that fall under it. For example, under the “external causes” under the macro level,
there are two risks: regional turbulences and dependence on or importance of major
power networks. These two risks are compared to each other using the same scale
previously mentioned: much more importance, more importance, same importance, less
importance and much less importance.
Level of impact of each risk which is a metric that considers the probability of occurrence
of a risk along with its priority in the project. The options were [0, 25, 50, 75, 100],
where 0 means absolutely no impact and 100 means very high impact.
The results of ICRAM-PPP for the ITR project are shown in Table 5.2 to 5.4 for the
concessionaire’s perspective and Table 5.5 to 5.7 for the Indiana Finance Authority’s perspective.

Table 5.2 Concessionaire Macro Level Risks
Criteria
Operational
Risk

Political
Risk

Financial
Risk

Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators)
1.orc=Political continuity/Stability of Government
2.orc=Attitude toward foreign/private investors and profit
3.orc=Nationalization/Expropriation/sequestration of assets
4.orc=Enforceability of contracts
5.orc=Government Incentives
6.orc=Inadequate/Absence/Change of national PPP laws and standardized models for PPP
projects
7.orc=Changes in country/region legislation and regulation
8.orc=Monetary inflation
9.orc=Economic growth and volatility
10.orc=Bureaucratic delays
11.orc=Required services (IT infrastructure, Communication, Transportation, etc.)
1.prc=Regional turbulences (war, etc.)
2.prc=Dependence on or importance of major power network
3.prc=Fragmented political structure (e.g. local and federal governments)
5.prc=Institutional behaviors including nationalism, corruption, and dishonesty
6.prc=Social conditions (e.g., population, density & wealth distribution)
7.prc=Satisfying short-term interest of the governing body
8.prc=Societal conflicts
9.prc=Government reliability/creditworthiness/cooperation
10.prc=Instability because of nonconstitutional changes
1.frc=Actual laws versus practices for repatriation of capital
2.frc=Current account balance
3.frc=Capital flow
4.frc=foreign exchange reserves
6.frc=Debt as GDP converted to US dollars
7.frc=Capacity to service debt
8.frc=Extent of deficit/surplus
9.frc=Restrictions to refinancing schemes
10.frc=Sources of revenue and major spending
Sum

Risk
Assessment

Weighted
Assessment

0.019050036
0.015778302
0.019096884
0.017498298
0.014021202

50
25
25
25
0

0.952501799
0.394457554
0.477422103
0.43745744
0

0.019563892

25

0.489097306

0.019888496
0.059764879
0.074706099
0.064343509
0.080429387
0.047115757
0.070673635
0.025344621
0.025344621
0.026837792
0.024008625
0.031246152
0.054680765
0.023434614
0.066942995
0.022314332
0.022314332
0.046352357
0.022314332
0.022314332
0.027694181
0.018462788
0.018462788

75
25
50
25
25
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
25
0
0
75
75
75
50
100
25
100
75

1.491637176
1.494121972
3.735304929
1.608587732
2.010734665
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.36701913
0
0
1.673574881
1.673574881
3.476426748
1.115716588
2.231433175
0.692354536
1.846278762
1.384709072

Weight

1

28.55241045
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Table 5.3 Concessionaire Market Level Risks
Criteria
Technology
Contracts &
Legal
Req.
Resources

Financing

Business
Cultural
Differences
Market
Potential

Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators)

Weight
0.069378825
0.104068238
0.076084027
0.065586395

Higher
Level
Impact

Risk Assessment

Weighted
Assessment

25
28.55241045
25
28.55241045

1.734470634
2.971399047
1.902100685
1.872649683

1m=Investor’s technological advantage
2m=Availability of basic construction technologies and equipment
3m=Type of partnership
4m=Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract
5m=Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of many
agencies, delay in granting approvals)
6m=Availability and quality of local…
7m=Availability of construction material
8m=Availability of skilled and unskilled labor
9m=Labor cost/productivity
10m=Availability of equipment and parts
11m=Availability of financing
12m=Tax and non tax incentives
13m=Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate
14m=Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability
15m=Interaction of foreign management…
16m=A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship
17m=Risk management practices of parties involved

0.056534866

0

0

0.03566632
0.028533056
0.028533056
0.028533056
0.028533056
0.050427879
0.038111594
0.038111594
0.045113543
0.051130749
0.051130749
0.051130749

25
0
25
25
0
28.55241045
0
0
25
0
0
0

0.891657996
0
0.713326397
0.713326397
0
1.439837511
0
0
1.127838568
0
0
0

18m=Current market volume in core competency

0.038348062

0

0

19m=Future market industry volume
20m=Bidding volume index resulting in competition
21m=Stability of associated industries
Sum

0.038348062
0.038348062
0.038348062
1

0
0
0

0
0
0
13.36660692

1
1

1
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Table 5.4 Concessionaire Project Level Risks
Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators)

Weight

Technology

1p=Problem with technology transfer and implementation
2p=Retention of technological advantage
3p=Possibility of contractual disputes
4p=Problems in dispute settlements due to country's laws
5p=Inadequate distribution of responsibilities/authorities/risk allocation
6p=Problems in contract conditions
7p=Capability and experience of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
including management, construction, operation, and financing capability
8p=Shortage of skilled and unskilled workers
9p=Insolvency / default of subcontractor or operator or suppliers
10p=Delay/unavailability/unreliability of material supply
11p=Delay with design and regulatory approvals
12p=Complex/Defective design, error, and rework
13p=Change orders/variations
14p=Difficulties to meet construction programs
15p=Unforeseen adverse ground conditions
16p=Bad quality of materials
17p=Bad quality of workmanship
18p=Uncertainty regarding the quality required for maintenance
19p=Financial difficulties because of tax/capital movement restrictions
20p=Financial difficulties because of currency exchange rate
21p=Drop in project revenue
22p=Non-payment/delayed payment by the public (Delay in annuity)
23p=Tariff problems
24p=High costs of project operations
25p=Third party delays
26p=Safety/Security/Failure problems at project site
27p=Managerial Issues
28p=Organization/coordination/commitment risks between parties
29p=Weather or other natural disaster
30p=Physical damage to the project

0.049623608
0.049623608
0.026599758
0.025453869
0.028911585
0.028005944
0.032073978
0.04525431
0.034081359
0.024089569
0.022990913
0.028738641
0.027535352
0.022990913
0.04452961
0.04452961
0.055662013
0.032679776
0.029886979
0.034169268
0.029830313
0.029830313
0.024573873
0.02323447
0.028894029
0.019431878
0.021256189
0.049314847
0.061643559

Sum

1

Contracts
and
Legal Issues

Resources
Design

Quality
Financing

Construction
And
Cultural
Issues
Other

Higher Level
Impact
2
2
1
1
1

0.024559861
1

1

2
1
2

Risk
Assessment
10.69328553
10.69328553
28.55241045
28.55241045
28.55241045
50

Weighted
Assessment
0.530639406
0.530639406
0.759487218
0.726769314
0.825495454
1.400297208

25

0.613996536

25
28.55241045
25
0
0
25
28.55241045
0
0
0
25
0
0
13.36660692
25
0
28.55241045
25
10.69328553
25
25
0
0

0.801849457
1.292119628
0.852033983
0
0
0.718466036
0.786200673
0
0
0
1.391550324
0
0
0.456727176
0.745757836
0
0.701643301
0.580861754
0.308972107
0.48579696
0.531404732
0
0
15.0407085
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Criteria

Table 5.5 Indiana Finance Authority Macro Level Risks
Criteria
Operational
Risk

Political
Risk

Financial
Risk

Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators)

Risk
Assessment

Weighted
Assessment

0.013676757
0.014580849
0.015181638
0.015445115
0.013004815

50
62.5
25
100
50

0.683837838
0.926840548
0.379540952
1.544511526
0.650240726

0.015480223

62.5

0.977955625

0.014767796
0.062280372
0.06991163
0.054835496
0.054857407
0.066653593
0.053322874
0.025460826
0.029797977
0.026690467
0.02604149
0.032151035
0.051210142
0.023461125
0.068109939
0.032751494
0.028794231
0.058394465
0.027393671
0.031000794
0.025922471
0.024914594

75
25
50
87.5
75
87.5
62.5
87.5
25
75
62.5
50
25
75
50
75
75
75
50
75
25
75

1.082709877
1.557009301
3.495581484
4.873048949
4.11430556
5.954319864
3.430384038
2.285210659
0.744949427
2.085820849
1.577462977
1.607551725
1.280253542
1.824147397
3.405496966
2.45636207
2.15956731
4.379584842
1.369683528
2.198298544
0.648061769
1.868594524
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1.orc=Political continuity/Stability of Government
2.orc=Attitude toward foreign/private investors and profit
3.orc=Nationalization/Expropriation/sequestration of assets
4.orc=Enforceability of contracts
5.orc=Government Incentives
6.orc=Inadequate/Absence/Change of national PPP laws and standardized models for PPP
projects
7.orc=Changes in country/region legislation and regulation
8.orc=Monetary inflation
9.orc=Economic growth and volatility
10.orc=Bureaucratic delays
11.orc=Required services (IT infrastructure, Communication, Transportation, etc.)
1.prc=Regional turbulances (war, etc.)
2.prc=Dependence on or importance of major power network
3.prc=Fragmented political structure (e.g. local and federal governments)
5.prc=Institutional behaviors including nationalism, corruption, and dishonesty
6.prc=Social conditions (e.g., population, density & wealth distribution)
7.prc=Satisfying short-term interest of the governing body
8.prc=Societal conflicts
9.prc=Government reliability/creditworthiness/cooperation
10.prc=Instability because of nonconstitutional changes
1.frc=Actual laws versus practices for repatriation of capital
2.frc=Current account balance
3.frc=Capital flow
4.frc=foreign exchange reserves
6.frc=Debt as GDP converted to US dollars
7.frc=Capacity to service debt
8.frc=Extent of deficit/surplus
9.frc=Restrictions to refinancing schemes

Weight

10.frc=Sources of revenue and major spending

0.023906717

Sum

62.5

1

1.522895889
61.08422831

Table 5.6 Indiana Finance Authority Market Level Risks
Criteria
Technology
Contracts &
Legal
Req.
Resources

Financing

Weight

Higher
Level
Impact

Risk
Assessment

Weighted
Assessment

1m=Investor’s technological advantage
2m=Availability of basic construction technologies and equipment
3m=Type of partnership
4m=Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract
5m=Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of many
agencies, delay in granting approvals)
6m=Availability and quality of local…
7m=Availability of construction material
8m=Availability of skilled and unskilled labor
9m=Labor cost/productivity
10m=Availability of equipment and parts
11m=Availability of financing
12m=Tax and non tax incentives
13m=Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate
14m=Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability
15m=Interaction of foreign management…
16m=A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship
17m=Risk management practices of parties involved

0.087877051
0.078612488
0.051180002
0.066336758

87.5
62.5
25
76.92441686

7.629634682
4.969480208
1.27950005
5.102317047

0.061758586

75

4.745698883

0.030076376
0.029476643
0.031355897
0.032877761
0.033560366
0.045072529
0.043807807
0.045124009
0.041498558
0.050416637
0.046940188
0.054233735

75
62.5
87.5
76.92441686
75
87.5
51.96725853
58.22796895
50.04284167
75
75
75

2.30450494
1.840095566
2.751243529
2.578255153
2.477120812
3.938959787
2.274927484
2.637069714
2.07674122
3.849409566
3.409871579
4.040264473

18m=Current market volume in core competency

0.04487629

50

2.243814506

19m=Future market industry volume
20m=Bidding volume index resulting in competition
21m=Stability of associated industries
Sum

0.042321197
0.04244507
0.041139979
1

50
75
62.5

2.116059862
3.124087064
2.587678501
67.97673462

1
1
1
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Business
Cultural
Differences
Market
Potential

Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators)

Table 5.7 Indiana Finance Authority Project Level Risks
Weight

Technology

1p=Problem with technology transfer and implementation
2p=Retention of technological advantage
3p=Possibility of contractual disputes
4p=Problems in dispute settlements due to country's laws
5p=Inadequate distribution of responsibilities/authorities/risk allocation
6p=Problems in contract conditions
7p=Capability and experience of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
8p=Shortage of skilled and unskilled workers
9p=Insolvency / default of subcontractor or operator or suppliers
10p=Delay/unavailability/unreliability of material supply
11p=Delay with design and regulatory approvals
12p=Complex/Defective design, error, and rework
13p=Change orders/variations
14p=Difficulties to meet construction programs
15p=Unforeseen adverse ground conditions
16p=Bad quality of materials
17p=Bad quality of workmanship
18p=Uncertainty regarding the quality required for maintenance
19p=Financial difficulties because of tax or capital movement restrictions
20p=Financial difficulties because of currency exchange rate
21p=Drop in project revenue
22p=Risk of non-payment/delayed-payment by public partner/Delay in annuity
23p=Tariff problems
24p=High costs of project operations
25p=Third party delays
26p=Safety/Security/Failure problems at project site
27p=Managerial Issues
28p=Organization/coordination/commitment risks between parties
29p=Weather or other natural disaster

0.062100032
0.069414538
0.031786896
0.027197032
0.022931165
0.025964471
0.025915356
0.036912444
0.037923037
0.04030226
0.02327718
0.027649774
0.024960093
0.024071153
0.025204023
0.044476595
0.041757677
0.034810916
0.0280411
0.024106454
0.025756357
0.025399047
0.022900531
0.02332529
0.023638478
0.028040122
0.024555154
0.022834663
0.066107962

Contracts
and
Legal Issues
Resources
Design

Quality
Financing

Construction
And
Cultural
Issues
Other

Higher
Level
Impact
2
2
1
2
2
2

2
2
1
1
2
1

Risk
Assessment

Weighted
Assessment

59.85681247
57.4796886
39.42441686
51.96725853
39.42441686
62.5
59.85681247
59.40410546
75
59.85681247
76.92441686
87.5
62.5
62.5
87.5
59.85681247
57.4796886
62.5
51.96725853
51.96725853
67.97673462
87.5
58.22796895
75
62.5
75
62.5
52.37712387
50

3.735397469
3.962022871
1.349408302
1.419177146
0.939414226
1.600660057
1.56004704
2.162502897
2.879513079
2.36728519
1.75868131
2.422873101
1.59010891
1.545661882
2.232405953
2.668352732
2.429534136
2.110779329
1.456246012
1.255116793
1.787881297
2.261906864
1.333215278
1.749396746
1.484760203
2.227760816
1.589585625
1.1874813
3.305398077
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Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators)
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Criteria
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30p=Physical damage to the project

0.058640202
Sum

MACRO LEVEL Concessionaire

1

50

2.932010118
61.30458476

MACRO LEVEL Indiana Finance Authority
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MARKET LEVEL

MARKET LEVEL

PROJECT LEVEL

PROJECT LEVEL

Figure 5.1 Relative weights for the three levels as calculated for the Concessionaire and IFA
MACRO Operational Risks

95

MACRO Operational Risks

MACRO Political Risks

MACRO Political Risks

MACRO Financial Risks

MACRO Financial Risks

Figure 5.2 Relative weights for the sub-levels under the Macro Level as calculated for the Concessionaire and IFA
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show pie charts of the weights assigned to each of the three levels
(macro, market and project) as well as the three sublevels under the macro level (operational,
political, and financial). The results for the concessionaire are shown on the left and those for IFA
on the right. Comparing the percentages for each level/sublevel, it can be seen that the weights
given by both parties are very similar most of the time. In certain instances, there is a difference
of 3-5% like under the Macro level where the concessionaire gave a weight of 33% for political
risks while IFA gave it 28%. However, underneath the political risks, the concessionaire and IFA
gave a near identical weighting for the three sublevels: internal causes [31% and 32%], external
causes [36% and 36%] and symptoms of instability [33% and 32%] respectively. Appendix B
shows the calculation details for ICRAM-PPP including how weights were assigned.
The total weighted assessment for the macro, market and project level were as follows:
Concessionaire: 28.55 (macro), 13.37 (market), 15.04 (project)
Indiana Finance Authority: 61.08 (macro), 67.98 (market), 61.3 (project

For the concessionaire, their outlook on risks can be extracted to mean that they view macro
risks as the highest and market as the lowest. For the IFA, they viewed market risks as the highest
and macro and project risks in a tie. A big gap can be noticed between both party’s answers. After
discussions with both parties, the main difference observed was that the concessionaire gave low
impact values to risks that were concessionaire-related because they could mitigate them whereas
the IFA looked at all risks from outside perspective, since they can not control them, they gave
them higher values. Another important issue to note is that the Indiana Toll Road is a pre-existing
project that was already constructed and operating. The concessionaire signed was for some
additions to the pre-existing roadway, renovations and maintenance of the assets. This means that
some of the risks that deal with new construction or unexpected conditions will not affect this
project.
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Table 5.8 shows the high risks obtained from ICRAM-PPP for the concessionaire and
IFA. A maximum threshold was used to determine which risks were considered high and which
were not. A threshold of 5% of the sum of weighted assessments per level was used for each of
the levels for IFA’s answers, while a threshold of 7.5% of the sum of weighted assessments per
level was used for the concessionaire’s side. This was because the concessionaire had a lower
total sum so the threshold had to be increased so as to only include the highest risks.
Table 5.8 High Risks from ICRAM-PPP
Indiana
Macro Risk Indicators
Finance Concessionaire
Authority
9.orc=Economic growth and volatility
10.orc=Bureaucratic delays
11.orc=Required services (IT infrastructure, Communication,
Transportation, etc.)
1.prc=Regional turbulences (war, etc.)
2.prc=Dependence on or importance of major power network
1.frc=Actual laws versus practices for repatriation of capital
4.frc=Foreign exchange reserves
7.frc=Capacity to service debt
Market Risk Indicators
1m=Investor’s technological advantage
2m=Availability of basic construction technologies and
equipment
3m=Type of partnership
4m=Type and enforceability of construction and concession
contract
5m=Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g. delays,
presence of many agencies)
11m=Availability of financing
15m=Interaction of foreign management with local
contractors
16m=A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship
17m=Risk management practices of parties involved
Project Risk Indicators
1p=Problem with technology transfer and implementation
2p=Retention of technological advantage
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6p=Problems in contract conditions
9p=Insolvency / default of subcontractor or operator or
suppliers
16p=Bad quality of materials
18p=Uncertainty regarding the quality required for
maintenance
29p=Weather or other natural disasters
30p=Physical damage to the project

From this list of high risks for the concessionaire and IFA, risks that were high according to
both parties were highlighted. Some of these risks involved only two parties while others
involved three parties. Since the focus of this dissertation is introducing and proposing three-party
analysis, a risk that involved three parties was chosen. This risk is “9p=Insolvency/default of
subcontractor or operator or suppliers.” This risk involves the following three parties:
subcontractor, contractor and IFA. Some reasons behind subcontractor insolvency/default include
the following:
•

Failure to perform

•

Ineffective business practices

•

Financial insolvency (economic downturns)

•

Not receiving payments

In this case study, the example chosen was the last point, subcontractor not receiving
payments. As discussed in the methodology, the approach used to create scenarios for the
interactional analysis is through scenario planning. The following scenario planning applies to the
subcontractor default risk.

Step 1: Identify scope
The scope of this risk analysis is to understand dynamic outcome of the chosen risks in the
Indiana Toll Road project because of the actions taken by the parties to the risk.
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Step 2: Identify factors affecting the outcome and rank them
The factors that affect the outcomes are the risks that manifest in a PPP project. From ICRAMPPP, a list of high risks was identified and shown in Table 5.9. One risk was chosen to move
forward with which is subcontractor default.
Step 3: Identify driving forces that affect the factors (from step 2)
The driving forces that affect the risks are the actions taken by each party that lead to escalation
or resolving of the issue. These actions can be divided into formal or informal actions where
informal actions include political/public/media pressures, threats of suing or contacting a party to
negotiate. On the other hand, formal actions include lawsuits, licensing challenges, legal actions
and claims. In this risk, possible actions for each party include:
Owner: withhold money from contractor, negotiate, settle, litigate, etc.
Contractor: withhold money from subcontractor, file claim against owner, stop work, etc.
Subcontractor: file a lien against project, stop work, negotiate, litigate, etc.
Step 4: Develop combinations of the driving forces that lead to scenarios
The driving forces (actions by each party) previously identified are used to create combinations of
different plausible sequences in order to create a scenario.
Step 5: Create scenarios
The different scenarios created from step 5 are looked into in order to eliminate scenarios that are
not realistic. Tables 5.9 through 5.11 present the final list of scenarios.
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Table 5.9 List of scenarios for 2-party interactions between subcontractor and contractor
Subcontractor (S)
Asks for money,
threatens to sue OR Status Quo

Contractor (C)

Subcontractor (S)

Denies/Withholds money
from subcontractor –
OR Pay subcontractor

Scenario

File Claim
(Litigation) –
OR Settlement

Scenario A

File Claim
(Litigation) –
OR Stops work

Scenario B

Table 5.10 List of scenarios for 2-party interactions between IFA and contractor
IFA (I)
Sends notice to
contractor OR Status Quo

Contractor (C)
Sends notice of
potential claim
against owner OR No action

IFA (I)

Contractor (C)

Withholds money
from contractor –
OR Settlement

Litigation –
OR Negotiation

Scenario
Scenario
C

Table 5.11 List of scenarios for 3-party interactions
IFA (I)

Withholds money
from contractor –
OR Status Quo

Contractor (C)

Withholds money
from subcontractor –
OR Pay
subcontractor

Subcontractor
(S)
Files a lien –
OR Resolves
issue with
contractor

Stops work –
OR Resolves
issue with
contractor

4th Action (IFA)

Scenario

-

Scenario
D

Litigates
contractor –
OR Settles with
contractor

Scenario
F

-

Scenario
E

Litigates
contractor –
OR Settles with
contractor

Scenario
G

Tables 5.9 and 5.10 show the scenarios for the two-party interactions. Table 5.9 shows the
scenarios between the subcontractor and contractor. The scenarios are read from left to right,
which represent the sequence of actions. In each box, there are two possible choices for an actor,
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they can either take an action (informal or formal) or decide on inaction. The first choice (A) is
always the action and the second choice (B) is the inaction. In the first scenario:
Subcontractor asks for money (choice A) or does nothing, which is the status quo (choice
B)
Contractor withholds money from subcontractor (choice A) or pays the subcontractor
(choice B)
Subcontractor can file a claim (litigation, which is choice A) or settle with contractor
(choice B)
These sequences of actions create a scenario, which is then transformed into a game theory
tree in order to create equations and solve it. The next section discusses interactional analysis and
how the scenarios created are transformed into game trees and solved.

5.4 Interactional Analysis for the ITR
This section discusses the application of the Interactional Analysis framework to the ITR project.
First, interactional analysis is applied to a two-party scenario to introduce its concepts. Next, the
three-party interaction will be shown.

Two-Party Interactional Analysis
This section discusses a two-party interactional analysis scenario for the ITR project.
Interactional analysis is based on the idea of relations between parties in a certain situation and
how their individual actions affect their individual payoffs in each scenario. Every PPP project
consists of a contractual relationship between a public entity, which can be the government, state
or another related entity, and a private entity, the concessionaire. In the ITR project, the public
entity is the Indiana Finance Authority and the private entity is the ITRCC concessionaire
(Cintra-Macquarie prior to 2015 and IFM post 2015).
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In an interactional analysis, we focus on the actions between parties in a certain situation
of risk. In this situation, the risk is subcontractor default. This risk occurred in the Indiana Toll
Road project where the owner had a problem with part of the contractor’s work and did not pay
them for it. The contractor in turn did not pay the subcontractor as well. It is a complete
information game since all actors know the possible actions by all other actors. This type of game
is solved using sub-game perfect equilibrium, which results in one equilibrium point (Selten
1975).
The first scenario is Scenario A from Table 5.9. This is a two-party analysis between the
subcontractor and contractor. Figure 5.3 shows the game theoretic diagram for this situation.
There are three levels of actions, starting with the subcontractor. In each level, there are two
branches, left branch that represents an action and a right branch, which represents no action.
Figure 5.3 is read as follows:
Subcontractor can threaten to sue (informal action) or maintain status quo (no
informal action). If subcontractor takes the choice on the right branch, decides on
status quo, the game ends here; otherwise the contractor has the next choice of action
if the subcontractor chooses the left branch.
Contractor responds to subcontractor’s informal action where he can either withhold
money from subcontractor (informal action) or give the subcontractor money (no
informal action). If the contractor takes the choice on the right branch, gives the
subcontractor money, then the game ends. If the contractor chooses the left branch
and withholds money, the subcontractor has the next choice of action.
In this final level, the subcontractor can either take a formal action, which is filing a
claim or no formal action, which is negotiation.
Under each choice, the payoff for each actor if the choice was taken is shown. A description of
the notations used is presented below:
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Ua b: utility of actor “a” under the request/benefit of actor “b”. Using an example
from Scenario A, in the second action where the contractor makes a choice. If the
contractor gives money to the subcontractor, this means that this action is requested
by (or to the benefit of) the subcontractor so its payoff is US

S

(read as utility of

subcontractor for the request of subcontractor) whereas the payoff for the contractor
is UC

S

(read as utility of contractor for the request of subcontractor). The maximum

payoff an actor can get is if the actor gets a utility for their request (Ua a), while the
minimum payoff an actor can get is a utility for the request of the opposing actor
(Ua b).
a

a

: transaction cost for informal action taken by actor a

: transaction cost for formal action taken by actor a

Scenario A
Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

Figure 5.3 Two-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario A
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As shown in Figure 5.3, the payoffs for each action are listed first for the subcontractor
followed by the contractor’s payoff. When an action is taken, the payoff is reduced by the cost of
this action. So when the subcontractor takes as informal action (threaten to sue), the cost shows
up under “give money” with

a

subtracted from the utility. This game is solved using backward

induction. Since there are two actions under each level and there are three levels, there is a total
of eight possibilities in this game. The solution is shown in Appendix C.
After the game is solved, a set of equations is extracted which provides criteria for the
eight possibilities under the game. When criteria are met under one of these eight possibilities, a
certain outcome is reached. Monte Carlo simulation is performed to get the probability of the
outcomes (Molenaar et al. 2010, Naderpajouh 2013). Anylogic software is used to perform these
simulations. Values for the parameters that were chosen are shown in Table 5.12. Since exact
numbers for the cost of informal or formal cost are unavailable, values were chosen that depict
the closest distribution for these costs. Changing these values would change the results for some
of the scenarios therefore it is important to try out different variations and settling on the one that
shows the closest version of the reality in a project.
The values for each of the nine parameters are shown and are kept constant throughout
the four sub-scenarios with the exception of one parameter that is changed. For example, under
high formal cost, the transaction cost for formal action is increased to a uniform value between
0.25 and 0.35 instead of the 0.15 to 0.25 in the base case. Simulations are carried out for 1000
times.

Definition
S
C
S

US

S

US

C

UC

C

UC

S

PL
PS

Cost of informal action by
the subcontractor
Cost of informal action by
the contractor
Cost of formal action by
the subcontractor
Utility of subcontractor
for its request
Utility of subcontractor
for request by contractor
Utility of contractor for
its request
Utility of contractor for
request by subcontractor
Probability of
subcontractor winning
litigation
Probability of
subcontractor winning
negotiation

Table 5.12 Value of Parameters for Scenario A
Base Case
High Formal Cost High Probability of
winning Litigation
Uniform(0-0.15)

Uniform(0-0.15)

Uniform(0-0.15)

High Probability
of winning
Negotiation
Uniform(0-0.15)

Uniform(0-0.15)

Uniform(0-0.15)

Uniform(0-0.15)

Uniform(0-0.15)

Uniform(0.150.25)
Uniform(0.75-1)

Uniform(0.2-0.35)

Uniform(0.150.25)
Uniform(0.75-1)

Uniform(0.150.25)
Uniform(0.75-1)

0
Uniform(0.75-1)
0

Uniform(0.75-1)
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
0

0
Uniform(0.75-1)
0

0
Uniform(0.75-1)
0

Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.55)

Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.55)
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Figure 5.4 Simulation for 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario A
Legend:
x-axis: range of payoffs received for each party (where the subcontractor is yellow and the
contractor is blue)
y-axis: count of times this range of payoffs was received out of 1000 simulations
This game was simulated and the results are shown in Figure 5.4. Simulation shows that
the Nash equilibrium is negotiation in all four sub-scenarios for the majority of the simulations.
Filing a claim is never reached as it provides a lower payoff than the alternatives. The x-axis
shows the range of payoffs received for each party where the subcontractor is yellow and the
contractor is blue. The y-axis shows the count of how many times this range of payoffs was
received out of 1000 simulations. In the base case, it can be noticed that the contractor has a
higher count for high payoffs than the subcontractor. Each scenario can be compared to the base
case in order to check the effect of changing a parameter on the payoffs received. For example,
when there is a high probability of winning litigation, payoffs for the subcontractor shift toward

108
the left, which means that their payoffs are decreasing compared to the base case. On the other
hand, the payoffs for the contractor increase, as can be seen (in Figure 5.4) with the payoffs
shifting towards the right. The number of times negotiation as the Nash equilibrium decreases and
the number of times where status quo as the equilibrium increases, which explains the increase in
payoffs for the contractor since payoffs for negotiation is higher than for status quo for the
contractor. In the case of high probability of winning negotiation, negotiation is the Nash
equilibrium for 943 out of 1000 simulations. It can be noticed that the payoffs for the
subcontractor increase, shifting to the right as compared to the base case.

Scenario B

Figure 5.5 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario B
The second scenario is Scenario B from Table 5.9. This is a two-party analysis between
the subcontractor and contractor. Figure 5.5 shows the game theoretic diagram for this situation.
There are three levels of actions, starting with the subcontractor. In each level, there two
branches, one left branch that represents an action and a right branch, which represents no action.
The diagram is read as follows:
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Subcontractor can threaten to sue (informal action) or maintain status quo (no
informal action). If subcontractor takes the choice on the right branch, decides on
status quo, the game ends here; otherwise the contractor has the next choice of action
if the subcontractor chooses the left branch.
Contractor responds to subcontractor’s informal action where he can either withhold
money from subcontractor (informal action) or give the subcontractor money (no
informal action). If the contractor takes the choice on the right branch, gives the
subcontractor money, then the game ends. If the contractor chooses the left branch
and withholds money, the subcontractor has the next choice of action.
In this final level, the subcontractor can either take a formal action, which is filing a
claim or no formal action, which is stopping work.
Equations for the payoffs received are shown in Figure 5.5 for each party at each action.
Simulations were performed for this scenario and the parameters chosen are presented in Table
5.14 and the simulation results shown in Figure 5.6.
Table 5.14 Value of Parameters for Scenario B
High Formal Cost
High Probability of
winning Litigation
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15Uniform(0.2-0.35)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
0.25)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
0
Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35)
Normal(0.15,0.55)

Uniform(0.75-1)
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.55)

Base Case

S
C
S

US
US
UC
UC
PL
PS

S
C
C
S

Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.35)

High Probability of
winning Negotiation
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
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Figure 5.6 Simulation for 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario B
Scenario C

Figure 5.7 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario C
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The third scenario we will discuss is Scenario C from Table 5.10. This is a two-party
analysis between the IFA and contractor. Figure 5.7 shows the game theoretic diagram for this
situation. There are four levels of actions, starting with the IFA. In each level, there two branches,
one left branch that represents an action and a right branch, which represents no action. The
diagram is read as follows:
IFA can withhold money from the contractor (informal action) or maintain status quo
(no informal action). If IFA takes the choice on the right branch, decides on status
quo, the game ends here; otherwise the contractor has the next choice of action if the
IFA chooses the left branch.
Contractor responds to the IFA’s informal action where he can either withhold
money from subcontractor (informal action) or give the subcontractor money (no
informal action). If the contractor takes the choice on the right branch, gives the
subcontractor money, then the game ends. If the contractor chooses the left branch
and withholds money, IFA has the next choice of action.
Next action is performed by the IFA where the choices are either sending a formal
notice to the contractor for the incorrect work (formal action) or settling with
contractor (no formal action).
In this final level, the contractor can either choose litigation (formal action) or
negotiation (no formal action).
Equations for the payoffs received are shown in Figure 5.7 for each party at each action.
Simulations were performed for this scenario and the parameters chosen are presented in Table
5.13.
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Table 5.13 Value of Parameters for Scenario C
High Formal Cost
High Probability of
winning Litigation
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15Uniform(0.2-0.35) Uniform(0.15-0.25)
0.25)
Uniform(0.15Uniform(0.2-0.35) Uniform(0.15-0.25)
0.25)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
0
Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35)
Normal(0.15,0.55)

Uniform(0.75-1)
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.55)

Base Case

i
C
i
C

Ui
Ui
UC
UC
PL
PN

i
C
C
i

Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.35)

High Probability of
winning Negotiation
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)

Figure 5.8 shows the results of the simulations for the four scenarios. All cases are
compared to the base case in order to see how changing one parameter affects the payoffs of the
actors. In the case of high formal costs, payoffs for the contractor decrease while payoffs for the
IFA increase. This is because the Nash equilibrium shifts toward the start of the game so it is
more likely to end at status quo and plan modification than go through formal costs.. it can be
seen that litigation is never a Nash equilibrium regardless of what scenario we look at. In cases of
high probability for winning negotiation or litigation, it is observed that the payoffs for the IFA
(in orange) decrease, shifting towards the right whereas the payoffs for the contractor (in blue)
increase, shifting towards the right. The best sub-scenarios for each actor can be observed from
looking at the four bar charts. For the IFA, the best scenarios are the top two (base case and high
formal costs) whereas for the contractor are the bottom two (high probability of winning
negotiation or litigation).
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Figure 5.8 Simulation for 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario C

Three-Party Interactional Analysis
Expanding on the two-party interactional analysis, a new dimension is introduced by adding one
more party to the scenario. Previous literature only discussed two parties in game theoretic
concepts; hence this dissertation aims to introduce a new idea. This section discusses three-party
scenarios for the ITR project that were presented in Table 5.11.
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Scenario D

Figure 5.9 3-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario D
Figure 5.9 shows the game theoretic framework for the three-party interaction. The three
parties involved are: IFA, contractor and subcontractor. There are three levels of actions, starting
with the IFA. In each level, there two branches, one left branch that represents an action and a
right branch, which represents no action. The logic in the diagram is read as follows:
IFA can withhold money from the contractor (informal action) or maintain status quo
(no informal action). If IFA takes the choice on the right branch, decides on status
quo, the game ends here; otherwise the contractor has the next choice of action if the
IFA chooses the left branch.
Contractor responds to the IFA’s informal action where he can either withhold
money from subcontractor (informal action) or give the subcontractor money (no
informal action). If the contractor takes the choice on the right branch, gives the
subcontractor money, then the game ends. If the contractor chooses the left branch
and withholds money, the subcontractor has the next choice of action.
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In this final level, the subcontractor can either take a formal action, which is filing a
claim or no formal action, which is negotiating with the contractor.

Table 5.15 Value of Parameters for Scenario D
High Formal Cost
High Probability of
winning Litigation
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15Uniform(0.2-0.35) Uniform(0.15-0.25)
0.25)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
0
Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35)
Normal(0.15,0.55)

Uniform(0.75-1)
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.55)

Base Case

i
C
S

US
US
UC
UC
Ui
Ui
PL
PS

S
C
C
S
S
C

Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.35)

High Probability of
winning Negotiation
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)

Figure 5.10 Simulation for 3-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario D
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Table 5.15 shows the values of parameters used for this scenario. This game was
simulated for 1000 simulations and the results are shown in Figure 5.10. Simulation shows that
high formal cost shifts the game away from litigation so it ends before any of the actors can do
formal actions. In all scenarios, negotiation is the Nash equilibrium in the majority of the
simulations. Litigation is a close contender when the probability of winning litigation is high.
Subcontractor gets highest count of high payoffs in the case of high probability of winning
negotiation. For the contractor, the base case and high formal cost sub-scenarios provide highest
payoff since their payoff histogram shifts towards the right (increasing ranges of payoff). For the
IFA, the two scenarios on the bottom, high probability of winning negotiation or litigation offer
higher payoffs.
Scenario E

Figure 5.11 3-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario E

Figure 5.11 shows the game theoretic framework for the three-party interaction for
Scenario E. This game is similar to the previous one, Scenario D with a difference in the
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subcontractor’s action in the end of the game. In the final level, the subcontractor can either take
an informal action, which is stop work (instead of litigation like in Scenario D) or no informal
action, which is negotiating with the contractor. Table 5.16 shows the values of parameters used
for the simulation.
Table 5.16 Value of Parameters for Scenario E
Base Case
i
Uniform(0-0.15)
C
Uniform(0-0.15)
S
Uniform(0-0.15)
US S
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
US C
Uniform(0.75-1)
UC C
0
UC S
Normal(0.15,0.35)
PL
Normal(0.15,0.35)
PS

Figure 5.12 shows the result of the simulation. It shows that the Nash equilibrium is
negotiation in 950 times out of 1000. The spread of payoffs shows that the contractor has a higher
count of high payoffs than subcontractor and IFA. The parameters were varied but there was
close to no change in the simulation results so they were not shown here. This shows that this
scenario is not sensitive to changes in the value of transaction cost or probabilities of winning
litigation or negotiation.
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Figure 5.12 Simulation for 3-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario E
Scenario F
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Figure 5.13 3-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario F
Figure 5.13 shows the game theoretic framework for the three-party interaction for
Scenario F. The three parties involved are: IFA, contractor and subcontractor. There are four
levels of actions, starting with the IFA. In each level, there two branches, one left branch that
represents an action and a right branch, which represents no action. The logic in the diagram is
read as follows:
IFA can withhold money from the contractor (informal action) or maintain status quo
(no informal action). If IFA takes the choice on the right branch, decides on status
quo, the game ends here; otherwise the contractor has the next choice of action if the
IFA chooses the left branch.
Contractor responds to the IFA’s informal action where he can either withhold
money from subcontractor (informal action) or give the subcontractor money (no
informal action). If the contractor takes the choice on the right branch, gives the
subcontractor money, then the game ends. If the contractor chooses the left branch
and withholds money, the subcontractor has the next choice of action.
Subcontractor can either file a lien (formal action), or no formal action, which is
negotiating with the contractor.
The final action is performed by the IFA where they can wither choose litigation
(formal action) or settlement (no formal action) with the contractor.
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Table 5.17 Value of Parameters for Scenario F
High Formal Cost
High Probability of
winning Litigation
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15Uniform(0.2-0.35) Uniform(0.15-0.25)
0.25)
Uniform(0.2-0.3)
Uniform(0.2-0.3)
Uniform(0.2-0.3)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
0
Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35)
Normal(0.15,0.65)

Uniform(0.2-0.3)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.65)

Base Case
i
C
i
S

US
US
UC
UC
PL
PS

S
C
C
S

Normal(0.15,0.35)

Normal(0.15,0.35)

High Probability of
winning Negotiation
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)

Table 5.17 shows the values of parameters chosen for this scenario. Simulations were performed
the results shown in Figure 5.14. It can be noticed that the payoff distributions are similar in all
cases. However, in the high probability of winning litigation, the subcontractor has the best
payoff distribution since it shifts towards the right while the IFA and subcontractor have the
worst payoff distribution since it shifts towards the left. Stopping at the second action (plan
modification) is always the Nash equilibrium regardless of which sub-scenario is looked at.

121

Figure 5.14 Simulation for 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario F

Scenario G

Figure 5.15 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario G

122

i
C
S
i

US
US
UC
UC
PL
PS

S
C
C
S

Table 5.18 Value of Parameters for Scenario G
Base Case
High Probability of
winning Negotiation
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
Normal(0.15,0.35)
Normal(0.15,0.35)
Normal(0.15,0.35)
Normal(0.15,0.55)

Table 5.18 shows the values of parameters chosen for this scenario. Simulations were
performed the results shown in Figure 5.15. It can be noticed that the payoff distributions are
similar in both cases. However, in the high probability of winning negotiation, the subcontractor
has a slightly better payoff distribution since it shifts towards the right while the IFA and
subcontractor have a slightly worse payoff distribution since it shifts towards the left. Stopping at
the second action (plan modification) is always the Nash equilibrium regardless of which subscenario is looked at.
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Figure 5.16 Simulation for 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario G
In order to validate the model and results, the experts at the ITR were first shown the
scenarios obtained to validate that all possible scenarios were taken into consideration. These
seven scenarios were found to be the only plausible scenarios that depict how this risk could
enfold. The results were also discussed with them and were approved by the experts as credible
results that formed plausible strategies as will be discussed in the next section.
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Discussion of the ITR Project Case Study
The Indiana Toll Road project is a unique project because it has faced problems since its start
specifically the bankruptcy process. This chapter presented the decision tool used to discover high
risks in the project and model the interactions between parties through the creation of strategies in
order to study the different outcomes and choose the optimal strategy. Tables 5.19 to 5.21 present
the strategies and payoffs for all the scenarios.
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Table 5.19 Expected Payoffs for each scenario (Subcontractor Vs. Contractor)
Subcontractor (S)

Contractor (C)

Asks for money,
threatens to sue
OR Status Quo

Denies/Withholds money
from subcontractor
OR Pay subcontractor

Subcontractor (S)

Scenario

Expected
Payoffs

Litigation
OR Settlement

Scenario A

S: 229.4
C: 517.3

Litigation
OR Stops work

Scenario B

S: 218.1
C: 283.5

Table 5.20 Expected Payoffs for each scenario (IFA Vs. Contractor)
IFA (I)

Contractor (C)

IFA (I)

Contractor (C)

Scenario

Expected Payoff

Sends notice to
contractor
OR Status Quo

Sends notice of
potential claim against
owner
OR No action

Withholds money
from contractor
OR Settlement

Litigation
OR Negotiation

Scenario C

I: 425.6
C: 244.1

Table 5.21 Expected Payoffs for each scenario (IFA Vs. Contractor Vs. Subcontractor)
IFA (I)

Withholds money from
contractor

Contractor (C)

Subcontractor (S)

Withhold money from
subcontractor

Files a lien
OR Resolves issue with
contractor

4th Action (IFA)

-

Scenario

Expected
Payoff

Scenario D

S: 321.7
I: 271.1
C: 462.2
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OR Status Quo

Litigates contractor
OR Settles with
contractor

OR Pay subcontractor

Stops work –
OR Resolves issue with
contractor

Scenario F

S: 868.3
I: 796.3
C: 51.3

Scenario E

S: 311.3
I: 240.8
C: 497.9

Scenario G

S: 870.6
I: 799
C: 50

Litigates contractor
OR Settles with
contractor
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Tables 5.19 to 5.21 present the expected payoffs for all scenarios for the actors involved.
The expected payoff is calculated as the summation of expected payoffs for the game (average for
the range multiplied by number of times it occurs in the game). Comparing the scenarios between
subcontractor and contractor (4 and 5), Scenario A produces better payoffs for both actors. Hence
it is always bad for both actors if the subcontractor chooses to stop work over settling and should
be avoided at all times.
Table 5.21 presents the expected payoffs for the three party games. Comparing the two
games where each actor only plays once (Scenario D and 0’), Scenario D provides a higher
expected payoff for both the IFA and subcontractor but a lower payoff for the contractor.
Comparing scenarios F and G where the IFA takes an additional action in the end shows that
Scenario F produces higher expected payoffs for all actors.

Table 5.22 Best scenarios for each actor
Best 2-Party Scenario
Actor

IFA Vs.Contractor

IFA

Scenario C

Contractor

Scenario C

Subcontractor

Contractor Vs.
Subcontractor

Best 3-Party Scenario
Scenario G

Scenario A

Scenario E

Scenario A

Scenario G

Table 5.22 shows the best scenarios for each actor in the 2-party and 3-party games. For the 3
party games, IFA and subcontractor have the same best scenario, which is Scenario E so it is in
their best interest to play that strategy. The subcontractor should file a lien (or resolve issue with
contractor) followed by IFA’s action to litigate (or settle with contractor). In the two-party game
between the contractor and subcontractor, the subcontractor should choose the strategy to
settle/negotiate over stopping work because it produces higher payoffs for both actors.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter showcased the research methodology through applying the ITR case study. First,
ICRAM-PPP was applied and discussed to show how the risks can be assessed. Next, thresholds
were chosen and high risks were obtained. One of these high risks was chosen for further
analysis. Using scenario analysis, seven scenarios were created for the risk (three two-party
scenarios and four three-party scenarios). Using game theoretic concepts, the scenarios were
converted into games and solved to create equations. Simulations were performed to analyze the
differences in payoffs obtained from changing the parameters. Finally, tables were created to
tabulate the best scenarios for each actor and extract their best strategies. The following chapter
presents the research conclusions and recommendations.
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6

NEGOTIATION

6.1 Introduction
This chapter starts by introducing the foundation of negotiation theory and discussing
renegotiations in PPP projects. Interactional analysis is then introduced to simulate a
renegotiation scenario for PPP projects. A case study, the Tanzania Railway Project, is chosen to
apply the interactional analysis framework and simulate different scenarios that could possibly
occur.
6.2 Negotiation Theory
Negotiation theory is the study of interactions between parties in a negotiation setting. Under
these settings, each party has an agenda to fulfill and they interact together to reach a conclusion.
The four main foundations of negotiation theory are decision analysis, behavioral decisionmaking, game theory, and negotiation analysis (Sebenius 2007). Decision analysis is the study of
decisions for one player where he/she seeks to optimize the received payoff based on several
decisions they have available. Behavioral decision-making adds the behavioral/psychological
aspects into decision-making and how players behave in a situation. Game theory is the study of
how players act or make a choice in a given scenario to reach an optimal payoff under a game of
n-players. Negotiation analysis is based on decision theory and game theory and seeks to give
prescriptive advice to a party in a negotiation scenario (Sebenius 1992).
The idea behind negotiation theory is to study the interactions between parties in order to
resolve the scenario in the best way possible for the parties involved. One of the concepts that
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many researchers have looked into is the idea of balance of power (Aguirre 2008). In any
contractual relationship, power may not be balanced between the parties due to various reasons
such as asymmetry of information between them, resources they have available, and tactics they
can use such as threats, coalitions and rewards (Aguirre 2008). Habeeb (1988) defines power as
composing of two main components: structural power and behavior power. Structural power
refers to an actor’s resources and capabilities while behavioral power refers to the actor’s
behavior and how they use their resources. Actions taken by each actor are also referred to as
negotiation tactics, which include threats and coalition formation (Aguirre 2008). Zartman (1976)
added three more definitions of power to the structural and behavioral components, which are:
strategic, processual and integrative. Strategic approach refers to the strategy or path that an actor
takes to secure their end goal and is considered the foundation for game theory (Alfredson and
Cungu 2008). The processual approach assumes that the negotiation is a learning process for the
actors in which they follow each other’s actions before taking the next action. The final approach
is the integrative approach, which looks at negotiation as a way to create an outcome of mutual
gain where all parties can win.
According to Kennedy et al. (1987), more than 80% of the negotiation time is spent in
arguments. These arguments adversely affect the negotiation process and delay its resolution.
Peña-Mora and Wang (1998) developed a negotiation tool using negotiation theory and game
theory. They defined five forms of negotiations: fighting, facilitation, mediation, arbitration, and
adjudication where the actors have control over the negotiation result in the beginning (fighting)
and lose this control as the negotiation form reaches adjudication (Peña-Mora and Wang 1998).
This dissertation focuses on three-party interactional analysis to evaluate possible scenarios in
which a negotiation process can pan out and show the outcomes/payoffs for all actors under each
scenario in order to provide a framework for future negotiations.
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6.3 Negotiation/Renegotiation in PPP projects
Renegotiations: Definition and Causes
Parties enter into a partnership in order to deal with risks and uncertainties in the project
jointly instead of having to rewrite the contract whenever a change occurs (Zou 2012). An
important risk that is inevitable in projects is renegotiation. Renegotiations occur in PPP projects
regardless of their sector, duration and location. A renegotiation can be defined as a change in the
original contract signed by the parties. It is a severe risk that occurs in many projects and can be
triggered by the occurrence of other risks. Examples of such triggers include modifications to the
originally agreed upon contract terms such as reduction/increase in the level of service, contract
extension, reduction/increase in tariffs and changes in the financial agreement (Guasch et al.
2014). Other causes include changes in the risk-sharing mechanism between the parties and
changes in project scope such as additions to the contract. However, in cases where changes are
written in the contract, such as tariff adjustment they are not considered renegotiation cases
(Guasch et al. 2014). After renegotiation, both parties agree on a new contract with the added
terms such as extension of time, additional payments or changed scope.
Domingues and Zlatkovic (2015) classified renegotiation triggers into four areas:
“institutional and regulatory frameworks, contract design, macro-economic environment and
political and social environment”. There are several causes behind contract renegotiations, some
of which fall under these four areas. The list below shows some of these causes (Bitran et al.
2012, Guasch et al. 2014, Shlyk 2009).
New administration taking over
Opportunistic behavior of government or firm
Political instability
Social opposition to a project or to an enforcement of tolls in case of roadway projects
Weak State institutions
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Vague legislation
Poor contract design
Long duration of the concession and inability to consider all contingencies
Changes in performance criteria
Recession
Economic instability
Incomplete contract (since it is extremely costly if not impossible to create a contract that
encompasses all possible risks, outcomes and mitigation strategies)
Failure to achieve performance indicators
Information asymmetry
Lack of trust between parties
Instability of either party
Opportunistic behavior can be seen during the bidding phase, for example, the private party
can lower their costs if they believe that they can renegotiate at a later time and retrieve this cost.
The public party can also be opportunistic by trying to change contractual terms later on and
relieving itself from some of the risks by transferring it to the private party (Garvin 2009).
Opportunistic behavior can also manifest during contract execution or during proposal of changes
in the contract (Brux 2009). Xiong and Zhang (2016) proposed a model to show the value of
renegotiations in PPP projects using real option theory to find out whether a renegotiationallowed contract is better than a renegotiation-proof one.
Reside and Mendoza (2010) introduced political risk as the government’s action to make
changes to regulations or investment and they presented examples of how currency risk has led to
renegotiations. An example is the tariff freeze in Argentina as a means for mitigating the effects
of the currency collapse in 2001, as well as after the Mexican crisis in 1994, which caused a
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reduction in the expected traffic demand, and then the Asian crisis in 1997, which caused a
devaluation of the Thailand Baht, all of which led to renegotiations. Other crises were the
currency collapse in Brazil in 1999 and in the Dominican Republic in 2003 (Reside and Mendoza
2010).
Renegotiations affect all parties such as the government, private sector and general public.
Consequences of renegotiations include (Guasch et al. 2014):
Higher costs to the government
Loss of government credibility
Public opposition to changes made
Public boycotting the project
Renegotiations can lead to an extension in contract duration, certain tax exemptions, or extra
subsidy from the government (Ho 2006). Guasch et al. (2014) suggested that the average
percentages of renegotiations occur in the construction phase 55% of the time and after the
construction phase 45% of the time for the countries they studied. However, they did not give
details as to when exactly they occurred or if it was a cascading risk or not. No previous research
has focused on risk outcomes and if the risk was eliminated or resolved after the renegotiation or
if caused more problems afterward. Renegotiations can either be seen as a risk that affects
projects or as a consequence of other risks that occur. In this research, renegotiation is looked at
as an outcome or consequence of other risks occurring. Table 6.1 shows a summary of the
statistics available on the number of renegotiated projects. The percentage of renegotiation varies
according to the country, where it was about 30% in East Asia, 50% in Latin America and 60%
from 13 developing countries (Guasch et al. 2006, Reside and Mendoza 2010 and Woodhouse
2006). The number of renegotiations per project also varies from an average of 2 renegotiations in
Chile to 20 renegotiations in Columbia (Bitran et al. 2012).
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Table 6.1 Statistics on renegotiated projects
Source
Guasch et

Location an time period of
study
1980s to 2000 in Latin

Total projects

Renegotiated Projects

307 projects

162 (53 firms’ calls, 15 joint calls

al. (2007)
Woodhouse
(2006)
Engel et al.
(2009)
Reside and
Mendoza
(2010)
Bitran et
al. (2012)

America
Electric power projects from
13 developing countries
1993 and 2006 in Chile

1993 to 2010 in Chile,
Columbia and Peru

61 projects

Raje (2014)

1991-2000 in the United
states

21 transport
projects

1986-2008 in East Asia

34 energy
projects
50 concession
projects
About 2700
projects

and 94 governments’ call)
21 projects underwent renegotiation
148 renegotiations or three
renegotiations on average per project
826 renegotiated projects

540 renegotiations
Mean: 2.2, 20.5 and 4.8 per country
respectively.
6 renegotiated projects

One of the triggers of renegotiation is when the government seeks to construct a new
building or roadway near the existing PPP project that may affect its revenues. Some contracts
started including a non-compete clause to prevent this from happening like in the “91 Express
Lanes” project in California where the concessionaire filed a lawsuit against CalTrans (California
Department of Transportation) for attempting to expand on a nearby facility, thereby stopping its
attempt. In an attempt to reduce renegotiations and the costs incurred as a consequence, the
Chilean government incorporated a cap between 10-30% for price changes during the concession
period (Engel et al. 2009). Engel et al. (2009) studied 16 concessions and reported a price
increase of $1.6 billion during the concession period as compared to the cap price of $483M
deeming this cap clause an unsuccessful attempt.
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Triggers of renegotiations
Renegotiations can take place due to instigations from the government, private party or an
outside party. Governments renegotiate in order to appease the general public about a new
project, eliminate their opposition, gain more votes in upcoming elections, increase their profitshare or readjust risk distribution. An example of government instigation is when the Malaysian
government tried to renegotiate contracts with independent power producers in order to gain back
some profit from the “guaranteed off-takes” they had agreed on (Reside and Mendoza 2010). The
private party renegotiates when it feels that it may have the upper hand due to more knowledge in
a project or weak government in order to increase its profit. Outside parties can directly or
indirectly affect PPP projects such as public protest to a project like the Vasco da Gama project
discussed in a later section.
Cases of renegotiations
Guasch (2004) examined 1,000 PPP projects between the 1980s and 2000 in Latin America
and found that 30% of these projects were renegotiated after an average of 2.2 years only. The
result of these renegotiations led to a delay in project target for 69% of the projects, an increase in
agreed tariffs for 62% of the contracts, and a reduction of the investment for 62% of the projects
(Guasch 2004, Brux 2009). Engel et al. (2009) studied 50 concession projects between 1993 and
2006 in Chile and reported a sum of 148 renegotiations or an average of three renegotiations per
project with an increase in the total investment from $8.4 billion to $11.3 billion. Woodhouse
(2006) examined 34 energy projects and reported that 21 of them underwent mutual or unilateral
renegotiations. Reside and Mendoza (2010) estimated 826 renegotiated projects or 30 percent of
projects in East Asia from 1986 to 2008 as well as about 20 percent of renegotiated projects
around the world at that time.
One project that underwent renegotiations is the Da Chang WFOE (Wholly Foreign-
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Owned Enterprise) BOT in Shanghai where the government decided to modify their policy and
change the fixed rate of return that was in existence (Choi et al. 2009). Negotiations were
unsuccessful and the private company eventually exited the project and sold its assets.
6.4 Interactional Analysis application in Negotiations
There are several modeling/simulation techniques available such as agent-based modeling,
system dynamics and game theory. Table 6.2 shows some of the previous research conducted on
negotiations using different modeling techniques.

Table 6.2 Previous Research showing modeling techniques for negotiations
Source
Carneiro

Description of work
al. Applied case-based reasoning to propose an online dispute resolution

et

(2013)

mechanism in legal cases

Leu et al. (2014)

Used Bayesian theory to analyze the opponent's historical offers and
approximately predict the opponent's preference over procurement price
negotiations

Xue et al. (2005)

Proposed an agent-based multi-attribute negotiation framework for
supply chain coordination issues. They also commented that simulating
behaviors was a challenge and limitation in their research
Used case-based reasoning and multi-attribute utility theory to model

Sycara (1990)

labor negotiations
Zlotkin

and Applied game theory to multi-agent negotiation

Rosenschein (1989)
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Literature has proposed the use of game theory to model negotiations or interactions between
parties (Ho 2006, Shen et al. 2007, Blockuis et al. 2012 and Naderpajouh et al. 2014). In this
research, game theory has been chosen to apply interactional analysis because it is the optimal
method to model interactions between parties as it focuses on actions and payoffs of players in a
game. It is based on the interactions of parties in a situation where each of them has a set of
actions/counter-actions that they can take. These actions dictate what their payoff is based on how
the game proceeds.
Game theory frameworks or models consist of three main aspects: “players, strategies and
payoffs” (Glumac et al 2015). Game theory can be used to portray the opponents’ behavior,
strategy and payoff for each move they make (Ho 2006). It can be used to solve situations of
conflict by estimating the “equilibrium point of conflict” (Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos 2008). It
can portray both competitive and cooperative behavior of players. Game theory has been used in
various fields such as psychology, economics and political science. Parsons and Wooldridge
(2002) state seven important properties of frameworks for multi-agent interactions:
1. Guaranteed success: when an agreement is ensured to happen. This is reached through
Nash equilibrium in game theory where Nash equilibrium represents the best-case
solution for all parties so they do not have any incentive to deviate from it.
2. Maximizing social welfare: when the negotiation result maximizes the aggregate utility
of all actors.
3. Pareto efficiency: occurs in the absence of another outcome that would increase an
actor’s utility without reducing another actor’s utility
4. Individual rationality: when rationality of all actors’ is the best strategy for all of them to
play.
5. Stability: such as Nash Equilibrium.
6. Simplicity: when an actor can easily reach the best strategy.
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7. Distribution: occurs when the framework reduces communication among actors.
Several authors (Asgari et al. 2014, Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos 2008, Madani 2010,
Madani and Lund 2011, Parsons and Wooldridge 2002, Samsura et al. 2009, Zlotkin and
Rosenschein 1989) proposed the use of game theory in various negotiations settings to analyze
and portray parties’ behaviors. Asgari et al. (2014) proposed a game theory framework to model
resource management and sharing among subcontractors. Naderpajouh et al. (2014) used game
theory to model social opposition to infrastructure projects. Madani (2010) applied game theory
to address conflicts in managing water resources. Samsura et al. (2009) used game theory to
model the behavior of actors in situations of decision-making related to land development. It can
be seen that game theory has been an important and effective technique in identifying the effects
of interactions between actors on the collective decision-making process in diverse settings.
However, all these researches have only looked at two-party interactions.
6.5 Tanzania Railway Project
Introduction
This chapter introduces the Tanzania Railways project as the renegotiation case study in this
dissertation. Multiple scenarios were created using interactional analysis between two and three
parties to show possible outcomes and best strategies. This is performed through three steps: the
first step is applying ICRAM-PPP to the project to get the high risks, the second step is creating
appropriate scenarios using scenario analysis, and the third step is applying the Interactional
Analysis framework to the risk scenario chosen.
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Background
This section describes the historic background of the project, parties involved and then introduces
the problems they faced. Data collection for this case study included analysis of published papers
and newspaper articles.
This project involves the rehabilitation, development and operation of the 2700 km railway. It
involves an investment by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) for up to $44 million for a
25-year concession contract. The Government of Tanzania entered into contract with a
consortium led by RITES of India by forming a new company, Tanzania Railways Limited or
TRL (International Finance Corporation 2016). Table 6.3 shows the parties involved, their roles
and concerns in the negotiation scenarios.

Party
Concessionaire

Government

Parliament

Table 6.3 Roles and Concerns of the Three Parties in TRL
Role
Concern
Delay of ($44M) investment
Contractual party that is responsible
promised by IFC
for rehabilitating, developing and
operating the railway.
Strike induced by the Union
Strike induced by the Union
Contractual party that represents the
Project delay caused by potential
project owner.
union-induced strike

Legislative body responsible for
passing acts to promote privatization
and improve road network.

Lower asset performance
compared to before the
concession
Government’s increased
financial involvement (as
compared to the original
contractual terms for the PPP
project)

The timeline of events that led to problems in the concession are as follows (Highbeam
Business 2008, Phipps 2009, Shlyk 2009, Worldbank Document ICR00001299 2010, Railway
Gazette 2011):
October 2007: the concession commenced
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January 2008: Tanzania Railway Association Workers Union (TRAWU) requested salary
increase (that was previously promised to them by the Government)
February 2008: TRAWU threatened to strike if their requests were not heeded to
March 2008: TRL met the Ministry of Infrastructure Development (MOID) and Reli
Asset Holding Company (RAHCO), which is a government agency tasked with securing
and providing railway infrastructure, to discuss the union’s request but no decision was
made
April 2008: TRAWU went on strike. TRL met MOID again and the Government of
Tanzania (GoT) where GoT decided to contribute towards the salary increase. Workers
and media requested to revoke the concession contract. There were criticisms about TRL
and the IFC loan was delayed. TRL suggested that GoT approach the Government of
India to ask for a loan but that was refused.
Threats of cancellations
November 2008: TRL sought to renegotiate the contract and made three requests: 1)
concession fee cancellation for the first five years, 2) exemption from the fuel levy for the
fuel used for the maintenance of roads, 3) shifting of the concession’s focus to rolling
stock investments with GoT focusing on all infrastructure investments.
Members of Parliament (MPs) emphasized that the asset’s performance under the
concession was lower than before the concession. Many of the MPs were from opposition
parties so they called for cancellation of the contract.
2009 RAHCO denied any renegotiation. There were delays in payment of wages that led
to industrial action by the workers. Eventually RITES pulled out its staff and GoT took
control of the project.
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In this chapter, the parties involved in the risk scenarios and interactional analyses are:
Government of Tanzania, Concessionaire, and Parliament. The Parliament is introduced in the
three-party analysis.
ICRAM-PPP for Tanzania Railways Project
ICRAM-PPP was applied to the Tanzania Railways project to identify the spectrum of risks
involved. Extensive literature review about the project was conducted prior to applying ICRAMPPP. Tables 6.4 to 6.6 present the results for the macro, market and project level analysis. The
risk assessments for each level were assumed based on the literature review conducted on each
risk. Same steps were taken to calculate the weight and weighted assessment for ICRAM-PPP as
for the Indiana Toll Road case study discussed in Chapter 5 (and shown in Appendix B). For the
market level, the “higher level impact” marks the activities that are affected by the macro level
and for the project levels, the “higher level impact” marks the activities that are affected by the
market or macro levels. These activities were found to be impacted by the higher level based on
literature review conducted by the researcher on these risks. Appendix A shows the list of the
literature collected which include over 400 articles and case studies.

Table 6.4 Tanzania Railways Project - Macro Level Risks
Criteria
Operational
Risks

Political
Risks

Financial
Risks

Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators)
1.orc=Political continuity/Stability of Government
2.orc=Attitude toward foreign/private investors and profit
3.orc=Nationalization/Expropriation/sequestration of assets
4.orc=Enforceability of contracts
5.orc=Government Incentives
6.orc=Inadequate/Absence/Change of national PPP laws and standardized models for
PPP projects
7.orc=Changes in country/region legislation and regulation
8.orc=Monetary inflation
9.orc=Economic growth and volatility
10.orc=Bureaucratic delays
11.orc=Required services (IT infrastructure, Communication, Transportation, etc.)
1.prc=Regional turbulences (war, etc.)
2.prc=Dependence on or importance of major power network
3.prc=Fragmented political structure (e.g. local and federal governments)
5.prc=Institutional behaviors including nationalism, corruption, and dishonesty
6.prc=Social conditions (e.g., population, density & wealth distribution)
7.prc=Satisfying short-term interest of the governing body
8.prc=Societal conflicts
9.prc=Government reliability/creditworthiness/cooperation
10.prc=Instability because of nonconstitutional changes
1.frc=Actual laws versus practices for repatriation of capital
2.frc=Current account balance
3.frc=Capital flow
4.frc=Foreign exchange reserves
6.frc=Debt as GDP converted to US dollars
7.frc=Capacity to service debt
8.frc=Extent of deficit/surplus
9.frc=Restrictions to refinancing schemes
10.frc=Sources of revenue and major spending
Sum

Weight

Risk
Assessment

Weighted
Assessment

0.026465471
0.01935436
0.01766811
0.019417852
0.017721707

75
50
75
75
50

1.984910328
0.967717996
1.325108225
1.456338899
0.886085343

0.014765615
0.017940219
0.088888889
0.044444444
0.044444444
0.022222222
0.091358025
0.045679012
0.026111111
0.017407407
0.017407407
0.026111111
0.046825397
0.036419753
0.026014109
0.087575758
0.048257576
0.016085859
0.067121212
0.029141414
0.029141414
0.021003788
0.016336279
0.018670034

75
75
25
75
100
50
75
75
75
75
75
75
100
50
75
50
75
50
50
50
50
100
100
75

1.10742115
1.345516388
2.222222222
3.333333333
4.444444444
1.111111111
6.851851852
3.425925926
1.958333333
1.305555556
1.305555556
1.958333333
4.682539683
1.820987654
1.951058201
4.378787879
3.619318182
0.804292929
3.356060606
1.457070707
1.457070707
2.100378788
1.633627946
1.400252525

1

64.2509583
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Table 6.5 Tanzania Railways Project - Market Level Risks
Criteria
Technology
Contracts &
Legal
Req.
Resources

Financing

Business
Cultural
Differences
Market
Potential

Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators)
1m=Investor’s technological advantage
2m=Availability of basic construction technologies and equipment
3m=Type of partnership
4m=Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract
5m=Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of many
agencies, delay in granting approvals)
6m=Availability and quality of local…
7m=Availability of construction material
8m=Availability of skilled and unskilled labor
9m=Labor cost/productivity
10m=Availability of equipment and parts
11m=Availability of financing
12m=Tax and non tax incentives
13m=Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate
14m=Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability
15m=Interaction of foreign management…
16m=A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship
17m=Risk management practices of parties involved
18m=Current market volume in core competency
19m=Future market industry volume
20m=Bidding volume index resulting in competition
21m=Stability of associated industries
Sum

Weight
0.101846091
0.101846091
0.081259811
0.064788228
0.051610961
0.030715218
0.045634039
0.041968861
0.025036775
0.019255087
0.052814438
0.035209625
0.035209625
0.035209625
0.047258882
0.047258882
0.047258882
0.03395472
0.03395472
0.03395472
0.03395472
1

Higher
Level
Impact
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1

Risk
Assessment

Weighted
Assessment

25
41.1206133
75
41.1206133

2.546152275
4.187973724
6.094485818
2.664131654

41.1206133
75
51.40076662
50
75
75
64.25095828
64.25095828
51.40076662
75
50
50
75

2.122274368
2.303641382
2.345624578
2.098443074
1.877758101
1.444131488
3.393378236
2.262252157
1.809801726
2.640721887
2.362944109
2.362944109
3.544416164

25
50
51.40076662
75

0.848867993
1.697735985
1.745298623
2.546603978
52.89958143
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Table 6.6 Tanzania Railways Project - Project Level Risks
Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators)

Weight

Technology

1p=Problem with technology transfer and implementation
2p=Retention of technological advantage
3p=Possibility of contractual disputes
4p=Problems in dispute settlements due to country's laws
5p=Inadequate distribution of responsibilities/authorities/risk allocation
6p=Problems in contract conditions
7p=Capability and experience of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
8p=Shortage of skilled and unskilled workers
9p=Insolvency / default of subcontractor or operator or suppliers
10p=Delay/unavailability/unreliability of material supply
11p=Delay with design and regulatory approvals
12p=Complex/Defective design, error, and rework
13p=Change orders/variations
14p=Difficulties to meet construction programs
15p=Unforeseen adverse ground conditions
16p=Bad quality of materials
17p=Bad quality of workmanship
18p=Uncertainty regarding the quality required for maintenance
19p=Financial difficulties because of tax or capital movement restrictions
20p=Financial difficulties because of currency exchange rate
21p=Drop in project revenue
22p=Risk of non-payment/delayed-payment by public partner/Delay in annuity
23p=Tariff problems
24p=High costs of project operations
25p=Third party delays
26p=Safety/Security/Failure problems at project site
27p=Managerial Issues
28p=Organization/coordination/commitment risks between parties
29p=Weather or other natural disaster
30p=Physical damage to the project

0.090026437
0.090026437
0.028629828
0.028629828
0.028629828
0.019086552

Contracts
and
Legal Issues

Resources
Design

Quality
Financing

Construction
and
Cultural
Issues
Other

Sum

0.019086552
0.042444219
0.084888437
0.042444219
0.020738652
0.020738652
0.031107979
0.020738652
0.020738652
0.037913829
0.037913829
0.037913829
0.046989871
0.016965326
0.021571033
0.016965326
0.021571033
0.015137101
0.015137101
0.015137101
0.030274201
0.030274201
0.045520863
0.022760431
1

Higher
Level
Impact
2

2
2
2

2
2
1
1
1
1
2

1

Risk
Assessment

Weighted
Assessment

42.3196651
25
75
75
75
75

3.809888678
2.25066093
2.147237106
2.147237106
2.147237106
1.431491404

75
42.3196651
75
42.3196651
42.3196651
75
75
50
50
42.3196651
42.3196651
50
64.2509583
64.2509583
64.2509583
64.2509583
42.3196651
75
75
50
50
100
25

1.431491404
1.796225115
6.366632777
1.796225115
0.877652826
1.555398932
2.333098398
1.036932621
1.036932621
1.604500554
1.604500554
1.895691457
3.019144263
1.090038437
1.385959525
1.090038437
0.912878883
1.135282553
1.135282553
0.756855036
1.513710071
3.027420142
1.138021569

51.4007666

1.169903622
54.64356979
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Interactional Analysis for the Tanzania Railways Project
This section discusses the application of the Interactional Analysis framework to the ITR project.
First, interactional analysis is applied to a two-party scenario followed by its application to a
three-party interaction. Similar to the Indiana Toll Road project case study, scenario analysis was
performed for the Tanzania Railways Project to reach the possible scenarios. The following steps
were taken for scenario analysis:
Step 1: Identify scope
The scope of this risk analysis is to understand dynamic outcome of the chosen risk in the
Tanzania Railways project because of the actions taken by the parties to the risk.
Step 2: Identify factors affecting the outcome and rank them. The factors that affect the outcomes
are the risks that manifest in a PPP project. From ICRAM-PPP, a list of high risks was identified
and one risk was chosen to move forward with, i.e., negotiation due to labor problems (previously
discussed) and political problems (Parliament opposition).
Step 3: Identify driving forces that affect the factors (from step 2)
These actions can be divided into formal or informal actions where informal actions include
political/public/media pressures, threats of suing or contacting a party to negotiate. On the other
hand, formal actions include lawsuits, licensing challenges, legal actions and claims. In this risk,
possible actions for each party include:
Government: deny negotiation/renegotiation, accept negotiation/ renegotiation or take
over project.
Contractor: negotiate/renegotiate, take no action.
Step 4: Develop combinations of the driving forces that lead to scenarios
The driving forces (actions by each party) previously identified are used to create combinations of
different plausible sequences in order to create a scenario.
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Step 5: Create scenarios
The different scenarios created from step 5 are looked into in order to eliminate scenarios that are
not realistic. Tables 6.7 to 6.9 present the final list of scenarios. For each actor, there is an action,
A which is the informal/formal action they can take, and B, which is the inaction in that instance.
Table 6.7 List of scenarios for 2-party interactions between government and concessionaire-part 1
Concessionaire (C)

Ask for loan
OR Status Quo

Government (G)

Settle
OR Accept

Concessionaire (C)

Scenario

Renegotiate
OR Settle

Scenario A

Renegotiate
OR No further action

Scenario B

Table 6.8 List of scenarios for 2-party interactions between government and concessionaire-part 2
Concessionaire
(C)

Ask for loan
OR Status Quo

Government
(G)
Reject
OR Settle
Reject
OR Accept
negotiation

Concessionaire
(C)
Renegotiate
OR No further
action

Government
(G)
Accept
renegotiation
OR Take over

Scenario

Scenario C

Scenario D

Table 6.9 Scenario for 3-party interactions
Concessionaire
(C)

Government
(G)

Ask for loan
OR Status Quo

Settle–
OR Accept

Concessionaire
(C)
Renegotiate
OR Accept
Settlement

Parliament
(P)
Oppose
OR No
opposition

Government
(G)
Cancel project
OR Accept
renegotiation

Scenario

Scenario E

Two-Party Interactional Analysis
The first scenario is Scenario A from Table 6.7. This is a two-party analysis between the
government and concessionaire. Figure 6.1 shows the game theoretic diagram for this situation.
There are three levels of actions, starting with the concessionaire. In each level, there are two
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branches, a left branch that represents an action and a right branch, which represents no action.
Figure 6.1 is read as follows:
Concessionaire can ask the government for a loan (informal action) or maintain status
quo (no informal action). If the concessionaire takes the choice on the right branch,
decides on status quo, the game ends here; otherwise the government has the next
choice of action if the concessionaire chooses the left branch.
Government responds to concessionaire’s informal action where they can either settle
with the concessionaire (informal action) or give the concessionaire money by
accepting (no informal action). If the government takes the choice on the right
branch, gives the concessionaire the money, then the game ends. If the government
chooses the left branch and decides to settle, the concessionaire has the next choice of
action. The Government chooses between these two options depending on its stance
on which option maximizes their benefit. For example, they might consider length of
time needed to reach a resolution or possibility of union going on strike again or
public opposition.
In this final level, the concessionaire can either take a formal action, which is
renegotiating or no formal action, which is accepting the settlement offered. Again,
this depends on several factors as discussed in the previous section.
Under each choice, the payoff for each actor if the choice was taken is shown. A description of
the notations used is presented below:
Ua( b): utility of actor “a” under the request/benefit ( ) of actor “b”. An example is
the action taken by the government in Scenario A where once of its choices is to
accept the concessionaire’s request for a loan. This means that this action (accepting
the concessionaire’s request) is to the benefit of the concessionaire so the
government’s payoff is UG(

C

) (read as utility of government for the request of
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concessionaire) whereas the payoff for the concessionaire is UC(

C

) (read as utility of

concessionaire for the request of concessionaire). The maximum payoff an actor can
get is if the actor gets a utility for their request (Ua( a)), while the minimum payoff
an actor can get is a utility for the request of the opposing actor (Ua( b)).
a

a

: transaction cost for informal action taken by actor a

: transaction cost for formal action taken by actor a

Ps: probability of concessionaire winning settlement
Pc: probability of concessionaire winning renegotiation

Scenario A

Figure 6.1 2-Party Game between government and concessionaire - Scenario A
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As shown in Figure 5.17, the payoffs for each action are listed first for the concessionaire
followed by the government’s payoff. When an action is taken, the payoff is reduced by the cost
of this action. So when the concessionaire takes as informal action (request a loan), the cost
shows up under the second level, “accept” with

a

subtracted from the utility. This game is solved

using backward induction. Since there are two actions under each level and there are three levels,
there are a total of eight possibilities in this game. The solution is shown in Appendix C.
After the game is solved, a set of equations is extracted which provides criteria for the
eight possibilities under the game. When criteria are met under one of these eight possibilities, a
certain outcome is reached. Monte Carlo simulation is performed to get the probability of the
outcomes using Anylogic software. The parameters used are as follows:
UC(

G

), UG(

C

,

G

,

C

, UC(

C

),

G

), UG( )C, PC, and PS. The minimum possible value is zero and the maximum is

one. Values for the parameters that were chosen are shown in Table 6.10. For example, under low
informal cost, the value of

i

(informal cost for party i) would be 0 to 0.15.

Since exact numbers for the cost of informal or formal cost are unavailable, values were
chosen that depict the closest distribution for these costs. Changing these values would change
the results for some of the scenarios therefore it is important to try out different variations and
settling on the one that shows the closest version of the reality in a project.
The values for each of the parameters are shown and are kept constant throughout the two
sub-scenarios with the exception of one parameter that is changed. For example, under high
probability of winning renegotiation, PC, the probability of concessionaire winning renegotiation
is increased as shown in Table 6.10. Simulations are carried out for 1000 times.
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C
G
C

UC
UC
UG
UG
PC
PS

C
G
G
C

Table 6.10 Value of Parameters for Scenario A
Base Case
High Probability of
winning Renegotiation
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
Normal(0.15,0.25)
Normal(0.15,0.60)
Normal(0.15,0.35)
Normal(0.15,0.55)

Figure 6.2 Simulation results for Scenario A
Note: X-axis represents the range of payoffs, for example 0.1-0.2, out of a maximum payoff of 1.
Y-axis represents the count of how many times the range of payoffs was reached, for example,
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the payoffs received ranged from 0 to 0.1 for about 200 times (out of 1000 simulations) for the
Government (yellow) in the second scenario (high probability of concessionaire winning
renegotiation).
Table 6.10 shows the values of parameters used for this scenario. This game was
simulated for 1000 simulations and the results are shown in Figure 6.2. Simulation shows that
high probability of concessionaire winning renegotiation leads the concessionaire to try and take
it one step further by renegotiating. The Nash equilibrium is “renegotiate” for 26 of the
simulations under this case as compared to zero in the base case. Comparing payoffs for both
cases show that there are no visible changes between them. The only change is in the number of
times each of the four nodes is selected. In all scenarios, stopping at settlement is the Nash
equilibrium in the majority of the simulations.

Scenario B

Figure 6.3 2-Party Game between government and concessionaire - Scenario B
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Figure 6.3 shows the game between the government and concessionaire. The difference
between scenario A and B is that in scenario A the government offers a settlement at the second
level so in the final level the concessionaire can choose between stopping at settlement and
renegotiating. However, in scenario B the government rejects the concessionaire’s request for a
loan from the first action so the concessionaire can either accept that and stop or try to
renegotiate.

Figure 6.4 Simulation results for Scenario B
Figure 6.4 shows the result of the simulations for Scenario B. The same parameters from
scenario A (Table 6.7) were used for all scenarios in order to keep it consistent. It can be seen that
the concessionaire (the dark bars, in blue) gets a very low payoff for all simulations and that it
never exceeds the 0.1 to 0.2 payoff bracket (out of the maximum of 1). On the other hand, the
government (in yellow) receives a wider range of payoffs and sometimes receives very high
payoffs in the 0.9 to 1 payoff bracket. It can be seen that scenario B is better than scenario A for
the government since it has a higher chance of receiving higher payoffs but is worse for the
concessionaire since it has a higher chance for receiving lower payoffs.
Scenario C
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Figure 6.5 2-Party Game between government and concessionaire - Scenario C

Figure 6.5 is read as follows:
Concessionaire can ask the government for a loan (informal action) or maintain status
quo (no informal action). If the concessionaire takes the choice on the right branch,
decides on status quo, the game ends here; otherwise the government has the next
choice of action if the concessionaire chooses the left branch.
Government responds to concessionaire’s informal action where it can either reject
(informal action) or settle with the concessionaire (no informal action). If the
government takes the choice on the right branch, gives the concessionaire the money,
then the game ends. If the government chooses the left branch and decides to reject,
the concessionaire has the next choice of action.
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The concessionaire can either take a formal action, which is renegotiating or no
formal action, which is no further action.
The final level is the government’s choice where it can either accept renegotiation
(formal action) or take over the project.

Figure 6.6 Simulation results for Scenario C
Figure 6.6 shows the result of the simulations for Scenario C. It can be seen that the
concessionaire (in blue) gets a very low payoff for all simulations and that it never exceeds the 0
to 0.1 payoff bracket (out of the maximum of 1). On the other hand, the government (in yellow)
receives a wider range of payoffs and sometimes receives very high payoffs in the 0.9 to 1 payoff
bracket. This scenario is good for the government since it has a higher chance of getting a high
payoff but is bad for the concessionaire.
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Scenario D

Figure 6.7 2-Party Game between government and concessionaire - Scenario D

The difference between scenario C and D is that in scenario D, under the second level,
the government can accept the concessionaire’s request for a loan but try to negotiate the amount
instead of settling to the amount they specified (as in scenario C) as shown in Figure 6.7.

156

Figure 6.8 Simulation results for Scenario D
Figure 6.8 shows the result of the simulations for Scenario D. It can be seen that the
concessionaire (in blue) gets a very low payoff for all simulations and that it never exceeds the 0
to 0.1 payoff bracket (out of the maximum of 1). On the other hand, the government (in yellow)
receives a wider range of payoffs and sometimes receives very high payoffs in the 0.9 to 1 payoff
bracket. This scenario is similar to scenario C and is good for the government as well but worse
for the concessionaire.

Three-Party Interactional Analysis
The previous section described interactional analysis for two parties in the Tanzania Railway
Project. It showed possible scenarios for how a negotiation setting can unfold and the possible
outcomes along with the payoffs received by each party. This proposed methodology aims to
present the interactions between the rational parties in a game setting to show how each of them
can possibly act and how this choice will affect their payoff. The aim is to find the best course of
action or strategy to take in order to reach their objective. For example, when one party is faced
with a choice of whether to demand a negotiation to get more money or not (as an opportunistic
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behavior to maximize their benefit), what would be their best option? And if they do decide to
negotiate, would the best option for their opposing party be agreeing to negotiate and changing
the financial terms of the contract or to put a stop to this notion/behavior to avoid recurrence in
the future? These questions can be answered by transforming these questions to scenarios and
extracting payoff equations to model the payoffs received based on taking certain actions. After
that simulations can be conducted to extract patterns of when the highest and lowest payoffs are
received. This will show each party their best strategy in order to maximize profit and minimize
losses.
Scenario E

Figure 6.9 3-Party Game - Scenario E
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Figure 6.9 shows the game theoretic framework for the three-party interaction. The three
parties involved are: concessionaire, government and parliament. In this case study, the
government represents the contractual entity that signed the PPP contract with the concessionaire
and the Parliament represents the legislative entity in Tanzania. There are five levels of actions,
starting with the concessionaire. In each level, there are two branches, one left branch that
represents an action and a right branch, which represents no action. The logic in the diagram is
read as follows:
Concessionaire can ask for a loan from the government (informal action) or maintain
status quo (no informal action). If the concessionaire takes the choice on the right
branch, decides on status quo, the game ends here; otherwise the government has the
next choice of action if the concessionaire chooses the left branch.
Government responds to the concessionaire’s informal action where it can either try
to settle with the concessionaire (informal action) or accept and give the
concessionaire money (no informal action). If the government takes the choice on the
right branch, gives the concessionaire money, then the game ends. If the government
chooses the left branch and tries to settle, the concessionaire has the next choice of
action.
Concessionaire here can either try to renegotiate or accept the government’s
settlement. If the concessionaire takes the choice on the right branch and settles, the
game ends here; otherwise the parliament has the next choice of action if the
concessionaire chooses the left branch.
Parliament can choose between opposing this decision and the concessionaire (left
branch) or not opposing (right branch). In this case the Parliament had opposed the
concessionaire for various reasons such as lower level of service than before
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concession and its attempts to secure money from the government post contract
signing.
In this final level, the government has two choices to decide between. The first is
taking a formal action against the concessionaire by canceling the project and taking
over from the concessionaire. The second choice is not taking a formal action and
accepting to renegotiate with the concessionaire (instead of ending their contract
which was the first option).

C
G
P
C
G

UC
UC
UC
UG
UG
UG
UP
UP
UP
PS
PC

C
G
P
G
C
P
P
C
G

Table 6.11 Value of Parameters for Scenario E
Base Case
High Probability of
winning Settlement
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
0
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
Uniform(0.5, 0.75)
Uniform(0.5, 0.75)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Normal(0.15,0.35)
Normal(0.15,0.60)
Normal(0.15,0.35)
Normal(0.15,0.35)
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Figure 6.10 Simulation results for Scenario E
Table 6.11 shows the values of parameters used for this scenario. The results of the 1000
simulations are shown in Figure 6.10. Simulation shows that high probability of winning
settlement for the concessionaire leads the concessionaire to try and take it one step further by
renegotiating. However, this tactic causes it to be more likely to get a lower payoff. In this case,
there is a shift of payoff to the left (lower payoff) for the concessionaire while there is a shift of
payoff to the right (higher payoff) for the government and parliament. In all scenarios, settlement
is the Nash equilibrium in the majority of the simulations.
According to Shlyk (2009), the actual result of the negotiation ended in the
concessionaire pulling out its staff and the Government of Tanzania taking over the project.
However, according to the model and simulation results (Figure 6.10), the optimum outcome
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(Nash equilibrium) in this case should have been settlement. The Government of Tanzania should
have sought a way to settle with the concessionaire and have them continue operating the
railways instead of the result, which was the disintegration of the PPP project.

Discussion of the Tanzania Railways Project Case Study
This section discussed the Tanzania Railway project and the problems it faced between the
government, parliament and concessionaire. It presented a three-party negotiation scenario where
each party has its own actions and payoffs. Tables 6.11 to 6.13 present the expected payoffs for
all scenarios for the actors involved. The expected payoff is calculated as the summation of
expected payoffs for the game (average for the range multiplied by number of times it occurs in
the game). Comparing the scenarios between concessionaire and government with three levels
(Scenarios A and B, shown in Table 6.7), Scenario A produces better payoffs for the
concessionaire while scenario B provides better payoffs for the government.
Tables 6.12 and 6.13 present the expected payoffs for the concessionaire and government
for games with four levels of action. The games in Table 5.32 have very close payoffs and are
always high for the government and low for the concessionaire. The best two-party scenario
that produces the highest payoffs for the concessionaire is scenario A and for the government
is scenario C closely followed by scenario D.
Finally, Table 6.14 presents the expected payoffs for the three-party game. The
concessionaire has the highest expected payoff followed by the parliament and then
government.
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Table 6.12 Expected Payoffs for each scenario (Concessionaire Vs. Government)
Concessionaire (C)

Government (G)

Settle –
OR Accept

Ask for loan
OR Status Quo

Concessionaire (C)

Scenario

Expected
Payoff

Renegotiate –
OR Settle

Scenario A

C: 496.1
G: 234

Renegotiate –
OR No further action

Scenario B

C: 54.4
G: 803.1

Table 6.13 Expected Payoffs for each scenario (Concessionaire Vs. Government)
Concessionaire (C)

Ask for loan
OR Status Quo

Government (G)
Reject
OR Settle
Reject
OR Accept negotiation

Concessionaire (C)

Government (G)

Renegotiate
OR No further action

Accept renegotiation
OR Take over

Scenario

Expected
Payoff

Scenario C

C: 50
G: 870.5

Scenario D

C: 50.2
G: 867.5

Table 6.14 Expected Payoffs for each scenario (Concessionaire Vs. Government Vs. Parliament)
Concessionaire (C)
Ask for loan
OR Status Quo

Government
(G)
Settle
OR Accept

Concessionaire
(C)
Renegotiate
OR Accept
Settlement

Parliament (P)
Oppose
OR No
opposition

Government
(G)
Cancel project
OR Accept
renegotiation

Scenario

Scenario E

Expected
Payoff
C: 496.7
G: 228.75
P: 301.2

163

163
Tables 6.12 to 6.14 show some reasons why parties negotiate. This section describes
a technique aimed at showing a renegotiation scenario triggered by the concessionaire and
two possible strategies it can use. Using this technique the concessionaire can evaluate the
outcomes for the renegotiation and if it is better to negotiate only one time or negotiate
multiple times. In case the concessionaire chooses multiple negotiations, it has two strategies:
act aggressively and ask for a high amount of subsidy from the beginning or act unaggressive
and ask for a smaller subsidy in the beginning and then request another subsidy later. In the
first strategy (aggressive), the concessionaire’s chances of winning the renegotiation are
lower since the government will more likely oppose giving them a high subsidy.
As discussed in previous sections, renegotiation has faced (and still faces) a large number of
PPP projects. These renegotiations can cause imbalance in the project and change the
dynamics between the parties. Opportunistic behavior by one party can cause the other party
to reconsider their tactics in order to defend this ‘attack’ on the contract. In a number of
projects (discussed in the literature review) the concessionaire has launched a series of
renegotiations of the contract either due to changes in the current conditions or opportunistic
behavior.
In case of multiple contract renegotiations, the concessionaire usually has two
strategies, the first is to start the first renegotiation aggressively and ask for a large subsidy
from the government to guarantee maximum gain, however, their success rate could be very
low depending on the government responsiveness. The second strategy is to start less
aggressively and ask for a small subsidy from the government as a way to get the government
to accept smaller amounts first and then ask for more money later or only ask for smaller
sums more frequently. In order to visualize these two strategies, an example was created
based on a scenario between the government and concessionaire. Figure 6.12 shows the
sequence where a concessionaire requests a negotiation followed by government response and
finally concessionaire renegotiating (or stopping at one renegotiation).
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Figure 6.12 Renegotiation Scenario
As previously mentioned, there are two strategies for the concessionaire: behave
aggressively or not aggressively. These two strategies can be depicted by changing the value
of the parameters in the simulation model. Table 6.15 shows the parameter values used for
both strategies. In order to show the two strategies, assumptions were made about the
parameters. For the first strategy (aggressive), it was assumed that the concessionaire would
start by requesting a large subsidy in the first negotiation then request a smaller amount in the
second one. The payoffs received from the first negotiation were given a high value with a
low percentage of winning this negotiation since the government will more likely reject a
request for a high subsidy. The second negotiation was given a lower payoff and a higher
percentage of winning the negotiation since the government will be more likely to accept a
request for a lower subsidy.
On the other hand, for the unaggressive strategy, the concessionaire was assumed to
start small and then move onto requests for a larger subsidy. Therefore, their payoff from the
first negotiation was given a lower value than the second. The percentage of winning the
negotiation was assumed to be higher in the negotiation since the government will be less
likely to grant them a second subsidy as compared to the first time. These assumptions
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present a renegotiation situation, which can be tailored depending on the parties’ risk aversion
and previous history.
Table 6.15 Value of Parameters for Renegotiation Scenario
C
G
C

(UC
(UC
UC
UG
UG
PC1
PC2

C
C
G
G
C

)1
)2

Aggressive Strategy

Unaggressive Strategy

Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
Uniform(0.75-1)
Uniform(0.5-0.75)
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
Normal(0.05,0.15)
Normal(0.15,0.25)

Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0-0.15)
Uniform(0.15-0.25)
Uniform(0.5-0.6)
Uniform(0.5-0.6)
0
Uniform(0.75-1)
0
Normal(0.25,0.30)
Normal(0.05,0.15)

Figure 6.13 Results of Aggressive Renegotiation Strategy by Concessionaire
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Figure 6.14 Results of Unaggressive Renegotiation Strategy by Concessionaire
Figures 6.13 and 6.14 show the simulation results for the two strategies. Comparison
between both of them shows a higher value of payoffs for the government in the aggressive
case and for the concessionaire in the unaggressive case. This can be due to the fact that the
government is more likely to reject the concessionaire’s aggressive approaches thus getting a
higher payoff for themself (and a lower for the concessionaire). This result encourages the
concessionaire to choose an unaggressive strategy to renegotiation. Under this scenario, the
concessionaire as a decision-maker should choose the option that gives them the highest
payoff, which is the unaggressive strategy. From the simulation, the government can identify
which strategy gives them the highest payoff and how they should react to the
concessionaire’s request.
Summary
This chapter discussed renegotiations, specifically in PPP projects and the causes behind its
occurrence. It showed examples of case studies where PPP projects were renegotiated and
some of the adverse effects that resulted such as government taking over the project.
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Interactional analysis was proposed to understand and assess potential outcomes of a
renegotiation scenario.
PPP projects are a complex venture (as compared to traditional delivery) due to the longer
contractual duration, the effect of public opinion on introducing a private party to a
government-owned

project

and

unique

risks

that

manifest

due

to

operational/financial/management issues. Interactional analysis was shown to be useful in
portraying and assessing such situations of negotiation as shown in the Tanzania Railway
Project. The negotiation scenarios can be seen in two ways, as a two party interactional
analysis game or a three party interactional analysis game. Both games represent how a reallife negotiation occurs between the parties involved. Five scenarios were created to show
these possible games that were then simulated. The result was a prediction of the payoffs to
be received by each party for the different sets of actions in a scenario. These payoffs were
utilized to propose strategies for the parties. Interactional analysis can also be applied to
assess whether it benefits a party to negotiate early on in the project and seek multiple
negotiations throughout the remaining duration.
The decision tool proposed in this dissertation can be used by any party to the project
such as the owner, concessionaire or financiers. It can be used at any stage, before a project
starts or throughout its different phases. It can be used for any PPP project and risk scenario
after following the steps in the decision tool description to modify the tool for the
project/scenario. The following steps were taken in the case study to reach the final outcome
of the research through the decision tool.
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1.

2.
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3.

4.

170
5.

6.

This chapter showcased the research methodology through applying two case studies: the
Indiana Toll Road and Tanzania railway projects. First, ICRAM-PPP was applied and
discussed to show how the risks can be assessed. Next, thresholds were chosen and high risks
were obtained. One of these high risks was chosen for further analysis. Using scenario
analysis, seven scenarios were created for the risk (three two-party scenarios and four threeparty scenarios). Using game theoretic concepts, the scenarios were converted into games and
solved to create equations. Simulations were performed to analyze the differences in payoffs
obtained from changing the parameters. Finally, tables were created to tabulate the best
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scenarios for each actor and extract their best strategies. The following chapter presents the
research conclusions and recommendations.
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7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Research Summary
The objective of this research was to provide a guideline for risk analysis, planning and
mitigation. This is performed through a unique twofold approach. The first part is to identify
the risks and the second is to apply interactional analysis to a specific risk.
Risks were collected using a systematic literature review approach to identify all risks
form literature and case studies and use them to modify ICRAM-1 and create ICRAM-PPP. A
quantification of the level of risk is obtained through ICRAM-PPP, which can be performed
by any actor in a project such as the government, private company or financier. A comparison
of each actor’s outlook on the level of risk can be compared. This can be added to a project’s
risk plan in order to understand the different outlooks of the actors involved and avoid
problems caused from these differences.
A Delphi approach was used to validate the risks in ICRAM-PPP and to map out the
phases that each risk occurs in, affects or occurs in and affects. Experts were targeted who are
involved in the public-private-partnership arena either in academia or industry or both.
The diagram below shows the detailed steps required for these two parts. First, ICRAMPPP is used to quantify risks in a project though AHP and pairwise comparison. ICRAM-PPP
consists of three levels; macro, market and project with sublevels and risks under each.
Prioritization is performed for all levels and risks and an assessment for each risk is given by
the expert and a final weighted assessment is calculated. The details of these calculations are
shown in Appendix B. Next, a threshold is chosen for risks in order to identify high risks.
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This risk is then used to perform scenario analysis on and create scenarios of how this
risk can pan out. Different scenarios are created, starting with two-party scenarios and then
increasing the complexity to three-party scenarios and a table of scenarios is filled in. Using
interactional analysis, the scenarios are transformed into a game and equations created for it
then solved. Simulations can then be performed using Anylogic software for the scenarios in
order to find the differences from varying the parameters and finding the best scenarios for
each actor. Finally, based on the analysis, plans can be created for the risk using the results of
the scenarios. Studying the opponent’s best strategy can help each actor in determining their
opponent’s next move and what the actor’s best response should be. Nash equilibrium,
payoffs per actor and distribution of payoffs for each scenario are studied to create these
mitigation plans to avoid incurring high transaction cost and maximizing payoffs.

Analyze and quantify risks (ICRAM-PPP)
Choose high risks
Scenario Planning for a risk
Create a Table of actions/scenarios for 2-party and 3-party
analysis
Using Interactional Analysis, solve these scenarios
Simulate the scenarios using Anylogic
Propose mitigation strategies

7.2 Research Limitations
This research introduced the concept of interactional analysis of three-parties to a risk through
the use of quantitative methods to analyze risks and game theoretic concepts to understand
interactions between parties and their effect on the risk outcome and payoffs.

174
ICRAM-PPP was developed based on ICRAM-1, which is based on AHP and pairwise
comparison. In order to make it more robust, fuzzy concepts can be integrated. Global metrics
can also be created to enhance its robustness and streamline the process since experts will
only have to plug in numbers that are readily available.
Complexity in this study was shown by starting with a simple two-party interaction and
then increasing the complexity to a three-party interaction. Increasing the number of players
increases the number of strategies in a game, number of possible scenarios and outcomes and
also payoffs. Increasing the number of steps/levels in a game from three to four steps doubles
the number of possible solutions to a game from eight to sixteen. Some conditions had to be
assumed in order to perform these calculations such as the assumption of rationality of actors.
This can be addressed by integrating behavioral psychology into the game to account for the
behavior of actors.
More projects can be studied in order to extract patterns of actions that maximize player
payoffs and eliminate or mitigate the risks.
7.3 Contribution
The following are the main contributions from this research:
Comprehensive risk registry for PPP projects: the three levels in ICRAM-PPP
represent all possible risks that could affect a PPP project, starting from a wider
approach, looking at macro risks and ending at a narrow outlook on the project itself.
Quantification of risks among 3 hierarchic levels: quantification of risks is important
because it provides a method to identify risks that are of higher importance that need
to be closely monitored. It also shows the level of risks for each actor and provides a
platform for comparison between the opinions of different actors once each one
applies ICRAM-PPP from their perspective.
Scenario planning for risk analysis: a structured approach to study how a risk unfolds
and the role actors play through their interactions to mitigate or exacerbate the risk.
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Interactional analysis for complex 3-party risk scenarios: provides a quantitative
method of looking into how interactions between actors impact each actor’s payoffs
and impact the risk itself.
Analysis of multiple scenarios to a situation and proposing strategies: a holistic
approach for risks is needed to address all possible views. Different scenarios are
created using different possible actions of each actor and these scenarios are analyzed
using game theory and simulated as well.
Application of the decision tool to two case studies: a real-life case study, the Indiana
Toll Road and another case study, the Tanzania Railway project.
7.4 Recommendations for Future Research
The following are recommendations for future research that the author intends to work on:
Creation/inclusion of global metrics/indicators for ICRAM-PPP
Apply IA to various case studies and extract patterns of actions/outcomes
Adding behavioral and psychological ideas into the interactional analysis to capture
the behavior of actors
Create a database of risk scenarios, outcomes and strategies
Expanding 3-party interactional analysis to n-party
Exploring IA beyond PPP projects, into other delivery modes
Expanding IA study to other three-person situations, especially to interdisciplinary
studies
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Appendix B
ICRAM-PPP Calculations
In this section, ICRAM-PPP for the market level (filled in by the concessionaire) is discussed
to show how the model works. The same calculations apply for the macro and project levels.
ICRAM-PPP is based on ICRAM-1 by Hastak and Shaked (2000), which was intended for
use for international construction projects. Risks pertaining to PPP projects were added to
create ICRAM-PPP and some modifications were made to the calculation process as will be
discussed. Using AHP, weighted assessments of risks are obtained for all levels in order to
provide a platform to prioritize risks. Next, pairwise comparison is used for risks that are
affected by higher levels (market risks affected by macro level or project risks affected by
macro/market levels) in order to prioritize how much they are affected by the higher levels.
First, the AHP process is discussed below.

The steps taken for the AHP are as follows (Hastak 1994):
1. Comparison matrices are created
a. Comparison of levels of risks
b. Comparison of sublevels of risks
c. Comparison of risks under each level/sub-level
2. Priority vectors are created, consistency of matrix is checked and weighted priority
vectors are calculated

The first step is the comparison between risks by choosing from the dropdown menu from
one of the following 5 choices in the risk comparison:
Much more important: (risk shown in the left column is much more important than
risk shown in the top row)
More important
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Same importance
Less important
Much less important
For example, Technology level is less important than Contracts and Legal issues level as
shown below. Every two risks are compared and the result is a table that shows comparison
for all risks/risk levels.

These choices are then converted to numbers as shown below:
Much more important: 1.5 (risk shown in the left column is 1.5 times more important
than risk shown in the top row)
More important: 1.25
Same importance: 1
Less important: 1/1.25
Much less important: 1/1.5

The results are shown below after converting the choices to numbers. Technology level is
1.25 times more important than Design level.
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The user inputs the grey boxes while the white boxes are calculated as their reciprocal. Below
the input for the market level risks are shown.
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Next, the risks impacted by the higher (macro) level are identified:
Criteria
Technology
Contracts
and Legal
Req.

MARKET Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators)
1 Investor’s technological advantage
2 Availability of basic construction technologies and equipment
3 Type of partnership
4 Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract
5 Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of
many agencies, delay in granting approvals)
6 Availability and quality of local resources

Impacted
by Macro
x
x

7 Availability of construction material
Resources

Financing

Business
Cultural
Differences
Market
Potential

8 Availability of skilled and unskilled labor
9 Labor cost/productivity
10 Availability of equipment and parts
11 Availability of financing
12 Tax and non tax incentives
13 Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate
14 Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability
15 Interaction of foreign management
16 A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship
17 Risk management practices of parties involved
18 Current market volume in core competency
19 Future market industry volume
20 Bidding volume index resulting in competition
21 Stability of associated industries

x

Using pairwise comparison, these three risks (risk #2, #4 and #11) are compared to each other
using the same scale as previously mentioned and shown in the table below (1.5 for much more
important to 1/1.5 for much less important).
Scale used for the pairwise comparison
Level of Impact
Numerical
Much more importance
1.5
More importance
1.25
Same importance
1
Less importance
1/1.25
Much less importance
1/1.5
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The first activity (risk #2) on the list is the first benchmark (value is 1) for the second activity
(risk #4). So the second activity is compared to the first and given a value from 1.5 to 1/1.5
depending on its value compared to the previous activity. For example, if risk #4 is more
important than #2, then it is given a comparison value of 1.25 which is then multiplied by the
value of #2 to get its final value: 1*1.25=1.25. Similarly, risk #11 is compared to risk #4. For
example, if risk #11 is much more important than risk #4, the value given for the comparison is
1.5 and activity 11’s final value is: 1.25*1.5=1.875.
After the comparisons are filled in, relative importance of the criteria (priority vector) is
calculated using the method established by Thomas L. Saaty for calculating Eigen vectors.
Normalizing the values in the columns produces the priority vectors as shown below. Values in
the consistency matrix are calculated by multiplying the row priority vector by the comparison
value in each cell. The consistency ratio is then calculated to ensure that it is below 0.10 (Hastak
and Shaked 2000). The diagram below shows a snapshot of the calculations for the first level
under the market level.
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For the second step, a rating of the magnitude/effect/impact of the risk is inputted under the
“Impact” column. The choices are:
0: Extremely Low probability and impact
25: Low probability and impact
50: Medium probability and impact
75: High probability and impact
100: Extremely High probability and impact
The table below shows the inputted impacts for the market level risks by the concessionaire.
Criteria
Technology
Contracts
and Legal
Req.

Resources

Financing

Business
Cultural
Differences
Market
Potential

MARKET Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators)

Impact

1 Investor’s technological advantage
2 Availability of basic construction technologies and equipment
3 Type of partnership

25
0
25

4 Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract
5 Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of many
agencies, delay in granting approvals)
6 Availability and quality of local resources
7 Availability of construction material
8 Availability of skilled and unskilled labor
9 Labor cost/productivity
10 Availability of equipment and parts

0

11 Availability of financing
12 Tax and non tax incentives
13 Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate
14 Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability
15 Interaction of foreign management
16 A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship
17 Risk management practices of parties involved
18 Current market volume in core competency
19 Future market industry volume
20 Bidding volume index resulting in competition
21 Stability of associated industries

0
25
0
25
25
0
25
0
0
25
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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The figure below shows the final results of the calculations. On the left, the levels are shown with
their weights as well. Under each level, there are risks that are shown with their weight, whether
they are impacted by the macro level, assessment (impact as given by user) and finally the
weighted assessment, which is calculated by multiplying the weight and the assessment. The sum
of all weighted assessments for the market level is shown to be 13.23. This value can be
compared to the values for macro and project risks in order to establish which level has the
highest level of risk. It can also be compared to the value obtained from the input of other parties
in order to compare their outlook on the severity of risks.
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Appendix C

Sample solution for Interactional Analysis Scenarios

This appendix presents the solution for Interactional Analysis Scenario C from the
Indiana Toll Road Case Study.
Backward induction is used to calculate the equations for equilibrium starting
from the lowest level. Since there are four levels and two options under each level, there
is a total of sixteen paths/solutions available for this game. The game is solved as shown
below starting from the last level (level 4) to the first level (level 1) in order to reach all
possible solutions. The number of possible paths increases as we go form level 4 to level
1 since there are two options under each level.
Level 4:
Contractor chooses “Negotiation” if its payoff is higher than “Litigation”, if:
C

(PL - PN) [UC C - UC i]

Level 3:
There are two possible paths under this level (i and ii) depending on whether the
contractor chose “Negotiation” or “Litigation” in the previous level (level 4).
i- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Settlement” if its payoff is
higher than “Negotiation”, if:
i

(1 - PN) [Ui i - Ui C]

ii- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Settlement” if its payoff is
higher than “Litigation”, if:
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i

(1 – PL) [Ui i - Ui C]

Level 2:
There are four choices possible paths under this level (i to iv) depending on two things: a)
whether the contractor chose “Negotiation” or “Litigation” in the previous level (level 4),
and b) whether IFA chose “Settlement”, or the other option (highest between
“Negotiation” or “Litigation”, which was the contractor’s choice in level 4).
i- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Settlement”, Contractor
chooses “Plan Modification” if its payoff is higher than “Settlement”, if:
C

UC C - UC i

ii- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Negotiation”, Contractor
chooses “Plan Modification” if its payoff is higher than “Negotiation”, if:
C+ C

PN [UC C - UC i]

iii- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Settlement”, Contractor
chooses “Plan Modification” if its payoff is higher than “Settlement”, if:
C

UC C - UC i

iv- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Litigation”, Contractor chooses
“Plan Modification” if its payoff is higher than “Litigation”, if:
C+ C

PL [UC C - UC i]

Level 1:
There are eight choices possible paths under this level (i to viii).
i- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Settlement”, Contractor
chooses “Plan Modification”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Plan
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Modification”, if:
i

Ui i - Ui C

ii- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Settlement”, Contractor
chooses “Settlement”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Settlement”,
if:
i

0

iii- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Negotiation”, Contractor
chooses “Plan Modification”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Plan
Modification”, if:
i

Ui i - Ui C

iv- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Negotiation”, Contractor
chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than
“Negotiation”, if:
i+ i

(1 - PN) [Ui i – Ui C]

v- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Settlement”, Contractor chooses
“Plan Modification”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Plan
Modification”, if:
i

Ui i - Ui C

vi- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Settlement”, Contractor chooses
“Settlement”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Settlement”, if:
i

0

vii- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Litigation”, Contractor chooses
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“Plan Modification”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Settlement”,
if:
i

Ui i - Ui C

viii- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Litigation”, Contractor
chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Litigation”,
if:
i+ i

(1 – PL) [Ui i – Ui C]

All these combinations are transformed into the sixteen possible solutions/paths to write
the simulation code for the Anylogic software. Results of the simulation for this scenario
are shown in Chapter 5.
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